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1.1 Background and motivation
The choice of a monetary policy strategy has been an important topic in
economic research and central banks’ policy making. According to Houben
(1999) and Walsh (2004), a monetary policy strategy is a complex frame-
work, which identifies objectives, an information structure and targets used
by central banks to achieve the ultimate goals of monetary policy. The stra-
tegy guides a central bank in selecting and using monetary policy instru-
ments in order to achieve price stability and other macroeconomic object-
ives.
Countries choose different monetary policy strategies depending on their
characteristics and pursued policy objectives. Mishkin (1999) and Stone and
Bhundia (2004) distinguish five main types of monetary policy strategies:
three strategies with one explicit target, a strategy with multiple targets, and
a strategy without an explicit nominal target. A country can adopt only one
type of monetary policy strategy at a time.
Monetary strategies with one explicit target include inflation targeting,
monetary targeting and exchange rate targeting.1 Inflation targeting requires
1 The literature distinguishes also nominal income targeting and price-level targeting. The
first one remains a theoretical concept as it has not been tried in practice (Mishkin, 1999).
While some studies (Bernanke et al., 1999; Svensson, 1999) claim that price-level targeting
was applied in Sweden in the 1930s, others (Rathke et al., 2011) argue that the Riksbank re-
jected the idea to target the price level. This strategy has not been used by any other country.
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a public announcement by central banks of numerical targets for inflation
and a strong commitment to these targets. Monetary targeting involves set-
ting medium-term targets for the growth rates of monetary aggregates. Ex-
change rate targeting is based on fixing the exchange rate of the domestic
currency to that of a large, low-inflation country, and applying monetary
policy instruments to keep the exchange rate at a fixed level or to keep its
movements within a fixed band. Finally, some central banks conduct mone-
tary policy with more than one explicit target (e.g., the multiple indicators
approach in India (Patra and Kapur, 2012)) or without an explicit anchor
(e.g., the ’two perspectives approach’ in Japan, the two-pillar framework of
the ECB, and the eclectic strategy of the Federal Reserve System (Cuaresma
and Gnan, 2008)).
In recent decades, many countries changed their monetary policy strate-
gies. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of monetary strategies for 135 countries
over the 1975–2012 period. Several important trends can be discerned. First,
after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system many countries abandoned
fixed exchange rates in favor of floating exchange rate regimes. This led to
a decline in the share of countries having a fixed exchange rate regime from
over 90% in 1975 to about 50% in 2012 (mostly emerging and developing
countries). Second, the popularity of monetary targeting dropped over time;
it disappeared completely in advanced countries by the late 1990s. Still, sev-
eral emerging and developing countries are implementing this strategy at
present. Third, an increasing number of countries have adopted inflation
targeting in the last two decades. Finally, many countries switched to mo-
netary strategies with no explicit anchor or with an implicit price stability
anchor. Such strategies may be attractive because they allow for more flex-
ibility and imply less commitment in monetary policy conduct.
Central banks can choose from a wide variety of monetary policy stra-
tegies. Given that countries do not maintain one strategy at all times but
switch from one type of monetary strategy to another, one may wonder
what makes countries prefer one particular strategy over the other, i.e. what
drives their choice of a monetary policy strategy.
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Figure 1.1. Evolution of monetary policy strategies, 1975–2012
Source: Own classification based on Fata´s et al. (2004), Stone and Bhundia (2004), Ilzetzki
et al. (2011), IMF Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER), and central banks’ publications.
The academic literature provides different perspectives on the choice of
a monetary strategy. Many studies recommend inflation targeting in ad-
vanced and emerging countries (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Roger,
2009). Others (Fata´s et al., 2004) suggest exchange rate targeting for develop-
ing countries. Monetary targeting, which has been commonly criticized, was
quite successful in countries such as Germany and Switzerland and is still
applied in several developing countries. Thus, there does not seem to be one
monetary strategy, applicable at all times. Countries select a strategy which
they believe to be the best option under given circumstances. Therefore, to
understand why countries adopt or abandon a particular monetary strategy,
it is important to examine the potential factors driving this decision.
According to Houben (1999), Truman (2003), and Fata´s et al. (2004), the
choice of an appropriate monetary policy strategy depends on the nature
of shocks that affect the economy, its structural, fiscal, monetary, and finan-
cial characteristics, exchange rate arrangements as well as its institutional
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framework. In addition, prioritization of macroeconomic objectives and the
political environment may play a role.
Only a few empirical studies have examined the factors leading to ad-
option or abandonment of a particular strategy. The only exception is ex-
change rate targeting, which has been analyzed extensively in the literat-
ure. As monetary targeting and inflation targeting are, next to exchange rate
targeting, the two most important monetary policy strategies practiced by
modern central banks, this thesis concentrates on them.
Previous research on monetary targeting (see Chapter 2) mainly explores
the conditions required to adopt this strategy. However, there is no empirical
study so far that examines why countries abandon monetary targeting. Al-
though at present no advanced country uses monetary targeting in its pure
form, the research on monetary targeting abandonment remains important
for those emerging and developing countries that apply this strategy but
may decide to give it up in the near future.
In recent research, special attention has been given to the analysis of the
performance of inflation targeting countries as well as the factors that led
countries to adopt this strategy (see Chapters 3 and 6 for literature reviews).
Although there are several studies on this topic, they did not reach a con-
sensus on what factors influence inflation targeting adoption and whether
this strategy indeed helps to reduce inflation.
The existing literature on the adoption of inflation targeting has several
limitations. First, previous studies examine general macroeconomic indic-
ators only and ignore financial system characteristics as possible drivers of
inflation targeting adoption. The financial aspect is significant for this ana-
lysis, since the financial system plays an important intermediary role bet-
ween the actions of a central bank and their impact on the real economy.
Thus, financial system characteristics could also influence the choice of mo-
netary policy strategies.
Second, previous studies use an incorrect methodological approach by
retaining the observations before and after the adoption of inflation target-
ing in the analyzed sample. Thereby they do not differentiate between the
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factors of inflation targeting adoption and the factors driving its continu-
ation; consequently, they simultaneously estimate both. This may lead to
biased results due to endogeneity problems.
Finally, the methodology used in existing studies applies ordinary bin-
ary response models and ignores the existence of spatial interdependence
between countries in a monetary strategy choice. A spatial approach in mo-
netary policy has been used mainly for the analysis of interregional depend-
ence (e.g., Di Giacinto, 2003). However, few studies analyze spatial depend-
ence between countries, especially in the context of the choice of a mone-
tary strategy. Applying a spatial approach to the analysis of inflation tar-
geting can explain how the adoption of inflation targeting by one country
is affected by the monetary strategy choice of other countries. To the best
of our knowledge, only Mukherjee and Singer (2008) examine spatial in-
teractions between inflation targeting countries; however, these authors do
not take into account that countries that already adopted inflation targeting
may have a different impact than those that have not yet adopted it. Dis-
entangling these two effects is relevant when countries adopt a strategy at
different moments in time.
This thesis contributes to the literature by extending the analysis of mo-
netary policy strategies and dealing with the above limitations in the follow-
ing ways. First, we examine two monetary policy strategies, namely mone-
tary targeting and inflation targeting. Second, we include a wide range of
macroeconomic, fiscal, external, financial, and institutional factors that may
influence the decision to abandon monetary targeting or to adopt inflation
targeting. Third, we modify the methodological approach to inflation tar-
geting adoption by leaving out the observations after adoption. This is an
innovative approach that has not been used before in this line of research.
Fourth, we use spatial econometrics techniques to examine spatial interac-
tions between countries in inflation targeting adoption. The methodological
innovation is in constructing a spatial probit model with two spatial vari-
ables that takes into account that countries adopt inflation targeting at dif-
ferent moments in time. The spatial analysis provides insights into under-
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standing the interdependence between countries and coordination of central
banks in the context of a monetary strategy choice. Finally, the thesis adds to
the academic debate on inflation targeting by conducting a comprehensive
robustness analysis of the effects of inflation targeting on inflation.
This research brings new insights into understanding the relations bet-
ween monetary policy, the financial system, and the real economy. It has an
important practical application for central banks’ decision making and the
construction of an appropriate monetary strategy framework.
1.2 Research questions
The overarching research question that motivates the research conducted in
this thesis is: what drives countries’ choice to adopt/abandon a particular
monetary policy strategy? To answer this general question, we specifically
examine the following four research questions:
1. Do financial system changes affect the decision to abandon money
growth targeting?
2. Which factors lead to inflation targeting adoption?
3. How do spatial interactions between countries influence the decision
to adopt inflation targeting?
4. Does inflation targeting have an impact on inflation and does this im-
pact differ across countries?
Answering these research questions will increase our knowledge of the
factors influencing the choice of both monetary strategies. Furthermore, the
analysis of spatial interdependence between countries is of great import-
ance, because spatial econometrics has not been broadly applied to the field
of monetary policy. Additionally, to provide a reliable answer to the last
research question, we conduct the analysis with different methodologies,
country samples, periods, and adoption dates of inflation targeting; such a
comparative analysis has not been done before.
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1.3 Outline of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes the factors
of monetary targeting abandonment. Chapters 3–6 focus on inflation target-
ing. Whereas Chapters 3–5 investigate the factors leading to inflation target-
ing adoption, Chapter 6 examines whether this strategy has an impact on
inflation. Chapter 7 concludes.
We start with monetary targeting as it was the first monetary policy stra-
tegy adopted by countries after the collapse of the fixed exchange rates sys-
tem in the 1970s. Chapter 2 focuses on the first research question and ex-
amines how reforms and characteristics of the financial system affect the
likelihood of countries to abandon monetary targeting. Apart from financial
system characteristics, we include macroeconomic, fiscal, external, and in-
stitutional factors potentially associated with countries’ decisions to give up
monetary targeting. Panel logit models are estimated for a sample of 35 mo-
netary targeting countries over the 1975–2009 period. We find that changes
in the financial system, such as financial liberalization, deregulation, and de-
velopment as well as dollarization, significantly increase the probability to
abandon monetary targeting. Additionally, more developed countries with
lower inflation and larger fiscal deficits are more likely to give up this stra-
tegy. An important outcome is that the financial determinants of abandon-
ing monetary targeting differ between advanced and emerging and devel-
oping countries.
Chapter 3 answers the second research question by examining which
economic, fiscal, external, financial, and institutional characteristics of coun-
tries affect the likelihood that they adopt inflation targeting as their mone-
tary policy strategy. We apply panel probit models for a sample of 60 coun-
tries and two subsamples consisting of OECD and non-OECD countries
over the 1985–2008 period. In contrast to previous studies, which include
the pre- and post-adoption periods in the analysis, we focus exclusively on
the factors leading to inflation targeting adoption and leave observations
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after adoption out of analysis. The results suggest that past macroeconomic
performance of a country, its fiscal discipline, exchange rate arrangements,
as well as the structure and development of its financial system significantly
affect the likelihood to adopt inflation targeting. However, the factors lead-
ing to inflation targeting adoption differ significantly (in a statistical sense)
between OECD and non-OECD countries and between soft and full-fledged
inflation targeters.
Chapter 4 examines to what extent the analysis of inflation targeting ad-
option is affected by the choice of the analyzed period, i.e., by either keep-
ing or discarding observations for the post-adoption period. The first ap-
proach may cause endogeneity and asymmetry problems. Once inflation
targeting is adopted, country characteristics and institutions adjust in a way
that makes them compatible with the inflation targeting framework. This
reinforces the decision to continue with inflation targeting. Consequently,
the impact of the factors after adoption is altered by the implementation of
inflation targeting; hence, these factors cannot be treated as exogenous. We
test whether country characteristics influence the decision to apply inflation
targeting differently before and after its adoption, using panel probit mod-
els for the dataset of Chapter 3. The findings suggest that the factors leading
to inflation targeting adoption differ significantly from those leading to its
continuation. Thus, including the post-adoption period when estimating the
factors driving inflation targeting adoption leads to biased results.
Chapter 5 focuses on the role of spatial interactions between countries
in inflation targeting adoption. We analyze whether a country is more likely
to adopt inflation targeting if (culturally or institutionally proximate) neigh-
boring countries have adopted the same strategy. We take into account that:
(i) countries adopt inflation targeting at different moments in time; (ii) neigh-
boring countries that did not adopt inflation targeting yet may have a dif-
ferent impact than countries that already adopted it. We develop a spatial
probit model with two spatially lagged variables, one for countries that did
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not adopt inflation targeting yet at the start of the period and one for coun-
tries that already adopted. The first spatial term is specified as unobserved
choices, while the second one as actual outcomes. We use several spatial
weights matrix specifications to control for geographic, cultural and insti-
tutional proximity. The dataset is based on the one used in Chapter 3. Our
results are sensitive to the choice of a spatial weights matrix. We find that
for the common language weights matrix the interaction effects with coun-
tries that adopt inflation targeting in the current period are insignificant,
while the countries that already adopted inflation targeting have a signific-
ant negative effect on others to adopt. Additionally, for a spatial weights
matrix based on common legal origins, countries that adopt inflation target-
ing in the current period have a significant positive impact on the decision
of others to adopt. For the ten-nearest neighbors’ matrix both spatial inter-
action effects are insignificant.
Chapter 6 focuses on the final research question. While the previous
three chapters discuss what factors drive inflation targeting adoption, this
chapter explores whether this strategy is effective in reducing inflation. This
study performs a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of the effects of infla-
tion targeting on inflation and examines to what extent the outcomes are in-
fluenced by the selection of country samples, adoption dates, time periods,
and methodological approaches. Two estimation techniques are applied —
difference-in-differences and propensity score matching — for a sample of
25 advanced and 59 emerging and developing countries over the 1985–2011
period. Our findings suggest that distinguishing countries by economic de-
velopment is crucial, as there is no effect of inflation targeting on inflation for
advanced economies, whereas inflation targeting contributes significantly to
decreasing inflation in emerging and developing countries.
The final chapter summarizes the main findings, discusses their policy






The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the mid-1970s forced countries
to search for an alternative nominal anchor for monetary policy under the
floating exchange rate regime. As a solution, the Monetary Targeting (here-
after, MT) framework was created. Inspired by the quantitative theory of
money propagated by monetarists, central banks of several advanced coun-
tries started using monetary aggregates as intermediate targets in their mo-
netary policy conduct (Argy et al., 1990; Mishkin, 2006; Woodford, 2008).
Central banks believed that targeting money growth could anchor inflation
expectations and ensure price stability.
According to Argy et al. (1990) and Mishkin and Savastano (2001), MT
involves the public announcement of medium-term targets for the growth
rates of some monetary aggregate(s), the reliance of monetary policy con-
duct on information conveyed by this (these) aggregate(s), and strong ac-
countability of a central bank to reach monetary targets. The success of MT
relies on strong assumptions: stability of the money demand function and
∗This chapter is based upon Samarina (2012). We thank Alex Cukierman, Maria Grydaki,
Roman Horva´th, Michael Koetter, and the participants of the WEAI Conference 2012, San
Francisco and the EPCS Meeting 2013, Zu¨rich, for helpful comments and suggestions.
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the existence of a strong and reliable relationship between the targeted mo-
netary aggregates and goal variables — inflation and/or nominal income
(Mishkin and Estrella, 1997; Mishkin, 2006).
Back in the 1970s, MT was considered a good alternative to exchange rate
pegs. It was relatively easy to monitor and communicate this strategy to the
markets. Moreover, monetary targets could be understood by the general
public (Mishkin and Savastano, 2001; Mishkin, 2006). However, the initial
enthusiasm about MT turned into a disappointment. The money demand
function was unstable in most MT countries and central banks were un-
successful in controlling the money stock. Additionally, MT central banks
suffered a credibility loss as they frequently missed money growth targets.
Exceptions were Germany and Switzerland, where MT was effective in con-
trolling inflation thanks to the active and clear communication of the stra-
tegy to the public (Mishkin, 1999).1 The sustained costs of MT implementa-
tion, including low institutional credibility and failure to achieve price sta-
bility, forced countries to quit this strategy.2 Until the late 1990s, all ad-
vanced countries abandoned MT. Meanwhile, many emerging and devel-
oping economies adopted MT in the 1980s and 1990s, and some of them are
still pursuing it at present (Roger, 2009).
This chapter investigates the causes and conditions that led countries
to MT abandonment. Mainly, we are interested in the impact of financial
system characteristics and reforms on the probability to give up MT.
Although advanced countries do not pursue MT anymore, this research
is relevant for emerging and developing countries which are still imple-
menting MT, but may decide in the near future to give it up. It could be
important for policy-makers in these countries to identify and monitor the
factors that may lead to the ineffectiveness and abandonment of MT.
While the instability of money demand function is frequently mentioned
in the literature as a major cause of MT breakdown (Mishkin, 1999; Wood-
1 Some studies argue that German monetary policy during 1974–1998 was closer to inflation
targeting than MT, as the Bundesbank announced inflation targets and used inflation fore-
casts in its monetary policy decision-making (Bernanke and Mihov, 1997; Mishkin, 1999).
2 McCallum (1985) provides an elaborate review of the major criticisms and costs of MT.
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ford, 2008), some macroeconomic, financial, and institutional characteristics
of countries created unfavorable conditions for the implementation of MT
and, consequently, increased the probability of its abandonment. In particu-
lar, reforms and changes in financial systems brought more diversification,
deregulation, and development of financial products and services. This led
to intensive and unrestricted flows of capital and money within the eco-
nomy. As a result of these changes, it became difficult for central banks to
control domestic credit and broad money supply. The increase in money
supply can lead to higher uncertainty, which destabilizes money demand.
Under these circumstances, central banks frequently missed money growth
targets and eventually abandoned MT.
While there is an extensive literature that analyzes prerequisites of MT
adoption, evidence on the causes of its abandonment is scarce. To the best
of our knowledge, only Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) apply binary-
choice models to estimate the determinants of MT choice. However, there
is so far no study that empirically analyzes the causes of MT abandonment
and the role of financial system characteristics and reforms in this respect.
This chapter adds to the literature by empirically examining several char-
acteristics of financial systems that could contribute to MT abandonment.
We also include macroeconomic, fiscal, and institutional control variables
potentially associated with countries’ decisions to leave MT. Panel logit mod-
els are applied on a sample of 35 MT countries over the period 1975–2009.
We find that financial liberalization, deregulation, and development as
well as dollarization significantly increase the likelihood to abandon MT.
Additionally, more developed countries with lower inflation and larger fiscal
deficits are more likely to switch from MT to an alternative strategy. How-
ever, the financial determinants to abandon MT differ between advanced
and emerging and developing countries.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 formulates
the hypotheses based on theoretical literature. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe
the methodology and the data. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 provide the main results
and sensitivity analysis, respectively. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 The role of the financial system to abandon MT
Some studies argue that financial system changes, such as liberalization, de-
regulation, development, and dollarization destabilize money demand (Mc-
Callum, 1985; Argy et al., 1990; Issing, 1997; Houben, 1999; Roger, 2009).
This means that money demand becomes less predictable and the linkages
between monetary aggregates and macroeconomic variables (inflation and
aggregate demand) weaken. Consequently, controlling the money stock be-
comes infeasible and money growth targets are missed. This forces central
banks to suspend MT. Goldfeld and Sichel (1990, p. 300) emphasize the rel-
evance of money demand for monetary policy and point out that “a stable
demand function for money has long been perceived as a prerequisite for
the use of monetary aggregates in the conduct of policy”.
Following Goldfeld and Sichel (1990) and Ball (2001), the conventional




= α0 + α1 log Yt + α2 log Rt + εt, (2.1)
where Mt, Pt, Yt, and Rt are the money stock, the aggregate price level, the
real output, and the nominal interest rate, respectively; εt represents money
demand shocks.
According to Judd and Scadding (1982), money demand is stable when
three conditions are satisfied. First, there is a statistically significant relation
between money demand and its determinants, and these determinants can
correctly predict money demand. Second, money demand cannot depend
on too many variables, as that reduces its predictability. Third, the determ-
inants of money demand should be linked to the real economy. As Judd
and Scadding (1982, p. 993) conclude, “a stable demand function for money
means that the quantity of money is predictably related to a small set of
key variables linking money to the real sector of the economy”. Since it is
difficult to include money demand stability in the model due to the lack
of a suitable measure, we cannot directly analyze its effect on the probabil-
ity of MT abandonment. Instead, we examine financial system changes and
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characteristics that may cause money demand instability, and, consequently,
indirectly contribute to the exit of MT.
Based on previous studies, we derive five hypotheses linking financial
determinants with the probability to abandon MT.
Financial (capital account) liberalization
According to Issing (1997) and Houben (1999), liberalization of external cap-
ital and money movements leads to the instability of the relationship bet-
ween money supply and macroeconomic variables (inflation and/or nom-
inal income). This makes the conduct of monetary policy based on targeting
money growth more difficult.
By definition, capital account liberalization is a government’s decision
to allow capital to flow freely in (and out of) the country (Henry, 2007). It
increases financial openness of the economy and leads to higher currency
exposure. Under such conditions, achieving price stability through the con-
trol of monetary aggregates becomes infeasible. Moreover, the subsequent
changes in financial and monetary conditions, including shifts in the capital
assets demand and uncontrolled growth of the money stock increase the risk
of missing money growth targets. In this situation, central banks abandon
MT as this strategy cannot reach its objectives. Thus, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Financial liberalization increases the probability to abandon MT.
Turning to practice, Germany completed liberalization of its cross-border
capital flows before the Bundesbank decided to adopt MT, which might ex-
plain why monetary conditions were rather stable in this country during
the MT period (Issing, 1997). In contrast, other countries removed capital
controls after they adopted MT. This caused radical changes in the financial
system and money growth dynamics, leading to the ineffectiveness of MT.
Policy trilemma: exchange rate regime and capital mobility
According to the policy trilemma hypothesis for open economies, a country
can reach at the same time only two out of three policy objectives — mo-
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netary policy autonomy, capital mobility, and exchange rate stability (Obst-
feld et al., 2005). Thus, conditional on the level of capital mobility (capital
account liberalization), the choice of an exchange rate regime may have a
different impact on the probability of MT abandonment.
If a country allows free movements of capital, it cannot simultaneously
pursue an independent monetary policy and achieve exchange rate stability.
With no capital restrictions in place and volatile exchange rates, countries
often experience the ’fear of floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). To reduce
exchange rate volatility, they limit exchange rate movements of their do-
mestic currencies. Once a central bank focuses on pegging exchange rates,
controlling the money stock becomes impossible due to the conflict between
the objectives of exchange rate and price stability (Houben, 1999; Mishkin
and Savastano, 2001). Thus, countries with fixed exchange rates will be more
likely to abandon MT, conditional on high capital mobility.
However, if there is limited capital mobility, a central bank can retain
policy autonomy and have a fixed exchange rate regime (Obstfeld et al.,
2005). Hence, countries with fixed exchange rates can still practice inde-
pendent monetary policy based on money growth targets. Our second, con-
ditional, hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are less (more) likely to
abandon MT when they have limited (full) capital mobility.
Financial deregulation
Financial deregulation is the process of removing government restrictions,
controls and regulations of the financial system (Gropp et al., 2007; Abiad
et al., 2008). While financial liberalization is mainly associated with unres-
tricted external capital flows, domestic financial deregulation covers a broad
range of financial reforms, such as removing credit, interest rate, and secur-
ities’ markets controls, eliminating entry barriers into the financial system
for new financial institutions, reducing bank reserve requirements and state
ownership in the banking sector, and abolishing other administrative re-
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strictions (Abiad et al., 2008).3
Financial deregulation may destabilize money demand and undermine
the usefulness of monetary aggregates in monetary policy (McCallum, 1985;
Issing, 1997). For instance, deregulation of interest rates and abolishment
of credit rationing in advanced countries in the 1980s freed banks in their
credit activities, increased the competitiveness of the banking sector and
financial intermediaries, and made it difficult for central banks to control
domestic credit (Argy et al., 1990). These changes resulted in higher than
targeted money growth and weaker relationships between targeted aggreg-
ates, GDP, and inflation. Consequently, central banks could not ensure price
stability and were forced to leave MT. Our next hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3: Financial deregulation increases the probability to abandon MT.
After the introduction of MT, Germany did not experience considerable
changes in its financial regulatory framework (Issing, 1997). As a result, it
preserved a stable relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation.
Meanwhile, financial deregulation in the 1980s in Switzerland made mone-
tary conditions unstable and reduced the effectiveness of MT (Rich, 1997).
Financial development
Another possible cause of MT abandonment is the development of financial
markets. The emergence of credit and various money substitutes, especially
interest-bearing ones, and their intensive circulation increase the income ve-
locity of money, which in turn affects the transactions demand for money,
making it unstable in the long run (Bordo and Jonung, 1990; Tan, 1997). This
hinders central banks’ control of money growth and undermines the effec-
3 Financial deregulation is sometimes confused with financial innovation. While the former
refers to the removal of restrictions and controls in the financial system, the latter captures
technological advances that improve the access to information and processing of financial
transactions as well as create new financial products, services and market segments (Tu-
fano, 2003; Gropp et al., 2007). While financial innovation is driven by deregulation (Gropp
et al., 2007), financial regulation can also lead to innovations, e.g. efficient deposit insurance
schemes, uniform accounting standards (De Haan et al., 2009). We do not include financial




Note that money demand functions are found to be stable in several de-
veloping countries whose central banks are currently implementing MT.4
These countries have relatively underdeveloped financial and banking sec-
tors, with low ratios of stock market capitalization and bank credit to GDP.
This could explain why their monetary conditions are still favorable for MT
implementation. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4: Financial system development increases the probability to abandon
MT.
Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) find that countries with developed
financial markets are more likely to leave MT.
Financial dollarization
Emerging and developing countries often experience financial dollarization.
This means that households, firms, and financial institutions prefer to hold
their assets and liabilities in foreign currency (usually US dollars) to protect
them from high domestic currency inflation and uncertain economic situ-
ations (Keller and Richardson, 2003; Levy-Yeyati, 2006). This alters capital
and money flows in financial markets and increases the volatility of money
demand, making it unstable (Levy-Yeyati, 2006). As a result, central banks
have difficulties controlling the money stock. Monetary policy based on MT
loses credibility as central banks miss money growth targets and fail to en-
sure price stability. Our final hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5: Financial dollarization increases the probability to abandon MT.
The explanatory variables used to test the formulated hypotheses are
described in section 2.4.
4 Slok (2002), Nassar (2005), and Narayan et al. (2009) find that money demand functions
for Bangladesh, India, Madagascar, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are stable in the long
run.
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2.3 Methodology
Our empirical approach is based on event history analysis which examines
the probability of an event occurring at the observed time.5 At each time
period a central bank can be in one of two states: state 0 corresponds to
implementation of MT strategy, while state 1 corresponds to an alternative,
non-monetary targeting (nMT) strategy. The event of interest is the aban-
donment of MT, i.e. the switch to an nMT strategy. As central banks gen-
erally do not return to MT after they leave it, MT becomes a non-recurrent
state. This implies that the probability of switching from nMT to MT is zero,
while the probability to continue pursuing nMT strategy is one. Here, we
focus on a single event of MT abandonment and examine how its likelihood
depends on different determinants.
In order to analyze time-series cross-section data with a binary depend-
ent variable, we apply panel binary choice models.6 We use the logit spe-
cification as it constraints probabilities to lie within the unit interval and
produces good statistical inference.
In each year one of two outcomes takes place: the central bank abandons
MT or it does not. Let yit be a binary dependent variable that takes the value
0 if a central bank of country i implements MT in year t (the event does not
occur) and 1 if it abandons MT in year t (the event occurs). The correspond-
ing observation rule is:
yit =
 1 if y∗it > 00 if y∗it ≤ 0 , (2.2)
where y∗it is the unobserved latent variable.
The underlying model for the latent variable is:
y∗it = α+ β
′EXPi,t−1 + γ′CTRi,t−1 + µi + ε it, i = 1, . . . , N; t = 1, . . . , Ti,
(2.3)
5 The event history analysis for time-series cross-section data with a binary dependent vari-
able is described in Beck et al. (1998).
6 The econometric methodology used in this chapter is described in Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, Chapter 23) and Baltagi (2008, Chapter 11).
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where Ti is the year of MT abandonment for those countries that left MT,
and the last year in the sample (i.e. 2009) for countries that did not leave
MT during the analyzed period. α is a constant term; β and γ are vectors
of parameter estimates; µi are country-specific effects; ε it is the error term
that follows a logistic distribution; CTRi,t−1 is a matrix of control variables;
EXPi,t−1 is a matrix of explanatory variables, including: financial liberaliza-
tion (Lib), exchange rate regime (Exr), the interaction term of exchange rate
regime with liberalization, financial deregulation (Der), financial develop-
ment (Dev), and financial dollarization (Dol):
β′EXPi,t−1 ≡ β1Libi,t−1 + β2Exri,t−1 + β3(Exr× Lib)i,t−1
+β4Deri,t−1 + β5Devi,t−1 + β6Doli,t−1.
(2.4)
All the control and explanatory variables are lagged one year as the current
decisions of central banks to give up MT rely on the available history of
macroeconomic, financial, and other indicators.
The probability to abandon MT in year t is formulated as follows:
Pr(yit = 1|EXPi,t−1,CTRi,t−1, µi) =
Λ(α+ β′EXPi,t−1 + γ′CTRi,t−1 + µi),
(2.5)
where Λ(.) denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function.
The important modeling step in panel data analysis includes the treat-
ment of country-specific effects µi that control for unobserved cross-country
heterogeneity. Depending on the assumptions about these effects, we may
distinguish three model specifications:
1. The coefficient estimate and variance of µi are insignificant. In this case
we estimate a pooled-data logit model.
2. µi are random effects, uncorrelated with the regressors: µi|EXPi,t−1,
CTRi,t−1 ∼ N (0, σ2µ). The appropriate model is the random effects
logit model.
3. µi are fixed effects, correlated with the regressors. With large N, the
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presence of fixed effects causes the incidental parameters problem, as
the number of parameters increases with the number of countries in
the sample (Baltagi, 2008). This problem is eliminated by estimating
the conditional fixed effects logit model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005;
Baltagi, 2008).7
To examine which model specification fits the data better, we estimate all
three types of logit and compare them by using a Hausman test. The models
are estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
The described models have their advantages and drawbacks. Pooled-
data and random effects logit models use the full sample for estimation, but
their results are inconsistent in the presence of fixed effects. Fixed effects lo-
git produces consistent and efficient parameter estimates when unobserved
country-specific effects are correlated with regressors. However, it drops the
entire control group, i.e., countries that have not left MT at the end of the
analyzed period. In addition, while fixed effects logit models describe the
variation in the data observed within countries, pooled-data and random ef-
fects logit models explain the variation observed both within and between
countries (Baltagi, 2008, Chapter 11). This comparison is important for the
interpretation of estimation results.
Another methodological issue refers to the analysis of interaction effects.
It is not possible to interpret the interaction effect in nonlinear models by
simply examining the coefficients on constituent variables and their interac-
tion term (Brambor et al., 2006). Therefore, we follow the approach of Ai and
Norton (2003) and Brambor et al. (2006) to calculate the correct interaction
effect. The total marginal effect of the exchange rate regime on the likeli-




= (β2 + β3Libi,t−1)×Λ(.) (2.6)
7 However, for the panel probit model the incidental parameter problem cannot be avoided.
There is no fixed effect probit estimator that would produce consistent parameter estimates.
For this reason we use the logit specification.
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The interaction effect and its significance can vary for different levels of
capital mobility. We cannot compute the interaction effect as in (2.6) for fixed
effects logit because marginal effects in this model depend on values of µi.
Hence, we evaluate and present the interaction effect only for pooled logit.
Since we analyze the probability of leaving MT, we only retain observa-
tions for countries from the start of MT until the year of its abandonment.
2.4 Data description
Country sample
Our sample consists of 35 countries that implemented MT over the period
1975–2009. We include two groups of MTers: 24 countries that implemented
and abandoned MT in the analyzed period (MT-’leavers’) and 11 countries
that continue implementing MT (MT-’stayers’).8 The latter serves as a con-
trol group. Time-series observations for each country start in the year of
MT adoption and end in the year of its abandonment (year 2009 for MT-
’stayers’). Duration of MT varies from 4 to 29 years in different countries.
Consequently, the panel dataset is unbalanced. Table 2.1 lists MT countries
and shows the dates of adoption and (where applicable) abandonment of
MT. According to the IMF classification, we distinguish 13 advanced and 22
emerging and developing MT countries.
Independent variables
To test the hypotheses formulated in section 2.2, we include five explanatory
variables in the model. As a proxy for financial liberalization, we employ the
Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2008). The index
uses the information on the restrictions on cross-border financial transac-
tions reported by the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions. To examine the conditioning effect of capital mobil-
ity, we include an interaction term of the exchange rate regime with financial
8 A similar division of MT countries is used by Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) who
distinguish ’MT movers’ and ’MT stayers’.
Monetary targeting and financial system characteristics 23
Table 2.1. List of countries with dates of MT adoption and abandonment
Countries that implemented and abandoned MT Countries that did not
(MT-’leavers’) abandon MT (MT-’stayers’)
Advanced (13) Advanced (0)
Country Datesa Post-MT monetary policy strategy Country Dates
Australia 1976-1985 inflation targeting (from 1993)
Canada 1976-1983 inflation targeting (from 1991)
France 1977-1999 ECB strategy (from 1999)
Germany 1975-1999 ECB strategy (from 1999)
Greece 1975-1998 ECB strategy (from 2001)
Italyb 1985-1999 ECB strategy (from 1999)
Japan 1978-1999 implicit price stability anchor (from 2001)
Korea 1979-1998 inflation targeting (from 1998)
Slovenia 1997-2001 exchange rate targeting (2001-2006),
ECB strategy (from 2007)
Spain 1978-1995 inflation targeting (1995-1998),
ECB strategy (from 1999)
Switzerland 1975-2000 inflation targeting (from 2000)
United Kingdom 1976-1992 inflation targeting (from 1993)
United States 1975-1996 implicit price stability anchor (from 1996)
Emerging and developing (11) Emerging and developing (11)
Albania 1993-2006 transition to inflation targeting (from
2006)
Bangladesh 2003-on
Egypt 1996-2005 transition to inflation targeting (from
2005)
China 1994-on
Ghana 1992-2007 inflation targeting (from 2007) Madagascar 1994-on
Guatemala 1993-1996 multiple targets (1996-2004), Mongolia 1995-on
inflation targeting (from 2005) Mozambique 1992-on
India 1985-1998 multiple indicators (from 1998) Nigeria 1986-on
Indonesiac 1997-2005 inflation targeting (from 2005) Pakistanb 1995-on
Moldova 1994-2009 transition to inflation targeting (from
2009)
Sri Lanka 1981-on
Philippines 1985-1995 transition to inflation targeting (1995-
2001),
Tanzania 1995-on
inflation targeting (from 2002) Tunisia 1987-on
Russia 1993-2004 multiple targets (from 2004) Uganda 1993-on
South Africa 1986-2000 inflation targeting (from 2000)
Thailandc 1997-2000 inflation targeting (from 2000)
Notes: Analyzed sample does not include several countries that are mentioned in the IMF De Facto
Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frameworks, but for which we are
unable to identify the exact dates of adoption (and abandonment) of MT.
a The first date refers to the adoption year; the second date – to the year of MT abandonment.
b Italy applied direct credit targeting during 1974-1984, in 1985 it started targeting M2; similarly,
Pakistan used credit ceilings and targets during 1973-1994, in 1995 M2 became an official monetary
target.
c These countries adopted base money targeting under the IMF-supported program for the post-
Asian crisis economic recovery.
Sources: Argy et al. (1990), Houben (1997, 1999), Sterne (2001), Festic´ (2002), Fata´s et al. (2004), Stone
and Bhundia (2004), Fane (2005), Nassar (2005), Al-Mashat and Billmeier (2007), Patra and Kapur
(2012), IMF De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frameworks,
and central banks’ publications.
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liberalization. The exchange rate regime indicator is based on the de facto
’fine’ classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
The financial deregulation index is based on the dataset of Abiad et al.
(2008) and includes five dimensions of financial reforms: credit controls and
reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, privatization of
banking sector, and government policies towards securities’ markets.9 A
higher value of the index indicates more deregulation.
Following Levine et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2009), financial develop-
ment is measured by the ratio of domestic credit provided by the banking
sector to GDP.
De Nicolo´ et al. (2003) distinguish three types of dollarization: payment
dollarization corresponds to the use of foreign currency in transactions; fin-
ancial dollarization refers to residents’ holdings of financial assets and liabil-
ities in foreign currency; and real dollarization implies indexing of prices in
foreign currency. Given these definitions, it would be suitable for our ana-
lysis to use the proxy for financial dollarization, measured as the ratio of
foreign currency deposits to total bank deposits. The data for this measure
is compiled from the Financial Dollarization Dataset of Levy-Yeyati (2006),
as well as national statistics. However, this variable is missing for 49% of all
observations in our sample. Therefore, we substitute deposit dollarization
with a reserves’ dollarization proxy (the ratio of foreign currency reserves
to total reserves), which is available for the whole sample. The shortcom-
ing of this measure is that it reflects payment dollarization (De Nicolo´ et al.,
2003) and that it is not strongly linked to deposit dollarization (correlation
between these proxies is 0.21).10 To test the robustness of results to differ-
ent specifications of dollarization, we include reserves’ dollarization in the
9 The financial reform index of Abiad et al. (2008) includes also capital account liberaliz-
ation and banking sector supervision. However, these dimensions are excluded from our
indicator. Capital account liberalization is measured by the Chinn-Ito index; and banking
sector supervision does not fit the definition of financial deregulation.
10 Although payment dollarization does not necessarily lead to financial dollarization, high
reserves’ dollarization combined with pegged exchange rates can encourage financial dol-
larization due to market failures, foreign currency deposit insurance, and extensive govern-
ment guarantees to bank creditors (De Nicolo´ et al., 2003).
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main analysis and deposit dollarization — in the sensitivity analysis.
Table A.1 in the Annex provides a detailed description of all variables
and their data sources.
Control variables
Apart from explanatory variables, we include six control variables that cap-
ture macroeconomic, fiscal, and institutional factors potentially associated
with MT abandonment.
The first control variable is the log of real GDP per capita measuring the
level of economic development. Economic development is strongly related
to financial development (De Haan et al., 2009). In addition, Caldero´n and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) argue that MT is more often implemented in emer-
ging and developing countries than in advanced ones. Due to the failure
of MT to ensure price stability and due to the accession of some MT coun-
tries to the EMU, this strategy disappeared in the monetary policy frame-
work of advanced countries by the late 1990s and is currently used only by
emerging and developing economies (Roger, 2009). Thus, higher economic
development is expected to increase the probability to give up MT.
Next, we include the CPI inflation rate, transformed as pi/1001+pi/100 to re-
duce the impact of extreme inflation observations. During the 1970s, ad-
vanced countries experienced high inflation caused by oil price shocks and
followed by volatile growth of monetary aggregates. Several countries used
money growth targets to achieve price stability (Argy et al., 1990; Rich, 1997;
von Hagen, 1999). However, once inflation was brought down to sustainable
levels, countries preferred to switch to alternative monetary strategies (such
as inflation targeting) that helped to maintain low and stable inflation. Thus,
we expect a negative impact of inflation on the probability to leave MT.
Previous studies emphasize that successful implementation of MT re-
quires the existence of a strong relationship between monetary aggregates
and inflation (Argy et al., 1990; Issing, 1997; Mishkin and Estrella, 1997;
Houben, 1999; Mishkin and Savastano, 2001). High money growth volat-
ility makes this relationship weaker and less predictable in the long run. It
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increases the risk of missing money growth targets and jeopardizes the ef-
fectiveness of MT. Money growth volatility is measured by 3-year rolling
standard deviations of annual money growth rates.
We introduce trade openness measured as the sum of exports and im-
ports (in percentage of GDP) as a proxy for the external exposure of an
economy. Open economies that are vulnerable to commodity prices and ex-
change rate shocks often prefer to focus on exchange rate stability rather
than price stability. Moreover, external shocks may destabilize the relation-
ship between monetary aggregates and inflation, which will increase the
risk of MT abandonment.
The last two control variables are fiscal and institutional. We include the
general government fiscal balance (in percentage of GDP) as a proxy for
fiscal discipline. In order to pursue credible monetary policy through con-
trolling money growth, central banks should not be forced to finance fiscal
deficits (Mishkin and Savastano, 2001). Inadequate fiscal discipline could
cause poor monetary policy decisions and, consequently, lead to the failure
of MT in reaching price stability. Fiscal balance is expected to have a negat-
ive effect on the probability to abandon MT.
Central bank independence is a relevant institutional factor. Central banks
with low political and economic independence are vulnerable to political
pressure for higher inflation to stimulate short-term economic growth (Mish-
kin, 2006). This makes any monetary strategy unsuccessful in achieving price
stability. MT central banks with low independence are especially ineffective
as their ultimate goal of low inflation is linked to the intermediate money
growth target (McCallum, 1985), and the actual money growth could be
manipulated by central banks facing government pressure. Measuring cent-
ral bank independence is difficult, especially for emerging and develop-
ing countries. The legal index of central bank independence may be a poor
proxy for actual independence, as it is based on central bank laws in place.
Many central banks in emerging and developing countries do not fully re-
spect the rule of law. For this reason, we construct the actual central bank
independence (ACBI) index as an interaction term of the legal index and
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the rule of law. The legal index is based on the data of Arnone et al. (2007)
and includes political and economic aspects of central bank independence.
Using the method of Klomp and de Haan (2010) to pinpoint the exact year
when the change in legislation enhanced central bank independence, we
use the information in Cukierman et al. (2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2008)
on major changes of central bank laws. The rule of law is based on the Law
and Order index of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database.
Imputation of missing observations
Before carrying out the estimations, we have to deal with missing obser-
vations. The data for five variables (financial liberalization, financial dereg-
ulation, financial development, money growth volatility, and rule of law)
are missing for some years in the sample. The percentage of missing obser-
vations on these variables ranges from 1% to 17% of all observations. We
apply the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm introduced by Demp-
ster et al. (1977) and described by Schafer (1997). It is a standard imputation
technique for filling in missing observations.
Following Schafer (1997), the log-likelihood of the complete data Ω can
be written as:
ln P(Ω|θ) = ln P(Ωobs|θ) + ln P(Ωmis|Ωobs, θ), (2.7)
where ln P(Ω|θ) denotes the log-likelihood of the complete data, ln P(Ωobs|θ)
is the log-likelihood of the observed data, and ln P(Ωmis|Ωobs, θ) is the pre-
dicted distribution of the missing data given θ. Ω,Ωobs, and Ωmis are the
matrices of the complete data, the observed part of data, and the missing
part of data, respectively. θ are parameters of the missing-data distribution.
AsΩmis is unknown, we can only calculate expectations of the log-likelihood
of the complete data given the estimates of θ.
The imputation procedure is the following. First, we choose initial val-
ues for θ and calculate the distribution of the missing data based on those
values. Next, we iterate the EM algorithm that involves two steps: the ex-
pectation step (E-step) and the maximization step (M-step). In the E-step,
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the conditional expectation of the log-likelihood of the complete data in
(2.7) is constructed given the likelihood of the observed data and the pre-
dicted distribution of the missing data. In the M-step, the parameters θ are
re-estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood of the complete data from
the E-step. The algorithm is repeated until the estimates converge. Demp-
ster et al. (1977) prove that the algorithm converges to the unique global
maximum of the log-likelihood of the observed data.11
We use the EM algorithm of SPSS, under the assumption that the data
are normally distributed.12
Descriptive statistics – mean comparison tests
Table 2.2 reports the mean comparison tests for all independent variables.
We compare the means of variables in two country groups: MT-’leavers’ and
MT-’stayers’. We apply a two-sided mean comparison t-test, where the null
hypothesis is that the mean difference of two groups is zero: H0: mean (MT-
’leavers’) − mean (MT-’stayers’) = 0. The alternative hypothesis is that the
mean difference is not zero. We perform mean comparison tests for unequal
variances of variables in two groups.13
The statistics show that MT-’leavers’ have on average more liberalized,
deregulated and developed financial systems as well as more flexible ex-
change rate regimes than MT-’stayers’. Additionally, MT-’leavers’ are char-
acterized by lower dollarization than MT-’stayers’. The mean differences of
all financial variables are statistically significant.
Regarding the control variables, on average MT-’leavers’ are more de-
veloped and less open. MT-’leavers’ do not differ statistically from MT-
11 Since the EM algorithm imputes missing observations based on the observed data only, us-
ing the complete dataset, obtained after imputation, in regression models should not distort
estimation results.
12 We also applied the EM algorithm assuming mixed normal distribution and t distribution.
However, these specifications did not produce sensible imputation results.
13 The Bartlett’s test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of equal variances, indicating that
two groups have unequal variances for each variable. The exceptions are trade openness
and fiscal balance, for which the variances are equal; we use the mean comparison test for
equal variances in these two cases.
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Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics — mean values comparison
Variable MT-’leavers’ MT-’stayers’ P-value
Financial liberalization 0.63 -0.52 0.00
Financial deregulation 10.03 9.27 0.01
Financial development 0.90 0.38 0.00
Financial dollarization 0.73 0.96 0.00
GDP per capita (ln) 8.67 6.26 0.00
Inflation 0.09 0.10 0.24
Exchange rate regime 9.37 8.03 0.00
Money growth volatility 7.17 7.78 0.55
Trade openness 52.19 65.38 0.00
Fiscal balance -3.72 -4.13 0.18
Central bank independence 2.34 1.77 0.00
Number of observations 360 195
Notes: Table 2.2 reports means of independent variables in each MT group. For MT-
’leavers’, the statistics are calculated for the period of MT practice from adoption until
abandonment. For MT-’stayers’, we use the period from MT adoption until the end of
2009. P-value< 0.05 indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis and suggests that the
mean difference of a particular variable is statistically significant at the 5% level.
’stayers’ in terms of money growth volatility, inflation and fiscal balance.
Finally, MT-’leavers’ have higher actual central bank independence than
MT-’stayers’. Note that if the legal independence index is used instead of
the actual one, we find no significant mean difference between the groups.
Correlation analysis
We perform a correlation analysis to check for potential multicollinearity
between the independent variables (see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Annex).
For the full sample (Table A.2), most variables are not highly correlated
with each other. However, there is a high and significant correlation bet-
ween the economic development proxy and financial development. Appar-
ently, more economically developed countries have better developed fin-
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ancial markets.14 To avoid multicollinearity, we include these variables in
model estimations separately.
For the subsample of MT-’leavers’ (Table A.3), high correlation is detec-
ted between economic development and two variables: financial liberaliz-
ation and financial development. These financial determinants will be in-
cluded in the fixed effects logit model without the economic development
proxy. A similar approach is used with respect to the ACBI index that is
highly correlated with financial liberalization.
2.5 Empirical results
This section discusses the main estimation results. The Hausman test, which
compares the estimates of fixed effects with random effects logit, rejects the
random effects null hypothesis in favor of the fixed effects model. Therefore,
we report only the results of the pooled-data logit model for both within
and between countries variation and the fixed effects logit model for only
within countries variation. Likelihood Ratio tests conducted on the residuals
of pooled-data logit indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation. Hence, we use robust standard errors clustered on the country
level.
When estimating a panel data model with large T, one should take into
account the potential time dependency problem. This means that the prob-
ability of a country to abandon MT in year t may depend on the duration of
MT in this country. Ignoring temporal dependence may lead to the under-
estimation of standard errors and too optimistic statistical inference (Beck
et al., 1998). To deal with this problem, we follow the approach of Beck et al.
(1998). First, we add time dummies marking the number of years since MT
adoption. Another technique is to use cubic splines that smooth time dum-
mies. We include in a model three cubic splines and a variable measuring
the number of years since MT adoption. The results show that these dura-
14 De Haan et al. (2009, Chapter 1) review studies which show that financial development
has a positive impact on economic growth and development.
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tion variables as well as time dummies are (individually and jointly) insig-
nificant. Therefore, we do not include them in our final specification.15
As pooled-data and fixed effects logit models explain different types of
variation in the data, it is difficult to compare their estimates. Thus, we in-
terpret them separately. Table 2.3 presents the results of pooled-data logit
estimation. For this model we report average marginal effects since coeffi-
cient estimates cannot be interpreted directly.16 Columns (1)-(2) show the es-
timation results without the interaction term, while estimations in columns
(3)-(5) include the interaction term. Additionally, in columns (2), (4) and (5)
we exclude from the model either financial development or economic de-
velopment as these variables are highly correlated with each other.
The findings from pooled-data logit suggest that most of the analyzed
financial characteristics play a significant role in MT abandonment. There is
strong evidence that countries which deregulate their financial systems and
liberalize capital movements during the period of MT use are more likely
to leave MT. Additionally, the marginal effect of reserves’ dollarization is
significant with a positive sign, indicating that more dollarized economies
have a higher probability to abandon MT. Financial deregulation, liberaliz-
ation, and dollarization destabilize money demand and make the growth of
monetary aggregates less predictable. This jeopardizes the effectiveness of
MT in reaching its targets.
The interaction term is significant with a negative sign in all the models.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the exchange rate regime influences the probab-
ility to abandon MT, depending on the level of financial liberalization. For
low levels of liberalization, the marginal effect is positive (left side of the
graph), implying that countries with flexible exchange rates are more likely
to give up MT. Thus, money growth targets can be still used by countries un-
der fixed exchange rate arrangements, given that they restrict capital flows.
The opposite conclusion is drawn when capital mobility is high (right side of
15 The estimation results with duration variables are available on request.
16 Average marginal effects are calculated as averages (over N and T) of individual mar-
ginal effects. Standard errors of these marginal effects are computed using the delta method
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Chapter 14).
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Table 2.3. Determinants of MT abandonment — pooled-data logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial liberalization 0.004 0.004 0.051 ** 0.050 ** 0.045 **
(0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Exchange rate regime −0.004 −0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Exchange rate regime × −0.006 *** −0.006 *** −0.005 **
Financial liberalization (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Financial deregulation 0.011 ** 0.011 ** 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.008 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Financial development −0.003 −0.005 0.016
(0.022) (0.021) (0.016)
Financial dollarization 0.110 ** 0.107 ** 0.169 *** 0.165 *** 0.116 ***
(0.050) (0.041) (0.060) (0.056) (0.053)
Economic development 0.009 0.008 0.015 * 0.014 *
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Inflation −0.158 −0.150 −0.248 −0.235 −0.210
(0.215) (0.216) (0.200) (0.198) (0.195)
Money growth volatility −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Trade openness 0.000 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0001)
Fiscal balance −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Central bank independence −0.002 −0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Number of observations 520 520 520 520 520
Log-likelihood −86.77 −86.78 −83.54 −83.57 −84.55
Wald χ2 22.44 ** 23.08 ** 23.18 ** 23.93 ** 24.09 **
Notes: The table reports average marginal effects and their robust standard errors (in parentheses)
computed using the delta method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signific-
ance level, respectively. The Wald χ2 test is equivalent to the F-test in linear regressions and evaluates
the goodness-of-fit of the model.
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the graph). Here the marginal effect is negative. This suggests that countries
with flexible exchange rate regimes are less likely to abandon MT; hence, it
is not possible to have both fixed exchange rates and money growth targets.
Our results are in line with the policy trilemma hypothesis. The interaction ef-
fect is significant for high levels of financial liberalization (between 1.3 and
2.5), that counts for 28% of all observations in our sample.
Figure 2.1. The effect of exchange rate regime on the likelihood to aban-
don MT conditional on financial liberalization
Notes: The solid line shows the total marginal effect of exchange rate regime on the prob-
ability to leave MT at different levels of financial liberalization; vertical boundaries indic-
ate the 95% confidence interval. The marginal effect is significant when the solid line and
confidence intervals are above (below) zero.
Our findings from pooled-data logit support hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and
H5, and reject hypothesis H4. As for the control variables, we find that eco-
nomically developed countries are more likely to abandon MT. The mar-
ginal effects of other variables are insignificant.
Next, we estimate the fixed effects logit model. This model discards the
entire group of MT-’stayers’ and explains the variation of determinants for
MT abandonment within MT-’leavers’. Since in fixed effects logit models
marginal effects depend on values of µi, they cannot be computed. Hence,
we report coefficient estimates instead. Their signs correspond to the signs
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of marginal effects.17 Table 2.4 reports the estimation results. Columns (1)-
(2) show the estimations without the interaction term, while columns (3)-(4)
include the interaction term. Since financial development is highly correl-
ated with economic development, we include these variables in the estim-
ation separately: columns (1) and (3) report the results for models without
economic development, and columns (2) and (4) models without financial
development.18
The results show that the coefficient estimates of financial development
and financial deregulation are significant with a positive sign, suggesting
that reforms and development in the financial systems of MT-’leavers’ in-
crease their probability to abandon MT. The coefficient estimates of financial
liberalization, exchange rate regime and their interaction term are insigni-
ficant. The outcomes confirm hypotheses H3 and H4; other hypotheses are
rejected.
The coefficient estimate of economic development is significant with a
positive sign implying that more developed MT-’leavers’ are more likely to
leave MT. This result is in line with previous studies claiming that advanced
countries do not practice MT anymore and that this strategy is currently
implemented only in emerging and developing economies (Roger, 2009).
Our findings indicate that lower inflation significantly increases the like-
lihood of MT-’leavers’ to abandon MT. Central banks that achieve low infla-
tion prefer to maintain price stability with the help of a different monetary
strategy than MT. Note that out of 24 MT-’leavers’ in our sample, 12 coun-
tries adopted inflation targeting after they left MT and another 3 countries
are preparing to adopt inflation targeting as a strategy to maintain inflation
17 For logit models the marginal effect of a change in a regressor on the conditional probab-
ility is calculated as:
∂P[Yit = 1|X]
∂xk
= Λ′(X, α, β,γ, µi)βk.
Λ′(z) = ∂Λ(z)∂z > 0, so the sign of the marginal effect depends only on βk.
18 As financial liberalization is highly correlated with the ACBI index, we estimated models
without the ACBI index and models without financial liberalization. That did not change the
significance and signs of independent variables. These results are available on request.
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Table 2.4. Determinants of MT abandonment — fixed effects logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial liberalization 1.162 1.243 2.084 5.347
(1.310) (2.303) (1.740) (8.701)
Exchange rate regime −0.066 −0.545 0.104 0.600
(0.170) (0.450) (0.264) (1.421)
Exchange rate regime × −0.113 −0.557
Financial liberalization (0.130) (0.661)
Financial deregulation 1.160 * 1.950 1.077 * 1.746
(0.642) (1.825) (0.604) (1.540)
Financial development 17.040 ** 17.140 **
(6.984) (7.007)
Financial dollarization 9.060 19.820 9.648 16.420
(7.143) (13.230) (7.323) (12.400)
Economic development 233.800 * 206.100 *
(122.600) (117.800)
Inflation −52.050 ** −294.200 * −50.190 ** −246.200
(21.730) (169.000) (21.170) (175.800)
Money growth volatility −0.066 −0.074 −0.070 0.004
(0.071) (0.122) (0.074) (0.179)
Trade openness 0.110 0.614 * 0.099 0.505
(0.082) (0.348) (0.080) (0.357)
Fiscal balance −0.440 * −2.180 * −0.356 −1.798
(0.246) (1.129) (0.267) (1.158)
Central bank independence 1.716 −0.614 1.766 −0.867
(1.177) (3.430) (1.221) (1.802)
Number of observations 336 336 336 336
Log-likelihood −21.68 −7.37 −21.28 −6.67
Likelihood Ratio χ2 76.21 *** 104.80 *** 77.03 *** 106.20 ***
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses). ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. LR χ2 test is equivalent
to the F-test in linear regressions and evaluates the goodness-of-fit of the model.
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at the low sustainable level.
Money growth volatility is insignificant in all model specifications. This
result is unexpected, given that the literature on MT assigns an important
role to money demand stability as a crucial factor for the implementation of
this strategy. Perhaps, the financial variables explain to some extent money
demand stability and, therefore, serve as indirect determinants of MT aban-
donment. Also, our measure of money growth volatility might not be a
strong indicator of money demand stability.
Our results also show that higher fiscal deficits significantly increase the
probability of MT-’leavers’ to abandon MT. The coefficient estimate of the
ACBI index is insignificant, which implies that central bank independence
is not a relevant prerequisite to leave MT. A more important aspect could
be the transparency of a central bank in communicating its monetary policy
strategy and money growth targets to the public. If central banks communic-
ate monetary policy-making in an unclear way, their credibility is reduced
and the effectiveness of MT in reaching price stability is undermined (Mish-
kin, 1999). Due to the limited availability of data on the transparency of cent-
ral bank communication, we cannot incorporate this aspect into the analysis.
2.6 Sensitivity analysis
We investigate whether our findings are sensitive to the inclusion of coun-
tries in the analyzed sample, to estimations for sub-samples, and to adding
and modifying variables. Most of the results are presented in Table 2.5. We
report only pooled-data logit estimations as they use the full sample and are
easier to interpret. Results for fixed effects logit are available on request.
First, we drop observations for four EMU countries (France, Germany,
Greece, and Italy). These countries abandoned MT when they joined the
euro area.19 In this situation, abandoning MT was not caused by macroeco-
nomic or financial factors but was a predetermined institutional agreement
19 We do not drop observations for Spain, as its MT abandonment was followed by the ad-
option of inflation targeting in 1995. Inflation targeting was implemented in Spain until it
joined the EMU in 1999.
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of central banks to delegate the conduct and choice of monetary policy stra-
tegy to the European Central Bank (ECB). The estimation results for the sam-
ple without the mentioned EMU countries are shown in columns (1a)-(1b)
of Table 2.5. The marginal effects of financial liberalization and dollariza-
tion remain significant with positive signs; financial deregulation becomes
insignificant in the model with the interaction term. Figure 2.2 shows that
the total marginal effect of the exchange rate regime conditional on financial
liberalization is insignificant for all levels of liberalization. Thus, dropping
the EMU countries from the sample does not lead to substantial changes of
our main results except for making the interaction effect insignificant.
Figure 2.2. The effect of exchange rate regime on the likelihood to aban-
don MT conditional financial liberalization (without 4 EMU countries)
Notes: The solid line shows the total marginal effect of exchange rate regime on the prob-
ability to leave MT at different levels of financial liberalization; vertical boundaries indic-
ate the 95% confidence interval. The marginal effect is significant when the solid line and
confidence intervals are above (below) zero.
Second, we exclude observations for two South-East Asian countries,
Indonesia and Thailand. These countries adopted money-based targeting
under the IMF-supported program for economic recovery in the aftermath
of the financial crisis in 1997–1998 (Fane, 2005). Here, MT was treated as a
temporary institutional solution under crisis conditions rather than a mo-
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netary strategy with long-term objectives. The estimation results without
these two countries are shown in Table 2.5, columns (2a)-(2b). The outcomes
do not change substantially compared to Table 2.3. Financial liberalization,
deregulation, and dollarization as well as economic development still have
a significant impact on the probability to leave MT. Figure 2.3 shows that the
total marginal effect of the exchange rate regime conditional on financial lib-
eralization is significant with a negative sign for high levels of liberalization
(between 1.2 to 2.5). Thus, our main conclusions are robust to the exclusion
of Indonesia and Thailand.
Figure 2.3. The effect of exchange rate regime on the likelihood to aban-
don MT conditional on financial liberalization (without Indonesia and
Thailand)
Notes: The solid line shows the total marginal effect of exchange rate regime on the prob-
ability to leave MT at different levels of financial liberalization; vertical boundaries indic-
ate the 95% confidence interval. The marginal effect is significant when the solid line and
confidence intervals are above (below) zero.
Third, we split the sample into advanced countries and emerging and
developing ones. As splitting the dataset leads to fewer observations in each
subsample, the results should be interpreted with caution. Since we divide
the sample by an economic development criterion, we do not include the
economic development proxy to control for country heterogeneity. Addi-
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tionally, this variable is highly correlated with financial development and
liberalization in both subsamples; therefore, including economic develop-
ment could create a multicollinearity problem.
The results for advanced countries (Table 2.5, columns (3a)-(3b)) are com-
parable to the ones for the full sample. However, only financial dollarization
and liberalization are relevant for the probability of advanced countries to
leave MT and the interaction effect is only marginally significant (the graph
does not show any significant areas; available on request).
The results for emerging and developing economies (Table 2.5, columns
(4a)-(4b)) are different than those for the advanced countries. Financial de-
regulation and dollarization become insignificant, while the marginal effects
of financial liberalization and development are significantly positive. Thus,
emerging and developing countries that liberalize capital flows and develop
financial systems during the period of MT practice are more likely to leave
this monetary strategy. The interaction term is insignificant.
As an additional control variable, we include a nominal interest rate to
test how a monetary policy instrument can influence the decision to aban-
don MT. An increase of the nominal interest rate may signal to the public
that the central bank is committed to maintaining low inflation. Higher in-
terest rates discourage banks from borrowing money; this can reduce money
growth and help reach the monetary targets. As a result, the central bank
might decide to continue MT instead of leaving it. The nominal interest rate
is proxied by the discount rate, at which central banks lend money to com-
mercial banks. The inclusion of this variable does not change the main res-
ults. The coefficient estimate of the interest rate is negative in all models and
significant in pooled-data logit with the interaction term, for the full sample
and for the subsample of emerging and developing countries. This implies
that higher nominal interest rates decrease the probability (of emerging and
developing countries, in particular) to give up MT. These results are avail-
able on request.
Finally, we re-estimate all models while including deposit dollarization
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by this modification, but deposit dollarization is insignificant in all mod-
els.20 Due to the limited data availability for deposit dollarization, the es-
timations are carried out on a much smaller sample. Consequently, the real
impact of this variable could be largely underestimated. Nevertheless, the
positive sign on its coefficient estimate suggests that higher deposit dollar-
ization may increase the likelihood to leave MT.
The robustness analyses show that our main conclusions are to some ex-
tent sensitive to the modification and selection of countries. Particularly, the
findings for emerging and developing countries differ from the ones for the
full sample and advanced countries. This could be explained by consider-
able heterogeneity of the analyzed countries that practice MT.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the role of financial system characteristics and re-
forms in the abandonment of MT by countries. Previous studies ignore fin-
ancial system characteristics and empirical evidence on the determinants of
MT abandonment is very limited. We formulate five hypotheses for financial
system characteristics and include six control variables that are associated
with countries’ decisions to leave MT. We apply panel (pooled-data and con-
ditional fixed effects) logit models to estimate the probability of abandoning
MT.
The results of the analysis using pooled-data logit models, show that
countries which experience liberalization, deregulation and dollarization in
their financial systems are more likely to abandon MT. Moreover, the choice
of the exchange rate regime influences the probability to give up MT dif-
ferently conditional on the level of financial openness. Countries with lim-
ited capital mobility can use money growth targets and have fixed exchange
rates at the same time. In addition, more economically developed countries
are inclined to leave MT. The results of the analysis using fixed effects logit
models, suggest that the probability of MT abandonment by MT-’leavers’
20 These estimation results are available on request.
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is affected by their financial development and deregulation. Also, more de-
veloped MT-’leavers’ with past low inflation and larger fiscal deficits are
more likely to leave MT.
The results are sensitive to the exclusion of some countries. Additionally,
for advanced countries, financial liberalization and dollarization have a sig-
nificant impact on the probability to leave MT. Meanwhile, financial liberal-
ization and development contribute to the probability of MT abandonment
by emerging and developing countries.
Chapter 3
Inflation targeting: exploring
the factors leading to adoption∗
3.1 Introduction
Inflation targeting (hereafter, IT) was first introduced in 1989 in New Zeal-
and as a monetary policy strategy. Since then, many countries started target-
ing inflation, since it was an attractive alternative to exchange rate pegs and
money growth targets (Walsh, 2009). In the 1990s, mainly advanced coun-
tries adopted IT, but more recently also several emerging and developing
economies have adopted IT. By the end of 2009, 31 countries adopted IT.
According to Mishkin and Savastano (2001), IT involves the public an-
nouncement of a numerical target for inflation, a strong commitment of
the central bank to price stability as monetary policy objective, and a high
degree of transparency and accountability. The distinctive feature of this
strategy is a forward-looking decision-making process known as ”inflation-
forecast targeting” (Svensson, 1997). It means that an IT central bank sets its
policy instruments in such a way that the inflation forecast (after some time)
equals the inflation target.
The primary objective of IT is to ensure price stability through reach-
ing the inflation target. Other goals (e.g., employment and exchange rate
∗This chapter is based upon Samarina and de Haan (2014).
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stability) should be subordinated to the inflation objective (Carare et al.,
2002; Mishkin, 2004). Central banks commonly use a flexible IT framework,
where output stabilization is also incorporated into the objective function
of the central bank (Svensson, 1999). However, more weight is put on sta-
bilizing inflation around its target. Due to the possible conflict between the
inflation target and other goals, a central bank must be independent from
government pressures and credible in its commitment to the price stability
objective (Mishkin and Savastano, 2001; Freedman and Laxton, 2009).
IT has several benefits compared to other monetary policy strategies.
First, IT reduces the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, which
helps to achieve lower and less variable inflation (Mishkin and Savastano,
2001; Ball and Sheridan, 2004; Gonc¸alves and Salles, 2008). Second, IT en-
hances the credibility of a central bank and anchors inflation expectations
thanks to its clear target as well as high transparency and accountability
(Ball and Sheridan, 2004; Batini and Laxton, 2006). Third, IT offers more flex-
ibility: inflation targets are set as a medium-term goal; consequently, short-
term deviations from the target do not harm credibility (Batini and Laxton,
2006). Flexibility also allows stabilizing output without forgoing the infla-
tion target. Finally, the economic costs of monetary policy failures are lower
for IT than for other strategies. As the central bank increases interest rates
to return inflation to its target, the costs are limited to a temporary higher
inflation and slower growth (Batini and Laxton, 2006).
IT has also some potential drawbacks. First, IT involves setting hard tar-
gets for inflation. This could be a serious problem for emerging and develop-
ing countries which apply IT to bring down inflation from a very high level,
as they are more likely to miss the targets and experience large inflation fore-
cast errors (Mishkin, 1999). Second, IT could increase output volatility and
lower economic growth. Third, IT does not provide immediate signals to the
public about the stance of monetary policy due to the long lags in revealing
inflation outcomes (Mishkin, 1999). Finally, IT does not allow policy-makers
enough discretion to react to unexpected circumstances (Mishkin, 1999).
The literature on IT focuses mainly on the benefits from IT adoption,
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while less attention is devoted to analyzing the factors leading to IT adop-
tion. Because of the increasing popularity of IT, there is a growing interest
among academic researchers and policy makers in the feasibility of IT adop-
tion in different countries. This motivates our research on the factors driving
the decision of countries to adopt IT.
Previous research on IT adoption (as discussed in section 3.2) has several
limitations. For instance, most studies have ignored financial system char-
acteristics as possible factors leading to IT adoption. Furthermore, studies
usually test for a limited number of potential factors.
This chapter examines a long list of variables that may influence the
choice for IT; these factors fall into the categories: macroeconomic, fiscal,
external, financial, and institutional. While macroeconomic, external, and
fiscal factors leading to IT adoption have been discussed in the literature,
financial system and institutional characteristics have received little atten-
tion. The study uses data for 60 countries over the period 1985–2008. Apart
from analyzing the full sample, we also investigate OECD and non-OECD
countries separately in order to control for possible heterogeneity and insti-
tutional differences. Additionally, we test whether factors differ across vari-
ous types of IT.
Also from a methodological perspective, this study distinguishes itself
from previous research as we focus exclusively on the factors leading to
IT adoption and ignore all observations after the adoption. Other studies
retain observations for IT countries after the adoption, thereby estimating
simultaneously the factors of adoption and continuation of IT. This may lead
to inadequate statistical inference and endogeneity problems.
We find that macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial factors significantly
affect the likelihood of adoption of IT. The factors leading to IT adoption
differ between OECD and non-OECD countries and between soft and full-
fledged inflation targeters. These differences come from different economic
characteristics of countries and the credibility of their central banks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews
the literature and describes the analyzed factors. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 de-
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scribe the methodology and data, respectively. Section 3.5 presents the main
results, while section 3.6 offers a sensitivity analysis. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
Previous empirical studies have examined a number of potential factors in-
fluencing the choice of IT. Below, we provide a summary of their findings.
Inflation is a primary concern of monetary policy, which is why it is
analyzed in all the studies on IT choice. Previous research provides mixed
results. While Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Mukherjee and Singer
(2008), and Gonc¸alves and Carvalho (2009) find a positive impact of infla-
tion on the likelihood to adopt IT, Hu (2006), Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), Lucotte
(2010), and De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012) report a neg-
ative effect of inflation. Vega and Winkelried (2005) also include inflation
volatility and find that it is negatively associated with IT choice.
Apart from inflation, several studies examine the effects of macroeco-
nomic performance on IT choice by adding such variables as investment
(Vega and Winkelried, 2005), GDP growth and its variability (Hu, 2006; Muk-
herjee and Singer, 2008), and income growth (Lin and Ye, 2007, 2009). Stud-
ies find that investment and GDP growth variability have a significant pos-
itive effect on the choice of IT. Additionally, Leyva (2008), Mukherjee and
Singer (2008), Lucotte (2010), and De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza
(2012) include GDP per capita to control for differences in income levels
between countries. They find that countries with higher levels of GDP per
capita are more likely to adopt IT.
Another factor studied in the literature is the exchange rate regime. The
adoption of IT is associated with flexible exchange rates to avoid a conflict
between the exchange rate target and the inflation target. Several studies
(Hu, 2006; Lin and Ye, 2007, 2009; Mukherjee and Singer, 2008; Lucotte, 2010)
report that countries with a floating exchange rate regime are more likely
to adopt IT. Additionally, Mukherjee and Singer (2008) find that exchange
rate variability is positively associated with IT adoption, while Mishkin and
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Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) obtain a similar result for exchange rate bandwidth.
Previous studies also analyze the effects of fiscal discipline (measured by
government debt or fiscal balance) on IT adoption, as it is relevant for main-
taining price stability. Vega and Winkelried (2005), Hu (2006), Gonc¸alves and
Carvalho (2009), and Lucotte (2010) report that fiscal discipline is positively
associated with the probability of having IT, whereas Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2001), Lin and Ye (2007, 2009) find that this factor is insignificant.
Several studies include trade openness and come to mixed conclusions.
Whereas Gerlach (1999), Vega and Winkelried (2005), Lin and Ye (2009), and
De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012) find that less open econom-
ies are more likely to choose IT, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Leyva
(2008), and Lucotte (2010) report opposite results. Hu (2006) adds external
debt as a proxy for financial openness; however, it is found insignificant.
Financial factors have received little attention in the literature. Hu (2006)
finds that financial depth, measured as the ratio of M2 to GDP, increases the
probability of having IT. Leyva (2008) finds that countries with developed
financial systems are more likely to adopt IT, while Lucotte (2010) reports
opposite results for emerging and developing countries.
Finally, previous studies include institutional factors leading to IT ad-
option. Hu (2006), Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), and Lucotte (2010) find that
higher central bank independence increases the likelihood of having IT, as
an independent central bank is resistant to government pressures and more
committed to achieving price stability. However, Gerlach (1999) reports that
central banks become more independent after they adopt IT. Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) distinguish different dimensions of independence
and conclude that higher instrument and lower goal independence of cent-
ral banks increase the probability of having IT. Apart from monetary insti-
tutions, two studies (Mukherjee and Singer, 2008; Lucotte, 2010) analyze the
impact of political institutions on IT choice.
This chapter analyzes several factors already mentioned in the literature
and adds some new ones. Most importantly, we include a group of finan-
cial factors, namely financial stability, development, and structure. These
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aspects (except for development) have not been examined before in the con-
text of IT adoption. As financial system characteristics and stability have
become increasingly relevant for monetary policy conduct, they may have a
significant impact on the choice of monetary strategy and, in particular, on
the decision to adopt IT.
3.2.1 Macroeconomic factors
Inflation
Several authors argue that countries choose IT in order to achieve low in-
flation; hence, economies with higher prior inflation are more likely to ad-
opt this strategy (Svensson, 1997; Freedman, 2001; Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2001; Gonc¸alves and Carvalho, 2009). However, many inflation tar-
geters adopted the strategy after inflation had come down, so that it may
also be argued that low inflation is a factor leading to IT adoption (Carare
et al., 2002). We expect that low inflation increases the likelihood to adopt
IT. There is a potential endogeneity problem with inflation. Inflation before
IT adoption could be low because of the expectation that inflation will fall
as a result of IT implementation. We deal with this problem by using the
sample for the pre-adoption period only and including the one-year lag of
the explanatory variables (see section 3.3 for details).
Output growth and volatility
We include output growth and volatility to control for the macroeconomic
performance of countries. Economic growth could affect central banks’ de-
cisions to adopt IT. Additionally, countries with increasing economic volat-
ility are motivated to adopt IT in order to stabilize output (Svensson, 1999;
Mukherjee and Singer, 2008). Batini and Laxton (2006) note that many emer-
ging countries experienced high macroeconomic volatility before the adop-
tion of IT. Thus, we expect that low output growth and high output volatility
increase the likelihood to adopt IT.
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Exchange rate regime and volatility
IT requires a flexible exchange rate regime because an exchange rate target
may lead to a conflict between the objectives of low inflation and a stable
exchange rate (Fischer, 2001; Mishkin and Savastano, 2001; Mishkin, 2004).
However, several emerging and developing countries initially adopted a
soft version of IT while still using crawling exchange rate bands.1 Once these
countries completed disinflation, they abandoned exchange rate bands and
switched to full-fledged IT. Meanwhile, advanced countries started to target
inflation as a single anchor after the abandonment of exchange rate pegs and
the ERM (Bernanke et al., 1999; Freedman and Laxton, 2009). Therefore, we
expect that a flexible exchange rate regime and high exchange rate volatility
influence the likelihood to adopt IT positively.
3.2.2 Fiscal factors
Fiscal discipline is often considered as a factor leading to IT adoption (Am-
ato and Gerlach, 2002; Carare et al., 2002; Mishkin, 2004; Batini and Laxton,
2006). Unsustainable fiscal policy may force the central bank to finance fiscal
deficits at the cost of higher inflation, jeopardizing the credibility of the cent-
ral bank. In addition, a highly indebted country may aim for higher inflation
in order to reduce the real value of its debt. Thus, a country that wants to
adopt IT should have its public finances in order. We expect that low budget
deficits and low public debt increase the likelihood to adopt IT.
3.2.3 External factors
Openness of the economy
The literature identifies openness of the economy as a relevant factor for
monetary policy choice (Fata´s et al., 2004; Batini and Laxton, 2006). Small
open economies are dependent on foreign trade and exposed to external
real shocks. As such countries are sensitive to exchange rate and commodity
1 Countries that initially adopted IT combined with exchange rate pegs are: Chile, Colom-
bia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey.
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price changes, they tend to limit exchange rate movements. Consequently,
open economies often prefer to have exchange rate pegs rather than IT with
flexible exchange rates. Nevertheless, as Svensson (2000) argues, open eco-
nomies can still successfully implement IT if the reaction function of the
central bank is modified to include exchange rate changes, while preserving
the inflation objective. We expect that openness of the economy has a posit-
ive impact on the probability of adopting IT.
External exposure
Several authors mention external exposure as a factor influencing the de-
cision to adopt IT, especially by emerging and developing countries (Carare
et al., 2002; Mishkin, 2004). External exposure is defined as the depend-
ence of countries on external financing through foreign capital and credit
(Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998). Sudden reversals of capital flows in coun-
tries with high external exposure lead to liquidity constraints of borrow-
ers, large currency depreciations, and subsequently cause currency crises
(Kaminsky et al., 1998; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998). Under these cir-
cumstances, countries prefer to focus on exchange rate stability by using
exchange rate pegs. Thus, external exposure is expected to have a negative
effect on the likelihood of IT adoption.
3.2.4 Financial factors
Financial stability
Schinasi (2004) broadly defines financial stability as the ability of the finan-
cial system to facilitate an efficient allocation of resources in the economy;
to assess and manage financial risks; and to perform its main functions
through self-corrective mechanisms even when affected by external shocks
or financial imbalances. According to Carare et al. (2002), Truman (2003),
Mishkin (2004), and Roger (2009), weak and unstable financial institutions
may create circumstances under which the central bank cannot raise interest
rates to sustain the inflation target because it may cause the collapse of the
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fragile banking sector and, subsequently, lead to a financial crisis. In addi-
tion, weak financial institutions may turn for liquidity injections to the cent-
ral bank which leads to escalating inflation. In both situations, IT may fail
and the credibility of the central bank may be undermined. Therefore, we
expect that financial instability (defined as the presence of financial crises)
decreases the likelihood to adopt IT.
Financial system development
A well-developed financial system with liquid and active financial markets
may facilitate IT (Carare et al., 2002; Truman, 2003; Batini and Laxton, 2006).
Well-functioning financial markets absorb short-term financial shocks, min-
imizing their impact on the real economy. In addition, a well-developed fin-
ancial system provides more opportunities for resource allocation and re-
duces the risk that funding dries up. Consequently, a central bank has to
care less about financial stability and can focus on inflation control. There-
fore, countries with developed financial systems are expected to be more
likely to adopt IT.
Financial structure
A distinction can be made between market-based and bank-based finan-
cial systems (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine, 2001). In a bank-based system,
the banking sector dominates in financing the real economy, whereas in a
market-based system the stock and bond markets are more important for
intermediation. Chowdhury et al. (2006) and Kwapil and Scharler (2010)
find that countries with a market-based financial system have a higher in-
terest rate pass-through than countries with a bank-based system. To ensure
a strong response of inflation expectations to monetary policy decisions, IT
requires effective monetary policy transmission channels. We expect that
countries with market-based financial systems are more likely to adopt IT.
52 Chapter 3
3.2.5 Institutional factors
Several authors emphasize central bank independence as an important in-
stitutional feature of IT (Gerlach, 1999; Amato and Gerlach, 2002; Carare
et al., 2002; Truman, 2003; Mishkin, 2004; Batini and Laxton, 2006; Roger,
2009). What matters most is instrument independence, i.e. the central bank
is independent from the government in choosing instruments to achieve its
goals. Similar to inflation, an important issue is whether countries should
have an independent central bank before adopting IT or whether they grant
instrument independence to their central bank after they adopt this strategy.
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) find that instrument-independent cent-
ral banks are more likely to adopt IT. Thus, higher instrument independence
of a central bank is expected to increase the likelihood to adopt IT.
All the analyzed factors, their expected signs, and variables used to test
them are summarized in Table B.1 in the Annex.
3.3 Methodology
During each year, a country chooses either to adopt IT or to continue imple-
menting an alternative, non-IT strategy. We employ a panel binary model
where the dependent variable yit is a dummy that takes the value 1 if coun-
try i adopts IT in year t , and 0 otherwise.
In the presence of unobserved characteristics, the appropriate specific-
ation is a panel probit model with random effects that is estimated using
Maximum Likelihood. The estimation of a fixed effects model faces the in-
cidental parameters problem (Wooldridge, 2002), as the number of paramet-
ers to be estimated increases with the number of countries in the sample.
However, there is no fixed effects probit estimator that can deal with this
problem. Although fixed effects logit solves the incidental parameters prob-
lem, it drops all observations for countries that did not change monetary
strategy in the analyzed period, i.e. observations for which ni = ∑Tt=1 yit = 0
are excluded from the log-likelihood function (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 491).
Therefore, we do not estimate a fixed effects model.
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The underlying latent model has the general structure:
y∗it = α+ β
′MACi,t−1 + γ′FISi,t−1 + θ′EXTi,t−1 + κ′FINi,t−1
+ δ′ INSi,t−1 + µi + ε it, i = 1, . . . , N; t = 1, . . . , Ti,
(3.1)
where y∗it is an unobserved latent variable which describes the decision to
adopt IT, yit = 1 if y∗it > 0 and yit = 0 if y
∗
it ≤ 0; Ti is the year of IT ad-
option for those countries that adopted IT, and the last year in the sample
(i.e. 2008) for countries that did not adopt IT during the analyzed period;
α is a constant term; β,γ, θ, κ, δ are vectors of parameter estimates; µi is an
unobserved random effect, uncorrelated with explanatory variables; ε it is a
normally, independently, and identically distributed error term with mean 0
and variance 1; and Xi,t−1 ≡ [MACi,t−1, FISi,t−1, EXTi,t−1, FINi,t−1, INSi,t−1]
are explanatory variables. Following previous studies, we include the ex-
planatory variables with a one-year lag to avoid potential endogeneity.2
The probability to adopt IT is formulated as:
Pr(yit = 1|Xi,t−1, µi) =
Φ[α+ β′MACi,t−1 + γ′FISi,t−1 + θ′EXTi,t−1 + κ′FINi,t−1 + δ′ INSi,t−1 + µi],
(3.2)
whereΦ(.) is a cumulative distribution function of the standard normal dis-
tribution.
The explanatory variables are classified into five groups: (1) macroeco-
nomic factors (MACi,t−1): inflation, output growth and volatility, flexible ex-
change rate regime, and exchange rate volatility; (2) fiscal factors (FISi,t−1):
fiscal balance and government debt; (3) external factors (EXTi,t−1): open-
ness of the economy and external exposure; (4) financial factors (FINi,t−1):
financial instability, financial structure, and financial development; and (5)
institutional factor (INSi,t−1): central bank instrument independence.
The decision to adopt IT is based on information available to the cent-
2 In this paper, we do not study the impact of forward-looking variables, such as inflation
and exchange rate expectations, because of the lack of data.
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ral bank at the moment of decision making. What happens afterwards is
not relevant for the decision to adopt IT and, therefore, we do not keep
these observations. In fact, using explanatory variables that refer to the post-
adoption period may lead to reverse causality and endogeneity problems.
For example, inflation in year (t− 1) could influence the decision to change
to IT in year t. However, inflation in year (t + 1) will be influenced by IT
practice. To avoid endogeneity and focus exclusively on IT adoption, we
only retain observations for the pre-adoption period and the first year of IT
adoption for the IT countries in the sample.
3.4 Data description
We use data of 60 countries over the period 1985–2008.3 30 countries in
our sample (17 OECD and 13 non-OECD countries) have adopted IT dur-
ing this period (inflation targeters), and 30 other countries did not adopt it
(non-inflation targeters). To make the two groups comparable and reduce
the risk of selection bias, we include in the group of non-inflation targeters
also OECD and non-OECD countries. The OECD part of this group consists
of 13 OECD non-inflation targeters. Following the approach of Rose (2007)
and Lin and Ye (2009), we include in the non-OECD part 17 emerging and
developing countries with GDP per capita that is at least as high as GDP per
capita of the poorest non-OECD inflation targeter.4
Table 3.1 lists the countries in our sample and shows the dates of IT
adoption. There is disagreement in the literature over the precise dates of
adoption, since different criteria are used for pinpointing the switch to IT.
Bernanke et al. (1999) associate the start of IT with the public announce-
ment of the first inflation target, and Ball and Sheridan (2004) with the im-
plementation of the first target. Batini and Laxton (2006) consider central
banks as inflation targeters if they use an inflation target as the single nom-
3 IT was adopted for the first time in 1989 in New Zealand. The sample period therefore
starts in 1985. We do not include the years of and after the recent financial crisis (2008–2010),
as from these years central banks began adding the objective of financial stability.
4 We include only those countries for which the data are available in the analyzed period.
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Table 3.1. List of countries with dates of IT adoption
IT countries
OECD (17) Non-OECD (13)
Country Official SIT FFIT Country Official SIT FFIT
adoption dates dates adoption dates dates
Australia 1993 1993 1994 Armeniaa 2006 2006 n/a
Canada 1991 1991 1994 Brazil 1999 - -
Czech Republic 1998 - - Chile 1991 1991 1999
Finlandb 1993 - - Colombia 2000 1995 2000
Hungary 2001 - - Ghana 2007 - -
Iceland 2001 - - Guatemala 2005 - -
Mexico 2001 1995 2001 Indonesia 2005 - -
New Zealand 1990 1990 1991 Israel 1992 1992 1997
Norway 2001 - - Peru 2002 1994 2002
Poland 1999 - - Philippines 2002 1995 2002
Slovakiab 2005 - - Romania 2005 - -
South Korea 1998 1998 2001 South Africa 2000 - -
Spainb 1995 1994 1995 Thailand 2000 - -
Sweden 1993 - -
Switzerland 2000 - -
Turkey 2006 2002 2006
United Kingdom 1993 - -
Non-IT countries
OECD (13) Non-OECD (17)
Austria Greece Luxemburg Argentina Egypt Pakistan
Belgium Ireland Netherlands Bolivia Estonia Panama
Denmark Italy Portugal Bulgaria India Singapore
France Japan United States China Latvia Sudan
Germany Costa Rica Lithuania Venezuela
Cyprus Malaysia
Notes: Official adoption dates are based on central banks’ documents. The alternative dates refer to
the start of SIT and FFIT, respectively. Following Hu (2006) and Lucotte (2010), we apply the ’half-
year rule’ — if IT is adopted in the second half of year t, the adoption year is (t + 1), otherwise the
adoption year is t.
a Armenia is still officially in transition to FFIT.
b Finland and Spain abandoned IT in 1999 because of the adoption of the euro; same holds for Slov-
akia in 2009.
Sources: Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Truman (2003), Fata´s et al. (2004), Vega and Winkelried
(2005), Leyva (2008), Freedman and Laxton (2009), Roger (2009), and central banks’ publications.
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inal anchor for monetary policy. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Vega
and Winkelried (2005), and Freedman and Laxton (2009) suggest that central
banks may choose one of the two forms of the strategy — soft or full-fledged
IT — depending on their commitment and policy objectives. Soft inflation
targeting (SIT) involves the simple announcement of an inflation target, not
accompanied by a strong institutional commitment, and coexistence of the
inflation target with other nominal anchors (e.g., money growth targets or
exchange rate pegs). This description applies mostly to emerging and de-
veloping countries, which often adopted IT but initially kept exchange rate
pegs in place. Full-fledged inflation targeting (FFIT) involves using the in-
flation target as the single nominal anchor for monetary policy and requires
strong commitment to the target.
Table 3.1 shows three dates for the start of IT: the start according to the
central bank, and dates for the start of SIT and FFIT. While SIT and FFIT
adoption dates for OECD countries tend to coincide, there are substantial
differences between SIT and FFIT dates for six non-OECD countries, and
for Mexico and Turkey. In our main analysis, we use all three dates: official
adoption dates as well as SIT and FFIT dates to check whether the factors
leading to adoption are different between the two versions of IT.
Another issue is whether Switzerland should be classified as an inflation
targeter. While Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Fata´s et al. (2004), and
Vega and Winkelried (2005) classify Switzerland as a de facto inflation tar-
geter, Truman (2003) and Roger (2009) do not include it in their sample of
IT countries. The Swiss National Bank does not consider itself an inflation
targeter. However, it uses inflation forecasts as a main indicator of monetary
policy aimed to achieve price stability in the medium and long run. Thus,
in our main analysis, we include Switzerland as an inflation targeter; in the
sensitivity analysis, we exclude it from this group.
Table B.1 (Annex) offers a detailed description of the variables used and
their data sources. To reduce the impact of extreme inflation observations,
the inflation rate is transformed as pi/1001+pi/100 . To proxy output growth and
volatility we use annual GDP growth rates and the annual standard devi-
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ation of monthly Industrial Production growth rates, respectively. The flex-
ible exchange rate regime dummy is based on the de facto classification of
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and takes the value 1 if a country has
a floating exchange rate regime, and 0 otherwise. Exchange rate volatility is
measured by the annual standard deviation of monthly changes of the real
effective exchange rate (REER).
The fiscal factors included are general government fiscal balance and
central government debt, both expressed as percentage of GDP. Openness
is measured as the sum of exports and imports as share of GDP. Follow-
ing Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), we measure
external exposure by external debt as percentage of GDP.
A financial crisis dummy is used as a proxy for financial instability. It
takes the value 1 if a country experiences a sovereign debt, currency, or
banking crisis in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The data on financial crises
come from Honahan and Laeven (2005) and Laeven and Valencia (2008).
Following Levine et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2009), we use private credit to
GDP as a proxy for financial development. The methodology for construct-
ing a market-based financial structure dummy is based on Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Levine (2001) and Beck and Levine (2002).5
The final variable is central bank instrument independence. As a proxy,
we use a dummy for economic independence of the central bank, which
takes the value 1 if the central bank is economically independent, and 0
otherwise. The dummy values are based on indices constructed in the liter-
ature (Cukierman et al., 1992; Cukierman et al., 2002; Arnone et al., 2007).
Since most studies measure independence as an average index over a cer-
5 To create a market-based financial structure dummy, we first construct the aggregate fin-
ancial structure index. The aggregate structure index consists of the size, activity, and effi-
ciency sub-indices, which measure the size, activity, and efficiency of the financial system,
respectively. They are calculated as follows:
Size Index = stock market capitalization/domestic assets of deposit money banks;
Activity Index = total stock market value traded/private credit of deposit money banks;
Efficiency Index = (total stock market value traded/GDP)× overhead costs.
The aggregate structure index is the average of these three sub-indices. If the structure index
is above the mean for the full sample, a country has a market-based financial system, and if
it is below the mean, it has a bank-based system.
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tain period of time, we use central banks’ documents to indicate the exact
year when central bank independence was enhanced.
To check for potential multicollinearity between the variables, we per-
form a correlation analysis (see Table B.2 in the Annex). Most explanatory
variables are not highly and significantly correlated.
Table 3.2 presents the mean comparison tests of the explanatory vari-
ables for all countries and for subsamples of OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries. We compare the means of variables in two groups — inflation targeters
and non-inflation targeters. We employ a two-sided mean comparison t test,
where the null hypothesis is that the mean difference of two groups is zero:
H0: mean (inflation targeters) – mean (non-inflation targeters) = 0. The altern-
ative hypothesis states that the mean difference is not zero. We perform the
mean comparison tests for unequal variances of variables in two groups.
The table suggests that there are important differences between both
groups of countries, as the mean values differ significantly for all variables.
Prior to the adoption of IT, inflation targeters had on average higher infla-
tion, lower levels of output growth and volatility, and higher exchange rate
volatility than non-inflation targeters. In addition, inflation targeters had
more flexible exchange rate regimes, a better fiscal performance, and lower
openness. Surprisingly, prior to the adoption central banks in IT countries
had lower instrument independence than central banks in non-IT countries.
This suggests that inflation targeters made their central banks independent
after they adopted IT.
The mean comparison tests of the financial variables suggest that infla-
tion targeters more frequently experienced financial crises prior to IT adop-
tion and have less developed financial markets than non-inflation targeters.
In addition, inflation targeters more often have a market-based financial sys-
tem than non-inflation targeters.
The mean comparison tests for OECD countries show that the mean dif-
ferences between inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters are statistic-
ally significant for all variables, except output growth. For the non-OECD
sample, inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters do not differ signific-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































antly in terms of central bank instrument independence, external debt, and
fiscal balance.
3.5 Empirical results
Before carrying out model estimations, we apply panel unit-root tests to
check for stationarity of the explanatory variables (see Table B.3 in the An-
nex). We use Fisher-type tests which allow for unbalanced panels. Only two
variables turn out to be non-stationary in either ADF or PP test. This should
not cause any serious problems during the estimation.
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results for the full sample. We find no
evidence for the existence of unobserved cross-country heterogeneity since
random effects are insignificant in the model. Consequently, we estimate a
pooled probit model with robust (White-corrected) standard errors. Since
coefficient estimates in probit cannot be interpreted directly, we report av-
erage marginal effects.6 Column (1) shows the estimation results for official
dates of adoption; columns (2) and (3) — for SIT and FFIT dates, respect-
ively.
The results using official adoption dates suggest that the likelihood that
a country adopts IT is significantly associated with the country’s macroe-
conomic performance, its exchange rate arrangements, fiscal discipline, and
financial development.
There is strong evidence that countries with low inflation are more likely
to adopt IT. Thus, countries adopt IT when they have already achieved low
and stable inflation. The marginal effect of inflation is much higher than that
of other factors, indicating the high relevance of this variable for IT choice.7
GDP growth is insignificant with a negative sign, while output volat-
ility is significant with a positive sign. Thus, countries with higher output
6 Average marginal effects are computed as averages of individual marginal effects. The
standard errors of marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
7 Note that if we compare coefficient estimates instead of marginal effects, the coefficient
estimate of inflation is also much higher (in absolute sense) than the coefficients of other
variables. This holds for all estimated models in the main and sensitivity analysis. Results
with reported coefficient estimates are available on request.
Inflation targeting: Exploring the factors leading to adoption 61
volatility are more likely to adopt IT.
Next, we find that a country with a flexible exchange rate regime is more
likely to adopt IT. According to the size of the marginal effect, this variable is
the second most relevant for the decision to adopt IT. Exchange rate volat-
ility is significant with a positive sign indicating that countries with more
volatile exchange rates tend to choose IT.
Our findings indicate that lower government debt significantly increases
the probability to adopt IT. However, the marginal effect of the fiscal balance
is insignificant. The external factors – the openness of the economy and ex-
ternal exposure — do not affect the likelihood to adopt IT.
Also our proxy for financial instability is insignificant. Interestingly, fin-
ancial development is significant with a negative sign. This result suggests
that countries with less developed financial systems are more likely to adopt
IT. In fact, it may be the case that countries with underdeveloped financial
systems choose to implement IT as a way to control inflation and also to
develop their financial system.
The financial structure index has a positive sign, which implies that coun-
tries with a market-based financial system are more likely to adopt IT. How-
ever, the marginal effect is insignificant.
Our proxy for central bank instrument independence is insignificant with
a positive sign. As suggested in section 3.2, it is possible that the central
bank becomes independent after IT is adopted. In addition, this result may
be caused by the fact that — at this stage — we do not distinguish between
advanced and emerging and developing countries. The quality of institu-
tions in advanced countries may be better than in emerging and developing
countries. Thus, while there is no evidence that central bank instrument in-
dependence affects the choice for IT in the full sample, this may be different
for the subsample of emerging and developing countries.
Next, the alternative dates of adoption as shown in Table 3.1 are used,
indicating the start of SIT (column (2) of Table 3.3) and FFIT (column (3) of
Table 3.3). The findings suggest that the factors leading to both types of IT
differ slightly. Most notably, inflation is less important for adopting SIT than
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Table 3.3. Factors leading to IT adoption — main results
(1) (2) (3)
Official IT dates SIT dates FFIT dates
Inflation −0.471 *** −0.218 ** −0.432 ***
(0.170) (0.103) (0.137)
Output growth −0.003 −0.003 −0.005 **
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Output volatility 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.065 *** 0.064 *** 0.058 ***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Exchange rate volatility 0.012 ** 0.014 *** 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Fiscal balance 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Government debt −0.001 ** −0.001 ** −0.001 **
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Trade openness 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
External debt −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Financial instability −0.002 −0.002 0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Market-based financial structure 0.021 0.039 * 0.019
(0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
Financial development −0.052 *** −0.052 *** −0.048 **
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Central bank 0.007 0.028 0.000
instrument independence (0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
Number of observations 562 531 577
Log-likelihood −88.11 −86.47 −88.46
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.17 0.14
Wald χ2 29.01 *** 30.03 *** 25.15 **
Notes: The table reports average marginal effects and their robust standard errors (in
parentheses). ***, **, and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance
level, respectively. Wald χ2 test, equivalent to the F test in linear regression, evaluates the
goodness-of-fit of the model.
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for adopting FFIT. Apparently, countries may adopt SIT without much con-
cern for low inflation, since central banks do not strongly commit to reach-
ing the inflation target. However, the decision to switch to FFIT requires
sufficiently low inflation.8 As for other factors, countries with high output
and exchange rate volatility, a flexible exchange rate regime, and better fiscal
discipline are more likely to adopt SIT. Financial structure and development
play a significant role, too. The choice of FFIT is not related to financial struc-
ture and output volatility, but other factors have a similar impact as in the
model for the likelihood to adopt SIT. In addition, output growth is signific-
ant with a negative sign for FFIT adoption.
Following Lucotte (2010), to control for the ’popularity effect’ of IT, we
add an explanatory variable that counts the number of countries that have
adopted IT until year t. Countries may adopt IT after observing that others
chose this strategy as well. The inclusion of this variable does not change our
main conclusions; the ’popularity effect’ is insignificant with a positive sign
for official IT and SIT adoption dates, while it is significant for FFIT dates.
These estimation results are available in Samarina and de Haan (2014).
3.6 Sensitivity analysis
We conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our
findings to changing and adding explanatory variables, modifying the coun-
try sample, and distinguishing several sub-samples. In the robustness checks
we use official dates of IT adoption.9
First, we include several additional explanatory variables that have been
suggested in the literature to correct for a potential omitted variable bias.
Following Carare and Stone (2006) and Lucotte (2010), we include the level
8 For example, Chile adopted SIT in 1991 when the country had high inflation. After infla-
tion was brought down from 21.8% in 1991 to 3.3% in 1999, Chile switched to FFIT.
9 Several sensitivity tests are not reported but are available on request. We use different spe-
cifications of volatility and exchange rate regime. Also, there is a potential multicollinearity
problem for openness, exchange rate regime and exchange rate volatility. We include in the
estimation each of these variables separately and in combinations with others. We find that
our main results are robust to different specifications.
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of economic development — proxied by the log of real GDP per capita —
as a factor leading to IT adoption. According to Lucotte (2010), more de-
veloped countries have better conditions for IT. Next, we include finan-
cial openness as another external factor. Higher capital mobility may shift
the central bank’s focus from inflation to exchange rates, making IT a less
preferred strategy option. We use the Chinn-Ito index to proxy financial
openness (Chinn and Ito, 2008). The inclusion of these additional variables
does not substantially change our main results. The economic development
proxy is insignificant, while the coefficient estimate of the financial open-
ness index is significant and negative.10 This implies that financially open
countries are less likely to adopt IT.
As a second robustness check, we drop all observations for EMU coun-
tries after the start of the currency area. By joining the euro area, these coun-
tries gave up their national sovereignty and delegated monetary policy to
the ECB. Since the ECB is responsible for monetary policy in the euro area,
EMU countries do not choose a monetary strategy. The results as shown in
column (1) of Table 3.4 are quite similar to those reported in Table 3.3.
We also re-estimate the models after including Switzerland as a non-
inflation targeter. This modification does not change our main conclusions.
Our next robustness check focuses on distinguishing different types of
IT. In the main analysis we estimated factors of IT adoption separately for
SIT and FFIT dates, but assumed that IT adoption is a binary choice (adopt
IT or not). However, it is reasonable to include several types of IT in one
model and examine the factors leading to the adoption of each IT type as
well as factors influencing transition from one IT type to another. Follow-
ing the approach of O’Sullivan and Tomljanovich (2012), we construct an
IT index which we use for one of the dimensions proposed by the authors,
namely the co-existence of other nominal targets in monetary policy. We
consider this aspect most relevant and obvious for distinguishing different
types of IT. The new dependent variable takes values 0, 1, or 2, depend-
ing on which monetary strategy a country chooses. Value 0 corresponds to
10 The results of these two robustness checks are available on request.
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a non-IT strategy, 1 to IT with more than one nominal target, and 2 to IT
with a single, inflation target.11 These choices are mutually exclusive and
unordered. The suitable specification is a multinomial probit model with
alternative-invariant regressors, estimated by Maximum Likelihood.12 The
probability that country i chooses monetary policy strategy j in year t, con-
ditional on the set of factors Xi,t−1 is:
pijt = Pr(yit = j) = Φ(Xi,t−1ψ), i = 1, . . . , N; t = 1, . . . , T; j = 0, 1, 2. (3.3)
For normalization, the non-IT strategy is set as the base, since it is most
prominent. The results are presented in Table 3.5. We report marginal effects
of a change in regressors on the probability of choosing strategy j.
Our findings suggest substantial differences in the factors leading to the
choice of IT types. First, low inflation significantly increases the probability
of adopting IT with a single, inflation target, while for the choice of IT with
multiple targets this factor is insignificant. Countries that do not have suffi-
ciently low inflation often start practicing IT with a combination of inflation
targets and other nominal anchors. Second, external factors, such as higher
exchange rate volatility and lower external exposure, significantly increase
the probability of adopting IT with multiple nominal anchors. Apparently,
countries that are sensitive to exchange rate changes adopt IT with multiple
targets (e.g., exchange rate pegs) in order to achieve price and exchange rate
stability. However, for adoption of the other IT type these factors are insig-
nificant, since a single inflation target implies that a central bank focuses
primarily on price stability. Third, low government debt increases the prob-
ability of adopting IT with a single target, while it is insignificant for the
choice of IT with multiple targets. Thus, strong commitment to the single
inflation target is complemented by good fiscal discipline, to avoid generat-
11 The dates of different IT regimes coincide with SIT (for IT with multiple targets) and FFIT
(for IT with a single target), as shown in Table 3.1. The exceptions are Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and Spain, for which we specify only IT with a single anchor based on the
official IT dates, since they used a single, inflation target from the start.
12 The methodology is described in Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 15) and Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, Chapter 15).
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ing inflation for reducing public debt. Additionally, countries with market-
based financial systems and higher central bank instrument independence
are more likely to adopt IT with multiple targets, while these factors are in-
significant for IT with a single inflation target. Finally, two factors have sim-
ilar impact on the choice of both IT types: countries with floating exchange
rates and less developed financial systems are more likely to adopt IT.
This robustness check shows that different factors lead to adopting dif-
ferent IT types. In addition, transition from IT with multiple targets to IT
with a single target is affected mainly by lower inflation and output growth,
better fiscal discipline, and flexible exchange rate regimes.
Finally, we split the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries. These
two groups of countries have different macroeconomic and institutional char-
acteristics, and, therefore, may pursue different objectives of monetary policy.
The (lack of) credibility of central banks plays an important role for IT adop-
tion, especially for non-OECD countries. Central banks in OECD countries
enjoy high credibility and do not face substantial difficulties in achieving
price stability. They adopt IT to maintain low and stable inflation and to ac-
quire a reliable nominal anchor for monetary policy (Bernanke et al., 1999;
Freedman and Laxton, 2009). Meanwhile, non-OECD (emerging and devel-
oping) countries often suffer from limited credibility of monetary authorities
(Amato and Gerlach, 2002). As a result, they do not only search for a good
monetary anchor, but also for a way to increase the credibility of their central
banks. Strong commitment to an inflation target is unfeasible for these coun-
tries during periods of high inflation, since failure to reach a target could un-
dermine the credibility of monetary authorities. These arguments provide
motivation for splitting the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries to
examine the factors leading to IT adoption. In view of the small number of
observations, the results should be interpreted with care.
While the results for the OECD sample are similar to the findings for
the full sample, for the non-OECD sample the results are different (columns
(2) and (3) of Table 3.4). OECD and non-OECD countries with low inflation,
flexible exchange rates, high output volatility, and low government debt are
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Table 3.4. Sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample, OECD Non-OECD Interaction effects with
modified for sample sample OECD dummy
EMU countries OECD=1 OECD=0
Inflation −0.522 *** −1.436 *** −0.281 −0.437 *** −0.531 ***
(0.195) (0.446) (0.199) (0.153) (0.192)
Output growth −0.004 −0.005 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Output volatility 0.003 * 0.005 ** 0.0002 0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Flexible exchange rate 0.070 *** 0.061 ** 0.082 ** 0.058 ** 0.073 **
regime (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.027) (0.031)
Exchange rate volatility 0.012 ** 0.037 *** 0.001 0.029 *** 0.005
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
Fiscal balance 0.002 0.002 −0.003 0.004 −0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Government debt −0.001 ** −0.002 *** 0.0001 −0.001 ** −0.001 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Trade openness 0.000 0.001 ** −0.0001 0.001 ** −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001)
External debt 0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0003 0.000 −0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.003)
Financial instability −0.004 −0.030 −0.001 0.011 −0.016
(0.022) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
Market-based 0.023 0.059 * 0.003 0.039 0.001
financial structure (0.023) (0.030) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Financial development −0.057 ** −0.088 *** 0.026 −0.055 ** −0.061 **
(0.023) (0.034) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024)
Central bank 0.011 −0.010 0.065 * 0.010 0.001
instrument independence (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.023)
Number of observations 486 303 259
Log-likelihood −86.66 −41.49 −32.35
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.34 0.24
Wald χ2 27.74 *** 52.78 *** 25.05 **
Notes: The table reports average marginal effects and their robust standard errors (in parentheses).
***, **, and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Wald χ2
test, equivalent to the F test in linear regression, evaluates the goodness-of-fit of the model.
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Table 3.5. Sensitivity analysis: multinomial probit
Base outcome — non-IT strategy (yit = 0)
IT with multiple IT with a single inflation
targets (yit = 1) target (yit = 2)
Inflation −0.037 −0.319 ***
(0.040) (0.079)
Output growth 0.003 −0.004 **
(0.002) (0.002)
Output volatility −0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.056 *** 0.067 ***
(0.021) (0.024)
Exchange rate volatility 0.010 *** 0.003
(0.004) (0.003)
Fiscal balance −0.0001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Government debt 0.000 −0.001 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Trade openness 0.000 0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
External debt −0.0004 *** 0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Financial instability 0.006 0.007
(0.013) (0.015)
Market-based financial structure 0.041 ** 0.015
(0.016) (0.014)
Financial development −0.060 *** −0.042 ***
(0.014) (0.014)
Central bank instrument independence 0.038 *** 0.003
(0.013) (0.014)
Number of observations 573
Log-likelihood −197.37
Wald χ2 104.15 ***
Notes: This table reports marginal effects and their standard errors (in parentheses). ***,
**, and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Wald χ2 test, equivalent to the F test in linear regression, evaluates the goodness-of-fit of
the model.
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more likely to adopt IT. However, whereas openness significantly increases
the likelihood to adopt IT in OECD countries, it has an insignificant effect
in non-OECD countries. Likewise, central bank instrument independence
increases the likelihood to adopt IT in the non-OECD sample, while it is
insignificant with a negative sign in the OECD sample.13 In addition, OECD
countries with less developed financial systems are more likely to adopt IT,
whereas financial development is insignificant in the non-OECD sample.
The occurrence of financial crises is insignificant in both subsamples. The
financial structure index is significant only for the OECD sample.
Alternatively, we conduct a robustness check for the full sample and in-
clude interaction terms of each variable with the OECD dummy (1 for OECD
countries, 0 for non-OECD). This way we can control directly for the differ-
ences in factors of IT adoption between the two country groups. Including
all interaction terms in a single model leads to a substantial loss of degrees
of freedom, which reduces the efficiency of estimates. Therefore, we add in-
teraction terms one by one. We use the method described by Brambor et al.
(2006) to calculate interaction effects in nonlinear models. Columns (4)-(5) in
Table 3.4 show the results. In these columns we report the interaction effects
of each explanatory variable for different values of the OECD dummy.
Our findings suggest that low inflation, a floating exchange rate regime,
low government debt, and low financial development are significant factors
leading to IT adoption in both country groups. Moreover, the marginal ef-
fects of these variables are larger (in absolute value) for non-OECD coun-
13 One needs to treat this result with caution. Especially for the non-OECD sample, where
this variable is positive and significant, the result may be overestimated due to the small
number of observations. In addition, a legal index of central bank independence may be a
poor proxy for actual independence in emerging and developing countries. The legal index is
based on official documents that set legal rules for central banks. However, those rules of law
are not always respected. Therefore, we construct an alternative index as: legal index × rule
of law index. The latter is based on the Law and Order index of the International Country
Risk Guide database. This proxy for independence is insignificant with a positive sign for
non-OECD countries and with a negative sign for OECD countries. It indicates that OECD
countries had a low level of actual central bank independence before they adopted IT. Mean
value statistics show that the actual index of central bank instrument independence was
lower for inflation targeters (both OECD and non-OECD) before the adoption and increased
substantially in the post-adoption period.
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tries, implying that these factors are more relevant for the decision of non-
OECD countries to adopt IT. There are also differences between two coun-
try groups in the sign and significance of trade openness and exchange
rate volatility. Different signs of the marginal effects are reported for out-
put volatility, fiscal balance, and financial instability.
In conclusion, the sensitivity analyses show that our main results are
quite robust to several modifications. The most important new insight is
that the factors leading to IT adoption differ between OECD and non-OECD
countries. Non-OECD countries that choose to adopt IT have different pre-
adoption characteristics than OECD countries. Additionally, different factors
lead to the choice of IT with multiple targets and IT with a single target.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines factors leading to the countries’ decision to adopt IT.
While the theoretical literature identifies several important factors affecting
the choice for this monetary policy strategy, previous empirical evidence
on their actual relevance is incomplete and mixed. We use a large sample
of countries to investigate the relevance of macroeconomic, external, fiscal,
financial, and institutional factors for the choice of IT. We employ a panel
probit model and solve potential endogeneity problem by excluding obser-
vations after IT adoption.
Our findings suggest that countries with low inflation, high output and
exchange rate volatility, a flexible exchange rate regime, fiscal discipline, less
developed financial markets and a market-based financial system are more
likely to adopt IT. Moreover, our results point to differences in factors lead-
ing to IT adoption between non-OECD and OECD countries. Low inflation,
low government debt, a floating exchange rate regime, low financial devel-
opment, and a high degree of central bank instrument independence are
associated with the choice of IT by non-OECD countries.
Chapter 4
Factors of inflation targeting
choice — the impact of
adoption∗
4.1 Introduction
This chapter builds upon the study conducted in Chapter 3 and explores
the methodological approach used in the analysis of inflation targeting (IT)
adoption.
Previous studies that analyze empirically the factors leading to IT choice
(e.g., Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; Hu, 2006; Mukherjee and Singer,
2008), do not differentiate between the factors of IT adoption and the factors
of IT continuation. These studies commonly use the full sample for estim-
ation, i.e., they keep observations before and after adoption, until the end
of the analyzed period. Such data treatment may cause endogeneity and
asymmetry problems, leading to biased results.
In this chapter we examine how the analysis of IT adoption is affected by
the choice of methodological approach, i.e., by either keeping or excluding
observations for the post-adoption period. We apply panel probit models on
the dataset of Chapter 3 and test whether IT adoption leads to a structural
∗This chapter is based upon Samarina and Sturm (2013).
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change, as a result of which country characteristics influence the choice of
IT differently before and after its adoption.
When analyzing the decision to apply or not to apply IT at a specific
moment in time, one should take into account which monetary policy stra-
tegy a country has so far used (IT or non-IT). To put it differently, the de-
cision to switch from non-IT to IT might not be symmetric to the decision to
switch from IT to non-IT. It seems to be institutionally and politically easier
to switch from non-IT to IT than vice versa. Hence, we cannot model this
process symmetrically. Indeed, the asymmetry is present in real life as we
do not observe (at least up to now) any transition from IT to an alternative
monetary policy strategy. So far, none of the IT countries has been forced to
abandon it. Thus, once a country adopts IT, the self-reinforcing mechanisms
make IT enduring (see section 4.2 for further discussion).
Our findings suggest that the decision to adopt IT is different from the
decision to maintain IT. The factors related to IT differ significantly between
the pre- and post-adoption periods, indicating that IT adoption creates a
structural change in institutional and economic characteristics of a country.
Most notably, the effect of inflation is largely overestimated in the model
including the post-adoption period. Thus, using the full sample (i.e., in-
cluding the post-adoption period) for analyzing IT adoption leads to biased
parameter estimates. This bias causes an overstatement of the importance of
variables that are pushed by the actual implementation of IT.
4.2 Theoretical framework
IT has proven to be a durable monetary policy strategy: so far no country has
been forced to give it up.1 The possible reason for the high durability of IT is
1 Note that three EU members (Finland, Spain, and Slovakia) abandoned IT when they
joined the euro area. However, this decision was not caused by unsatisfactory economic res-
ults, but rather by the institutional commitment of countries to adopt the euro. Thus, their
choice to abandon IT was politically predetermined and can be considered as an exception.
Additionally, although these countries gave up explicit IT, their new monetary strategy un-
der ECB framework resembles implicit IT and might in the future be transformed into a
formal IT strategy (Rose, 2007).
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its endogeneity.2 As an explanation of this endogeneity, we refer to the liter-
ature on Optimum Currency Areas (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Rose, 2000). In
such studies it is argued that countries are more likely to satisfy the criteria
for entry into a currency union ex post than ex ante. That is, even if a currency
union is not an optimal choice for a country at the point of its accession, the
process of economic and trade integration will transform the economic fun-
damentals and institutions in such a way that a currency union becomes an
optimal regime after all. Consequently, given the self-reinforcing mechan-
isms and on top of that the asymmetry in political consequences, it becomes
more difficult and costly to exit a currency union than to stay in.
Similar mechanisms may be at work for IT. Although some countries
do not satisfy initial conditions for IT adoption, they may choose to apply
IT anyway in a belief of its effectiveness in controlling inflation. Once IT
is in place, country characteristics and institutions subsequently develop in
a way that supports the IT framework. As institutions adjust to functioning
under IT, it reinforces the decision of the central bank to maintain IT, making
it an endogenously determined optimal choice. In this situation, abandoning
IT becomes more difficult than keeping this strategy. The decision to give
up IT after years of its implementation may undermine the credibility of the
central bank and destabilize inflation expectations.
Given the endogeneity of IT, there is an asymmetry in the monetary stra-
tegy choice. That is, the (importance of) factors influencing the decision to
continue or exit IT are likely to be different from those affecting the decision
to adopt or not adopt IT. This asymmetry is caused by a structural change
during and after IT adoption. Ignoring the asymmetry and structural change
leads to biased estimation results and inadequate statistical inference.
Therefore, we test the hypothesis:
IT adoption creates a structural change in economic and institutional conditions.
As a result, the factors driving IT adoption are different from those leading to IT
2 In this paper, endogeneity of IT is understood in a broader economic sense — endogenous
means ’having an internal cause or origin’. Thus, when we say that IT is endogenous, we
infer that its continuation is internally affected by the institutions and economic conditions
that are shaped under the IT regime.
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continuation.
Special attention in this analysis is given to inflation, which is considered
to be the most important factor driving IT adoption. Previous studies find
that lower inflation increases the probability to adopt IT (see Chapter 3). At
the same time, the implementation of IT helps to maintain low inflation. As
inflation after IT adoption is influenced by the use of IT, the importance of
this variable could be overstated. Thus, we expect that the effect of inflation
on the probability of IT adoption is overestimated in models that do not
distinguish between the pre- and post-adoption periods.
4.3 Methodology
The study employs a panel binary choice model where the dependent vari-
able yit (i = 1, . . . , N; t = 1, . . . , T) takes the value 1 if country i implements
IT in year t, and 0 otherwise. We use a probit specification and estimate two
types of models: (i) random effects probit to account for unobserved cross-
country heterogeneity; (ii) pooled probit with standard errors clustered at
the country level to control for serial correlation across time.3
To test whether the explanatory variables influence the probability of IT
choice differently before and after IT adoption, we employ a structural break
analysis. Let D(τ) be a time function, where τ measures the duration of IT
in years, starting from 0 in the adoption year. The unrestricted model has
the form:
Pr(yit = 1|Xi,t−1, D(τ), µi) =
Φ(α+ β′Xi,t−1 + θ′D(τ) + λ′(Xi,t−1 × D(τ)) + µi),
(4.1)
where yit = 1 if y∗it > 0, yit = 0 if y
∗
it ≤ 0, y∗it is an unobserved latent
variable which describes the decision to adopt IT; Φ(.) is a cumulative dis-
tribution function of a standard normal distribution; α is a constant term;
3 We do not estimate a fixed effects model because it drops the entire control group, i.e., all
countries that did not adopt IT. For this reason, a fixed effects model has not been used in
previous studies of IT adoption either.
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β, θ,λ are vectors of parameters to be estimated; Xi,t−1 is a matrix of explan-
atory variables, lagged one year, as current decisions of central banks rely
on the history of analyzed factors; Xi,t−1 × D(τ) is a matrix of interaction
terms between the explanatory variables and D(τ); µi are random effects,
uncorrelated with the regressors, µi|Xi,t−1, D(τ) ∼ N (0, σ2µ).
Given that the adjustment of country characteristics to IT implementa-
tion is a gradual process, we introduce D(τ) as a smooth transition function.
Such specification takes into account the fact that it may take more than one
year to accommodate the economic conditions and institutions so as to be
compatible with the IT framework. For τ > 0, D(τ) is specified as:
1) D(τ) = e−ρ/τ; ρ ≥ 0, ρ is a decay parameter; a larger value of ρ means a
slower transition;
2) D(τ) = 1− e(−γτ2); γ > 0, γ is the speed of transition; a smaller value of
γ implies a slower transition.
In the estimations, we will use both specifications of D(τ) to examine
the sensitivity of results to the choice of the smooth transition function.
For the pre-adoption period, τ = 0 and D(τ) = 0, the estimated para-
meters for the explanatory variables correspond to vector β. For the post-
adoption period, τ > 0 and D(τ) > 0, the estimated parameters are β, θ,
and λ.
The restricted model has the form:
Pr(yit = 1|Xi,t−1, µi) = Φ(α+ β′Xi,t−1 + µi). (4.2)
The estimation procedure is the following: first we estimate the restricted
model; then, we fit the unrestricted model with different specifications of
D(τ) and use a Wald test to test for the joint significance of the interaction
terms and D(τ). Testing for a structural break implies the following null and
alternative hypotheses:
H0: there is no structural break, i.e. all interaction terms with D(τ) plus D(τ)
itself have jointly insignificant coefficient estimates;
H1: there is a structural break after IT adoption, i.e. either the coefficient of
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D(τ) or at least one of interaction terms are significantly different from zero.
Additionally, to show how the findings could be affected by excluding
the post-adoption period, we estimate the model in (4.2) while removing
observations on countries after they adopt IT, as was done in Chapter 3.
4.4 Data
We use the dataset from Chapter 3, consisting of 60 countries (30 IT and
30 non-IT) over the period 1985–2008. We conduct estimations for official
adoption dates according to the central banks’ documents (see Table 3.1).4
We analyze 12 explanatory variables associated with IT choice, namely:
inflation, output growth, output volatility, exchange rate regime, exchange
rate volatility, fiscal balance, government debt, trade openness, external debt,
market-based financial structure, financial development, and an index for
actual central bank instrument independence (ACBI independence).5 These
variables are analyzed in previous studies as potential factors leading to
IT adoption (e.g., Hu, 2006; Mukherjee and Singer, 2008). First, we include
6 explanatory variables that are found significant in Chapter 3. These are:
inflation, output volatility, flexible exchange rate regime dummy, exchange
rate volatility, government debt, and financial development. Subsequently,
we extend the model and examine all 12 variables.
4.5 Empirical results
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the estimation results for random effects probit
and pooled probit models, respectively. First, we fit the model with 6 and
then with 12 explanatory variables. We report average partial effects at µ¯ = 0
for random effects probit and average marginal effects for pooled probit.
In the transition function D(τ) we set ρ and γ equal to 1, which implies
4 The estimation results using alternative adoption dates for soft IT and full-fledged IT are
qualitatively similar and available on request.
5 See Chapter 3 and Table B.1 (Annex) for a description and the data sources of the explan-
atory variables.
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a transition half-life (i.e. when D(τ) = 0.5) of 17 months and 10 months,
respectively.
We also report the estimation results for the models as specified in Equa-
tion (4.2), where we exclude the post-adoption period for IT countries.
The Wald test statistics indicate that all interaction terms with D(τ) plus
D(τ) itself are jointly significant in the unrestricted models. Thus, we reject
the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative that there is a structural break
after IT adoption.
Our results point to substantial differences between restricted and unres-
tricted models in terms of significance and magnitude of marginal/partial
effects for the explanatory variables. In the unrestricted models we find
significant but smaller effects (in an absolute sense) for inflation, exchange
rate regime, exchange rate volatility, and financial development.6 Especially
noteworthy is the finding that in the unrestricted models the estimated ef-
fects of inflation are substantially different from the restricted models, point-
ing to a large overestimation bias in the latter. This result is in line with our
argument that the impact of inflation on the decision to apply IT changes
considerably after IT adoption. Furthermore, in the random effects probit
models the estimates of government debt turn significant in the unrestric-
ted models, whereas output volatility, trade openness, external debt, and
market-based financial structure become insignificant. The remaining vari-
ables do not show noticeable changes. The results for the pooled probit mod-
els are comparable to the ones for the random effects probit models.
Comparing the results for the restricted model and the model exclud-
ing the post-adoption period, we find considerable differences between the
two. All marginal/partial effects are much smaller (in absolute values) in the
model without the post-adoption period. Thus, including the post-adoption
period leads to overestimation bias in the analysis of factors leading to IT
adoption. This bias could be eliminated by excluding observations on coun-
tries after they adopt IT.
6 The only exceptions are financial development and exchange rate variables in the unres-
tricted random effects probit specification with 12 explanatory variables. As compared to the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since ρ and γ cannot be easily estimated, we conduct a robustness ana-
lysis to check how sensitive the results are to the choice of ρ and γ.7 Fig-
ures 4.1 and 4.2 show the estimated effects across different values of ρ and
γ, respectively, that are used to measure half-lives of transition. In Figure 4.1
the half-life of transition varies from 3.5 months (i.e. ρ = 0.2) to 69 months
(i.e. ρ = 4), while in Figure 4.2 the half-life of transition varies from 45
months (i.e. γ = 0.05) to 6 months (i.e. γ = 3). We show the graphs for
models including 6 explanatory variables (the results using 12 variables are
comparable and available on request).8 We find that the outcomes with the
exception of inflation do not vary substantially across ρ and γ in terms of
sign and significance of the estimated effects. For inflation, the estimated
effects become much smaller (in absolute value) as transition is allowed to
go faster. Moreover and as to be expected, the slower is the transition to IT
(corresponding to a higher half-life of transition), the closer our estimates
get to the restricted model. However, even for a very slow transition, the
results from the unrestricted models remain significantly different from the
restricted model.
The comparison between the restricted and unrestricted models shows
that using the assumption that the factors explaining IT adoption do not
depend upon the monetary regime in place is rejected by the data. Stud-
ies that rely on this assumption tend to overestimate the effects of crucial
economic factors, such as inflation, exchange rate regime, financial develop-
ment, fiscal discipline, and trade openness on the probability of countries to
start applying IT (e.g., Hu, 2006; Mukherjee and Singer, 2008).
7 Alternatively, one could apply non-linear techniques to program the estimation of ρ and
γ. This remains a task for future work.
8 The variables shown on the graphs include: inflation (INFL), output volatility (OUTVOL),
a flexible exchange rate regime dummy (EXRATE), exchange rate volatility (EXRVOL), gov-
ernment debt (GOVDEBT), and financial development (FINDEV).
Factors of inflation targeting choice — the impact of adoption 81
Figure 4.1. Average partial/marginal effects for D(τ) = e−ρ/τ
Figure 4.2. Average partial/marginal effects for D(τ) = 1− e(−γτ2)
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter examines how the selection of the time period affects the ana-
lysis of IT adoption and tests whether country characteristics influence the
probability to use IT differently before and after adoption. We find that there
is a structural change in economic and institutional characteristics occur-
ring during and after IT adoption. The factors leading to IT adoption dif-
fer significantly between the periods before and after adoption due to the
asymmetry and endogeneity of IT. Importantly, the effect of inflation on the
probability of IT adoption is largely overestimated in the model including
the post-adoption period. Hence, using the full sample for analyzing the
determinants of IT adoption produces biased parameter estimates. Exclud-
ing all the observations after the IT adoption date eliminates this bias. This
approach has been applied in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
Chapter 5
Spatial interactions in inflation
targeting adoption: a spatial
probit approach∗
5.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters we investigated different country characterist-
ics that may lead to inflation targeting (IT) adoption. However, the decision
of countries to apply IT could be influenced not only by their own charac-
teristics but also by the monetary strategy choices of other countries.
Previous studies on IT adoption ignore spatial interdependence between
countries in their decisions to adopt or not to adopt IT; consequently, they
use ordinary binary choice models. To our knowledge, only Mukherjee and
Singer (2008) analyze the decision of 78 countries to adopt IT dependent
on the decisions taken by other countries using time-series cross-sectional
data over the period 1987–2003. These authors find that the probability that
a country will adopt IT increases if other (neighboring) countries have pre-
ceded. However, by just pooling cross-sectional data over time, they impli-
citly assume that the period that has expired since a neighboring country
has decided to adopt IT, has no impact. In addition, they assume that neigh-
∗This chapter is based upon Elhorst et al. (2013).
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boring countries that did not adopt yet, have the same impact as countries
that already switched to IT.
In this chapter we apply spatial econometrics to explore spatial interac-
tions between countries in IT adoption. We construct a spatial probit model
with two spatially lagged variables, one for countries that did not adopt IT
yet and one for countries that already transferred to IT. The parameters of
this model will be estimated based on observations of those countries that
are still using non-IT strategies at the start of the different time periods con-
sidered; observations on countries after they switched to IT are removed.
The dependent variable and the first spatial term are both specified in terms
of unobserved choices, i.e. the willingness to adopt IT, while the second spa-
tial term is specified in terms of observed choices, i.e., the actual adoption.
Consequently, we allow countries that did not adopt IT yet to have a differ-
ent impact than countries that already adopted.
The standard spatial probit model may be used to explain interaction ef-
fects among geographical units when the dependent variable takes the form
of a binary response variable. However, one shortcoming of this model is
that it cannot be used to explain the transition from one state to another
when this transition for one geographical unit takes place at a different mo-
ment in time than for another unit.
These and related issues have been discussed in the literature on dura-
tion modeling (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Chapter 17). Generally, dur-
ation models are used to explain the time that has passed to the moment
when unit i transfers from one state to another.1 This literature has produced
two results that are relevant for our study. First, if the data are observed in
discrete time intervals, one can use a discrete-time transition model, since
in each time interval two outcomes are possible: the transition to the differ-
ent state takes place or it does not (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 602). A
probit model which restricts the coefficients of the regressors to be constant
over time, except for the intercept, is then a straightforward and legitim-
ate choice. Second, observations on units after they transferred to another
1 A well-known example is the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972).
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state are generally removed from the sample. This is because explanatory
variables that change over time may exhibit feedback and hence may not be
strictly exogenous; once a unit has transferred to another state, the explan-
atory variables may change as a result of this transition.
The standard probit model as suggested in Cameron and Trivedi (2005)
for duration data is not appropriate for our setting since individual units are
treated as independent entities. Interaction effects result in additional com-
plications. In duration models the process that is observed may have begun
at different points in time for different units in the sample. In our setting not
only the time that has passed before units transfer to state 1 is important,
but also the time that has passed since the transfer of other units. Therefore,
the transfer process can only be modeled adequately if the starting point of
the observation period is the same for every unit in the sample.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the
literature on spatial probit models. A detailed description of our model is
provided in section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the data, while section 5.5
presents the empirical results. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Spatial probit models: a review
The spatial error probit model
The basic spatial probit model is a linear regression model with spatially
correlated error terms ε i for a cross-section of N observations (i = 1, . . . , N).
In vector notation, the spatial error probit model reads as
Y∗ = Xβ+ ε, ε = λWε+ v, (5.1)
where Y∗ is an N × 1 vector consisting of one observation on the latent
dependent variable for every unit in the sample, and X is an N × K mat-
rix of explanatory variables with parameters contained in a K × 1 vector
β. ε = (ε1, . . . , εN)′ and v = (v1, . . . , vN)′ represent the error terms of the
model; ε reflects the spatially correlated error term with the coefficient λ,
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while v follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
I. We use I rather than σ2I here since β and σ2 cannot be separately identi-
fied. For this reason, σ2 is set to 1. W is an N×N pre-specified non-negative
spatial weights matrix describing whether or not the spatial units in the sam-
ple are neighbors of each other. Its diagonal elements are zero, since no unit
can be viewed as its own neighbor. Usually, the spatial weights matrix is
normalized such that the elements of each row sum to one. The spatial error
model is consistent with a situation where determinants of the dependent
variable omitted from the model are spatially autocorrelated, and with a
situation where unobserved shocks follow a spatial pattern. The spatial er-
ror probit model in (5.1) can be rewritten as
Y∗ = Xβ+ ε = Xβ+ (I − λW)−1v, (5.2)
which implies that the covariance matrix of ε isΩλ = [(I−λW)′(I−λW)]−1.
The basic problem that needs to be solved in estimating this model is
that the likelihood function cannot be written as the product of N one-
dimensional normal probabilities as is the case with a standard (non-spatial)
probit model. This is because individual error terms ε i (i = 1, . . . , N) are de-













Another problem might be the inversion of the matrix (I−λW) for large
values of N when using a numerical algorithm to find the optimum of λ,
especially if this inversion needs to be repeated several times. This is be-
cause the number of steps which most algorithms require to determine the
inverse of an N × N matrix is proportional to N3. Nevertheless, for small
or moderate values of N (<1000) this is not really a problem. The spatial
error probit model has mainly been used to present solutions to these meth-
odological problems (see McMillen (1992), Pinkse and Slade (1998), LeSage
(2000), Beron and Vijverberg (2004), Fleming (2004), and Klier and McMillen
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(2008)), but it has rarely been used in empirical applications.
The spatial lag probit model
Another popular spatial probit model is the spatial lag probit model: a lin-
ear regression model with endogenous interaction effects among the unob-
served dependent variable:
Y∗ = ρWY∗ + Xβ+ v, (5.4)
where ρ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient. Endogenous interaction ef-
fects are typically considered as the formal specification for the equilibrium
outcome of a spatial or social interaction process, in which the value of the
dependent variable for one agent is jointly determined with that of neigh-
boring agents. By rewriting the spatial lag probit model as
Y∗ = (I − ρW)−1Xβ+ (I − ρW)−1v = (I − ρW)−1Xβ+ ε, (5.5)
it can be seen that the covariance matrix of ε in this model is similar to that
of spatial error probit, Ωρ = [(I − ρW)′(I − ρW)]−1, the difference being
that the parameter λ is replaced by ρ. To estimate this model, not only the
integration of N-dimensional integral needs to be accounted for, but also the
endogeneity of the variable WY∗. Many studies have considered this model
from a methodological viewpoint: McMillen (1992), LeSage (2000), Beron
and Vijverberg (2004), Fleming (2004), Klier and McMillen (2008), LeSage
and Pace (2009, Chapter 10), Franzese Jr. and Hays (2010), Pace and LeSage
(2012). It has also been used in many empirical studies, among which, Muk-
herjee and Singer (2008) and LeSage et al. (2011).
An important variant of the spatial lag probit model for the analysis to
be conducted in this chapter is
Y∗ = ρWY + Xβ+ v, (5.6)
where the latent dependent variable Y∗ depends on observed choices rep-
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resented by WY rather than unobserved ones. The only application of this
model we could find is Qu and Lee (2012). They derive LM tests for spatial
correlation in a standard probit model not only if the alternative model is
Equation (5.4) but also if the model is Equation (5.6). Soetevent and Koore-
man (2007) apply Equation (5.6) to analyze social interactions in the beha-
vior of teens at high school. They assume that the unobserved choice of in-
dividual i depends on the observed choices of other individuals. One of the
basic problems of this interaction model is that it does not have a unique
equilibrium, but different equilibria depending on the sign of the interac-
tion parameter ρ and on the sample size N (Soetevent and Kooreman, 2007,
Propositions 2 and 3). To estimate the model they assume that the prob-
ability that one particular equilibrium occurs is equal to one over the total
number of equilibria.
Estimation methods
The expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm adapted by McMillen (1992)
for the spatial probit model is one of the earliest attempts to deal with the
multidimensional integration problem. The E-step takes the expectation of
the log-likelihood function for the latent variable y∗i conditional on its ob-
served value yi and the parameter vector. The initial parameter vector is
obtained by estimating the spatial model as if the dependent variable is
continuous, while subsequent values are obtained from the previous iter-
ation. The M-step maximizes the likelihood function for the parameter vec-
tor conditional on the expected value of yi obtained from the E-step, which
boils down to estimating a regular spatial model for a continuous variable.
These steps are then repeated until the parameter vector converges. This al-
gorithm, however, has been severely criticized. First, there is a substantial
computational burden in the repetitions of the algorithm (Fleming, 2004).
Second, it does not produce an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix
needed to determine the standard errors and t-values of the parameter es-
timates (LeSage, 2000; Fleming, 2004). It should be stressed that this is be-
cause of another methodological shortcoming that has not been discussed
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in the literature before. Whereas the expectation of the latent variable y∗i in
the EM algorithm is determined conditional on the observed value yi of the
unit itself, it should be determined conditional on the observed values of all
other units. Consequently, this algorithm produces inconsistent parameter
estimates.
A similar type of problem applies to the Bayesian MCMC estimation
procedure initially developed by LeSage (2000). This procedure is based
on sequentially drawing model parameters from their conditional distribu-
tions. This process of sampling parameters continues until the distribution
of draws converges to the targeted joint posterior distribution of the model
parameters. Two different sampling schemes are used: the Gibbs sampler for
model parameters that have standard conditional distributions (β, Y∗), and
the Metropolis-Hastings sampler for the spatial parameter λ in the spatial
error model or ρ in the spatial lag model, both of which have a non-standard
distribution (LeSage and Pace, 2009, Chapter 7). The key problem is to sam-
ple Y∗. In LeSage (2000), the individual elements of Y∗ are obtained by
sampling from a sequence of univariate truncated normal distributions. In
later work, LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 285) point out that ”this cannot be done
for the case of a truncated multivariate distribution” (emphasis in original).
Draws for individual elements y∗i should be based on the distribution of
y∗i conditional on all other N − 1 elements [y∗1 , . . . , y∗i−1, y∗i+1, . . . , y∗N ]. Prob-
ably because James LeSage has made a Matlab routine of the (improved)
Bayesian MCMC estimator of the spatial lag probit model available at his
website (www.spatial-econometrics.com), it has been frequently used in
empirical research (Mukherjee and Singer, 2008; Wang and Kockelman, 2009;
LeSage et al., 2011). Another reason might be that Bayesian MCMC is faster
than other estimation techniques (Franzese Jr. and Hays, 2010). One draw-
back of the Bayesian MCMC is that it is difficult to verify whether conver-
gence actually occurs. In some experiments we carried out it clearly did
not, even though LeSage’s Matlab routine simply reported final estimation
results after the pre-specified number of draws had been passed through.
Choosing starting values sometimes helps but not always. In addition, the
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convergence to the joint posterior distribution is sometimes sensitive to the
choice of the prior distributions (Franzese Jr. and Hays, 2010).
A third estimation method is Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),
initially proposed by Pinkse and Slade (1998) for the estimation of a spa-
tial error probit model. To deal with the endogeneity of the spatially lagged
dependent variables in case of the spatial lag model, the variable WY∗ is
instrumented by [X WX . . .W gX], where g is a pre-selected constant. Typ-
ically, one would take g = 1 or g = 2, dependent on the number of re-
gressors and the type of model (see Kelejian et al., 2004). To avoid repeated
inversions of the matrix (I − λW), they linearize spatial parameters around
the non-spatial parameter values that are obtained from a standard (non-
spatial) probit or logit model. GMM studies do not specify the distribution
function of the error terms, and therefore do not solve the multidimensional
integration problem. Moreover, they ignore spatial interaction effects among
the error terms.2
This chapter adopts a maximum likelihood estimation method. Starting
from McMillen (1992), Beron and Vijverberg (2004) developed a Simulated
Maximum Likelihood (SML) estimator for the spatial lag probit model. This
simulation method is known as Recursive-Importance-Sampling (RIS) and
relies on Monte Carlo simulation of truncated multivariate normal distribu-
tions, as discussed by Vijverberg (1997). First, a lower-triangular Cholesky
matrix of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms is determined,
and then the multidimensional integral in Equation (5.3) is evaluated. Ori-
ginally, Vijverberg (1997) considered four different density functions: the
logit, normal, t and a transform of the Beta(2,2). Although relatively slow,
Beron and Vijverberg (2004) favor the normal distribution for its efficiency.
These authors also point out that the RIS-normal simulator is identical to
the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Haji-
vassiliou, 1993; Keane, 1993). The advantage of this estimation method is
that it provides a feasible and efficient algorithm to approximate the N-
dimensional truncated normal density function needed to maximize the
2 See Elhorst et al. (2013) for details.
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log-likelihood function. A more detailed explanation is given in the next
section. Franzese Jr. and Hays (2010) compare the performance of different
estimation methods of the spatial lag probit model and find that the RIS
simulator produces more efficient estimates of the spatial parameter ρ than
Bayesian MCMC. However, the RIS procedure turns out to be computation-
ally intensive and time-consuming. Recently, Pace and LeSage (2012) called
the GHK/RIS simulator one of the most effective techniques for computing
the N-dimensional truncated normal distribution. They also suggest sev-
eral sparse matrix algorithms to speed up computation time. Unfortunately,
their Matlab routines are not available yet.
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Model
Suppose there are two states, 0 and 1, that yit denotes the state a particular
unit i (i = 1, . . . , N) is in at time t (t = 1, . . . , T). We are interested in the
determinants of transition from state 0 to state 1. The transition from one
state to another for one unit takes place at a different moment in time than
for another unit. To deal with this issue we assume that the data are sorted;
first the units that are in state 0 at the start of time period t (Y0∗t ) followed by
the units that are already in state 1 at the start of period t (Y1∗t ). We initially
















where t = 1, . . . , T is an index for the time dimension. The N× N matrix Wt
describing the spatial arrangement of the units in the sample is partitioned
into four submatrices: W00t expresses spatial relations between the units that
are in state 0 at the start of period t; W11t between the units that are already
in state 1 at the start of t; and W01t and W
01
t describe spatial relations of the
units in state 0 with the units in state 1 (and vice versa) at the start of period
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t. Since the number of spatial units in state 0 and 1 may be different from one
period to another, these submatrices are time dependent. This is indicated
by the subscript t.3
If observations on units after they transferred to state 1 are removed from
the sample, in line with the literature on duration models, only the observa-
tions with superscript 0 in the first line of this model remain. If N0t denotes
the number of observations that are not yet in state 1 at the start of period
t, the total number of observations to estimate the parameters of this model
amounts to ∑Tt=1 N0t . Due to the removal of observations that are in state
1, the expected value of the latent variable Y1∗t on the right-hand side is no
longer defined. Therefore, we replace the latent variable Y1∗t by the observed
variable Zt which is equivalent to Y1t . Furthermore, since it is reasonable to
assume that neighboring units that already transferred to state 1 have a dif-
ferent impact than neighboring units that are still in state 0, we allow these
two variables to have different coefficients ρ and δ. This yields
Y0∗t = ρW00t Y0∗t + δW01t Zt + X0t β+ v0t . (5.8)
The first variable on the right-hand side, W00t Y
0∗
t , denotes the endogen-
ous interaction effect with neighboring units that are also in state 0 at the
start of period t. That is, it includes all neighboring units that will transfer
to state 1 during period t as well as units that will not transfer during this
period. The second variable on the right-hand side, W01t Zt, denotes the in-
teraction effect with neighboring units that transferred to state 1 any time
before period t (i.e., in periods t − 1, t − 2, t − 3, etc.). The first variable,
like the dependent variable, is specified in terms of unobserved choices, and
the second variable in terms of observed choices. In some studies, there are
units that are still in state 0 at the end of the observation period and units
that already transferred to state 1 before the start of the observation period.
In the first case, the sample is called right-censored; these observations are
covered by the first spatial term on the right-hand side of the regression. In








t × N0t , N0t × N1t , N1t × N0t
and N1t × N1t , respectively, where Nt = N0t + N1t , for all t.
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the second case, the sample is called left-censored; these observations are
covered by the second spatial term on the right-hand side of the regression.
Units that did not yet transfer may be affected by neighboring units that
also did not yet transfer, and vice versa, as a result of which the right-hand
side variable W00t Y
0∗
t , needs to be treated as an endogenous explanatory
variable. Units that did not yet transfer may also be affected by neighbor-
ing units that already transferred before period t . However, since observa-
tions on units in time periods after they transferred to state 1 are removed
from the sample, units that did already transfer cannot be affected by units
that are still in state 0. Consequently, the right-hand side variable W01t Zt is
treated as an exogenous rather than an endogenous explanatory variable.4
Hence, the parameters in Equation (5.8) can be estimated similarly to those
of a standard spatial lag probit model, Equation (5.4).
5.3.2 Estimation
Based on strengths and weaknesses of different estimation methods dis-
cussed in section 2, we use the RIS/GHK-simulator for the normal distribu-
tion to obtain ML parameter estimates, described in Vijverberg (1997). For
this we need to evaluate an N-dimensional integral similar to Equation (5.3).
We explain the mechanisms behind the simulator using a simple example.
Assume that N = 3, Y = (1, 0, 1)′ and that the mean µ of Y∗ corresponds
to Equation (5.8) with variance-covariance matrix Ωρ, where Ωρ is positive
definite. Using the Cholesky decomposition, we can find a lower-triangular
matrix Q such that QQ′ = Ωρ. Taking qij as elements of Q, we have:
y∗1 = µ1 + q11ν1 ≥ 0
y∗2 = µ2 + q21ν1 + q22ν2 ≤ 0
y∗3 = µ3 + q31ν1 + q32ν2 + q33ν3 ≥ 0.
Note that ν1 follows a standard normal distribution truncated below by
4 This is the reason why we change the notation from Y1t to Zt in Equation (5.8).
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−µ1/q11. Let z1 be a draw from this distribution.5 Conditional on z1, ν2 fol-




Next, let z2 be a draw from the distribution of ν2. Finally, conditional on z1
and z2, ν3 follows a standard normal distribution truncated below by
−µ3 − q31z1 − q32z2
q33
,
and z3 is a draw from this distribution.
Since z1, z2, and z3 are independently distributed, the mean of p˜r = (1−
Φ(z1))Φ(z2)(1 − Φ(z3)) is the joint probability that y∗1 ≥ 0, y∗2 ≤ 0 and







is a consistent estimator of the joint probability, known as the RIS estimator
(Vijverberg, 1997; Beron and Vijverberg, 2004). The general form of the RIS













5 The procedure of drawing from a truncated standard normal distribution is the following:




where Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. If u ∼ U (0, 1), then we can draw
x by solving u = F(x). This leads to:
x = Φ−1(u(1−Φ(a)) +Φ(a)).
If x < a, then a similar derivation method implies
x = Φ−1((1− u)Φ(a)).
Spatial interactions in inflation targeting adoption 95












by the following optimization
min
β,ρ
{− log L(β, ρ)}
subject to ρ ∈ (−1/ωmin, 1), where ωmin denotes the smallest characteristic
root of W . Note that δ is an element of β. Finally, we compute the Hessian H
of − log L(β, ρ) numerically and calculate standard deviations as the square
root of the diagonal elements of H−1.
Lee (2004) and Qu and Lee (2012) show that the ML estimator of the spa-
tial lag and the spatial probit model produces consistent and asymptotically
normal estimates, provided that several regularity conditions are satisfied
(see Elhorst et al. (2013) for a description of regularity conditions).
5.3.3 Direct and indirect effects
It is known that the point estimates of the parameter vector β in the probit
model Y∗ = Xβ+ v and in the spatial lag model with a continuous depend-
ent variable Y = ρWY + Xβ+ v are not equal to their marginal effects, see
respectively Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 466) and LeSage and Pace (2009,
pp. 293–297). LeSage et al. (2011) consider the marginal effects of the spatial
probit model by combining these two models. When applied to our model
set forth in Equation (5.8), the matrix of partial derivatives of the expected
value of Y with respect to the kth explanatory variable of X in unit 1 up to
















. . . ∂E(yNt)∂xNk
 = diag(φ(η))(I− ρW00t )−1 INβk,
(5.11)
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where η = (I − ρW00t )−1(δW01t Zt + X0t β) denotes the vector of predicted
values of Y0t .
6
The first matrix on the right-hand side of this equation is a diagonal mat-
rix of order N whose elements φi represent the probability that the depend-
ent variable takes its observed value, dependent on the observed values of
the other units in the sample. For this reason, each observation has its own
mean and variance. Define the matrixΠ asΠ = ηη′, piij as the (i, j)th element
of Π, Π−ii as the (N − 1)× (N − 1) matrix that is obtained after removing
both row and column i, and pi−i as the ith row vector and pii− as the ith
column vector removed fromΠ. Then φi (i = 1, . . . , n) evaluates the normal
probability density function for the observed value of yi, which is either 0 or
1, with mean µi +pi−iΠ−1−ii(yi − µi) and variance piii −pi−iΠ−1−iipii−.
The second matrix on the right-hand side is an N × N matrix whose di-
agonal elements represent the impact on the dependent variable of unit 1
up to N if the kth explanatory variable in the own unit changes, while its
off-diagonal elements represent the impact on the dependent variable if the
kth explanatory variable in another unit changes. The first is called a direct
effect and the second an indirect or spatial spillover effect. Since both the dir-
ect and indirect effects are different for different units in the sample, the
presentation of these effects is a problem. If we have N spatial units and K
explanatory variables, we obtain K different N × N matrices of direct and
indirect effects. LeSage and Pace (2009) therefore propose to report one dir-
ect effect measured by the average of the diagonal elements of the matrix on
the right-hand side of Equation (5.11), and one indirect effect measured by
the average of either the row sums or the column sums of the non-diagonal
elements of that matrix. Since the numerical magnitudes of these two cal-
culations of the indirect effect are the same, it does not matter which one is
used. Usually, the indirect effect is interpreted as the impact of changing a
particular element of an exogenous variable on the dependent variable of all
other units, which corresponds to the average column effect. In contrast to
LeSage et al. (2011) and other studies in the spatial econometrics literature,
6 A similar expression applies to the explanatory variable W01t Zt with the coefficient δ.
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the right-hand side of our model is not independent of time. To obtain one
summary indicator for the direct and indirect effects of every explanatory
variable in the model, we propose to also average the outcomes over time.
The standard errors and t-values of the direct and indirect effects’ estim-
ates are more difficult to determine, because they depend on βk, ρ and the
elements of the spatial weights matrix W00t in a rather complicated way. In
order to draw inferences regarding the statistical significance of the direct
and indirect effects, LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 39) suggest simulating the
distribution of the direct and indirect effects using the variance-covariance
matrix implied by the maximum likelihood estimates. If the full parameter
vector θ = (ρ, δ, β′)′ is drawn D times from N(θˆ, AsyVar(θˆ)), the standard
deviation of each summary indicator can be approximated by the standard
deviation of the mean value over these D draws, and the significance by
dividing each summary indicator by the estimated corresponding standard
deviation.
5.4 Data description
We apply our model to the analysis of IT adoption. While Chapter 3 exam-
ines the factors leading to IT adoption, this study focuses on spatial interac-
tions between countries in their choice to adopt IT. The research questions
are: (i) do endogenous interaction effects influence the probability of coun-
tries to adopt IT and (ii) do the explanatory variables of IT adoption cause
significant spatial spillover effects?
In our analysis, we assume that in each time period (year) a country can
be in one of two possible states: state 1 corresponds to the implementation
of IT, while state 0 corresponds to an alternative, non-IT strategy. We are
interested in estimating the probability of transition from non-IT to IT, i.e.
from state 0 to state 1.
Our panel dataset is the same as in Chapter 3 and consists of 58 countries
over the period 1985–2008; coincidentally, 29 countries adopted IT during
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this period and 29 countries did not (see Table 3.1).7 We use official adoption
dates based on central banks’ announcements.
To examine the sensitivity of results to the choice of spatial weights
matrices and also to control for different dimensions of proximity between
countries (such as institutional, socio-cultural, and geographical proximity),
we use three specifications of a spatial weights matrix:
1) Common legal origin. An important measure of institutional proximity
is common legal tradition. Countries with similar legal origins are stronger
connected with each other and more inclined to follow similar policy choices.
We adopt the legal similarity weights matrix in which the weights are equal
to 1 if countries i and j have the same origin of the legal system, and 0 oth-
erwise. The data on legal systems is based on La Porta et al. (1999) who
distinguish English, French, German, Scandinavian, and socialist legal ori-
gins.
2) Common language. A particular country may be willing to adopt IT if
it is implemented by other countries with similar cultural and social back-
ground. As a measure of socio-cultural proximity, we use a spatial weights
matrix with weights equal to 1 if countries i and j share a common lan-
guage, and 0 otherwise. Data on countries’ official languages are taken from
the CIA World Factbook.
3) Ten-nearest neighbors. To control for geographical proximity between
countries, we adopt the spatial weights matrix in which the elements are
equal to 1 if country j belongs to the ten nearest neighbors of country i in
the sample, and 0 otherwise.
In all the analyzed spatial weights matrices the diagonal elements are set
to zero. The weights matrices are row-normalized before they are split into
submatrices. In addition, the submatrix W00t is row-normalized for every
time period.
The matrix X includes six explanatory variables that may affect coun-
tries’ decision to adopt IT, namely: inflation, output growth, the flexible ex-
7 In this chapter we exclude Armenia and Sudan from the dataset due to the limited data
availability for these two countries.
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change rate regime dummy, government debt, financial development and
central bank instrument independence. Table B.1 in the Annex describes the
explanatory variables and their data sources.8 The dataset is not complete;
the percentage of missing observations on the different explanatory vari-
ables ranges from 1% to 13% of all observations. In order to have a complete
dataset, an imputation technique is used for filling in missing observations.9
All explanatory variables are included in the model with a one-year lag, sim-
ilarly to the approach used in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
5.5 Estimation results
Table 5.1 reports the estimation results. We record the coefficient estimates
and their t-statistics for three specifications of the spatial probit model and
three spatial weights matrices.
Column (1) of Table 5.1 presents the estimation results for the standard
spatial lag probit model when pooling the cross-sectional data over time.
This model can be obtained from Equation (5.4) by adding a subscript t
(t = 1, . . . , T) to the variables and the error terms of that equation. This
model is similar to the one employed in Mukherjee and Singer (2008) for
their analysis of IT adoption. We find that the coefficient estimate ρ of the en-
dogenous interaction effects is positive and significant for all spatial weights
matrices, while Mukherjee and Singer (2008) report a positive but insignific-
ant result. One explanation is that we use data over a longer time period,
1985–2008 versus 1987–2003 in Mukherjee and Singer (2008). The findings
for two variables used in their study and ours — exchange rate regime and
central bank independence — are comparable, while the result for inflation
is different, both in terms of the sign and significance of the estimate.
8 Note that in this chapter we use a slightly different definition of financial development,
measured as domestic credit provided by the banking sector/GDP. The data for this variable
is provided by WDI World Bank. The data for this financial development proxy was available
for more countries than for the proxy used in Chapter 3.
9 We apply the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm for missing values imputation,
proposed by Dempster et al. (1977) and described in e.g. Schafer (1997). For the description
of the imputation procedure, see Chapter 2, pp. 27-28.
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Column (2) shows the estimation results for our spatial probit model
with two spatially lagged variables and a full set of regressors. The results
suggest that the coefficients of both spatial terms are insignificant for the
ten-nearest neighbors’ and common language weights matrices, while for
the common legal origin matrix the coefficient of the first spatial term (ρ) is
significant with a positive sign. Note that the value of the log-likelihood is
much higher in our specification compared to Column (1).
The estimation of our spatial probit model may also suffer from the
potential temporal dependency problem, similar to discrete-time duration
models. This means that the probability of a country to adopt IT in year
t may depend on the duration of the non-IT period, i.e., the time that has
passed from the start of the sample period until the IT adoption date. Ignor-
ing temporal dependence may lead to inefficiency and inaccurate statistical
inference (Beck et al., 1998). To correct for temporal dependence, we con-
struct a duration variable that counts the number of years from the start of
the sample period until the IT adoption date.10
Column (3) reports the estimation results when the duration variable is
added as a regressor to our spatial probit model. Importantly, the coefficient
estimate of the duration variable turns out to be significant with a posit-
ive sign, implying that the longer is the non-IT period, the more likely are
countries to adopt IT. Hence, this specification of our spatial probit model is
preferred.
The results are sensitive to the choice of a spatial weights matrix. For
the common legal origin weights matrix, the coefficient estimate of the en-
dogenous interaction effect in Column (3), ρ, is significant with a positive
sign. This indicates that countries that adopt IT in the current period have a
positive effect on the probability of other countries to take the same decision
in that period. Thus, countries follow the IT adoption decisions of countries
which are institutionally proximate to them. The coefficient estimate of the
spatial interaction effect with countries that already adopted IT before the
10 Alternatively, one could generate a set of time dummies that mark each non-IT duration
period. However, including 24 dummies leads to a substantial loss of degrees of freedom
and a substantial increase of computation time.
Spatial interactions in inflation targeting adoption 101
Table 5.1. Estimation results - spatial lag probit
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Standard spatial probit Our spatial probit ... with duration variable
Common legal origins weights matrix
ρ 0.482 (9.86) *** 0.262 (2.00)** 0.471 (5.41)***
δ 0.391 (0.90) −0.532 (−0.93)
Inflation −6.033 (−6.58) *** −3.153 (−2.23)** −1.167 (−1.27)
Output growth 0.010 (0.63) −0.067 (−2.50)** −0.040 (−1.68)*
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.879 (8.18) *** 0.798 (4.23)*** 0.677 (3.61)***
Government debt 0.0001 (0.07) −0.005 (−1.48) −0.005 (−1.45)
Financial development −0.228 (−2.90) *** −0.481 (−2.57)** −0.275 (−1.63)
Central bank instrument independence 1.028 (10.19) *** 0.435 (2.39)** 0.141 (0.71)
Constant −0.094 (−13.49) *** −0.898 (−2.45)** −1.042 (−3.11)***
Duration of non-IT period 0.042 (2.14)**
Log-likelihood -366.20 -110.97 -110.49
Common language weights matrix
ρ 0.196 (2.82) *** 0.116 (1.25) −0.036 (−0.37)
δ −0.186 (−0.41) −1.351 (−1.99)**
Inflation −7.433 (−7.59) *** −3.613 (−2.51)** −3.816 (−2.78)***
Output growth 0.001 (0.05) −0.063 (−2.44)** −0.097 (−3.51)***
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.887 (8.12) *** 0.804 (4.19)*** 0.893 (4.45)***
Government debt −0.002 (−1.13) −0.003 (−1.03) −0.006 (−1.71)*
Financial development −0.274 (−3.29) *** −0.469 (−2.41)** −0.515 (−2.65)***
Central bank instrument independence 0.916 (9.31) *** 0.373 (2.06)** 0.066 (0.32)
Constant −0.103 (−13.14) *** −1.185 (−3.80)*** −1.729 (−4.73)***
Duration of non-IT period 0.077 (3.32)***
Log-likelihood -391.55 -112.86 -106.86
Ten-nearest neighbors’ weights matrix
ρ 0.123 (1.68) * 0.024 (0.19) −0.092 (−0.71)
δ 0.041 (0.09) −0.689 (−1.16)
Inflation −7.289 (−7.46) *** −3.583 (−2.35)** −4.179 (−2.33)**
Output growth −0.002 (−0.10) −0.065 (−2.48)** −0.078 (−2.76)***
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.838 (7.86) *** 0.729 (3.96)*** 0.802 (4.16)***
Government debt −0.002 (−1.35) −0.005 (−1.50) −0.005 (−1.69)*
Financial development −0.254 (−3.02) *** −0.476 (−2.35)** −0.377 (−1.94)*
Central bank instrument independence 0.941 (9.47) *** 0.347 (1.80)* 0.217 (1.09)
Constant −0.102 (−12.71) *** −1.205 (−3.36)*** −2.057 (−4.62)***
Duration of non-IT period 0.070 (2.85)***
Log-likelihood -394.15 -113.83 -107.59
Observations 1334 1069 1069
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and their t-values (in parentheses). ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Column (1) shows the results for a
standard spatial lag probit model, column (2) for our spatial probit model, while column (3) extends
the model by controlling for temporal dependence.
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current period (δ) is insignificant with a negative sign.
For the common language weights matrix ρ is insignificant, but δ be-
comes significant with a negative sign in the model with the duration vari-
able. There are several explanations for this negative spatial interaction ef-
fect. An intuitive explanation for the negative sign of δ is that more countries
adopt IT as time elapses, as a result of which there are less countries in the
sample left that did not transfer yet. Therefore, over time the probability to
adopt IT becomes lower as the number of neighboring (culturally proxim-
ate) countries that can decide to switch, diminishes. Another explanation is
that the explanatory variables of countries that did and did not yet adopt
IT take different values and are treated differently. Whereas the explanatory
variables are part of the model for the latter group of countries, they are
not for the former group since observations on these countries are removed
from the sample after adoption. Consequently, the impact these countries
have on countries that are still considering IT only runs through the spatial
interaction coefficient, which therefore also captures the effect of any value
changes in these explanatory variables.
For the ten-nearest neighbors’ weights matrix, both spatial interaction
effects are insignificant. Apparently, geographical distance does not play a
role when we analyze spatial interactions between countries in their mone-
tary strategy choice. This also follows from the year when different coun-
tries adopted IT. For instance, countries that adopted IT in 2001, namely
Hungary, Iceland, Mexico, and Norway, are anything but close neighbors to
each other. Conversely, countries that are close neighbors to each other, like
the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, adopted IT
in various years (see Table 3.1). Thus, in the analysis of spatial interdepend-
ence between countries, non-geographical measures of proximity could be
more useful in explaining why countries interact with each other.
Additionally, we find that countries with lower inflation, lower output
growth, more flexible exchange rate regimes, and lower government debt
are more likely to adopt IT. Financial system development has a negative
and significant (in most of estimated models) impact on the probability to
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adopt IT, while the estimate for central bank instrument independence is
significant with a positive sign (except for models with the duration vari-
able). It should be noted that differences between these variables in the pre-
and post-adoption periods affect the magnitude of the spatial interaction
coefficient too, which therefore should be interpreted as the net effect of all
value changes in all explanatory variables between these two periods.
Direct and indirect effects
Table 5.2 shows the effects of changes in explanatory variables on the prob-
ability of a particular country to adopt IT (direct effects), as well as the spa-
tial spillover effects of explanatory variables on neighboring (proximate)
countries (indirect effects) and the sum (total effects) for the three models
of Table 5.1. We calculate these effects for the models using a spatial weights
matrix based on common legal origins since for this matrix the estimate of ρ
is significant.
Four explanatory variables produce significant direct and indirect ef-
fects in the standard spatial probit model (inflation, exchange rate regime,
financial development, and central bank instrument independence). In our
spatial model specifications several direct effects are significant. The spa-
tial probit model (2) shows no signs of spatial spillover effects. However,
including a duration variable in our model (3) leads to the significance of
indirect effects for three variables — exchange rate regime, duration of non-
IT period and number of countries that already adopted IT (Zt). Thus, the
fewer countries have already adopted IT, the longer is the non-IT period
and the more flexible is the exchange rate regime of a particular country, the
higher is the probability of other (proximate) countries to adopt IT.
Importantly, direct and indirect effects of inflation in model (1) are lar-
ger in size than their counterparts in models (2) and (3). These results are in
line with Chapter 4, which also shows that the marginal effect of inflation
on the probability of IT adoption is largely overestimated in the model in-
cluding the post-adoption period compared to the one without this period.
The standard spatial probit model (1), similarly to the restricted model in
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Table 5.2. Direct, indirect and total effects for common legal origins matrix
Variables Direct effects Indirect effects (×10−2) Total effects
(1) Standard spatial probit
Inflation −1.177 *** −1.296 *** −1.190 ***
(−8.25) (−6.60) (−8.26)
Output growth 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.77) (0.75) (0.77)
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.168 *** 0.187 *** 0.170 ***
(7.58) (5.03) (7.55)
Government debt 0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.08) (−0.06) (−0.08)
Financial development −0.043 *** −0.048 *** −0.044 ***
(−3.11) (−2.79) (−3.11)
Central bank instrument independence 0.198 *** 0.220 *** 0.200 ***
(9.88) (5.01) (9.79)
(2) Our spatial probit
Countries that already adopted IT (Zt) −0.103 ** −0.054 −0.103 **
(−2.40) (−1.55) (−2.40)
Inflation −0.391 * −0.220 −0.393 *
(−1.84) (−1.23) (−1.83)
Output growth −0.008 ** −0.005 −0.009 **
(−2.22) (−1.29) (−2.21)
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.105 ** 0.061 0.106 **
(2.54) (1.34) (2.52)
Government debt −0.001 0.000 −0.001
(−1.41) (−1.04) (−1.40)
Financial development −0.062 ** −0.035 −0.062 **
(−2.09) (−1.32) (−2.08)
Central bank instrument independence 0.057 * 0.032 0.057 *
(1.82) (1.25) (1.82)
(3) Our spatial probit with a duration variable
Countries that already adopted IT (Zt) −0.251 *** −0.205 ** −0.253 ***
(−3.01) (−2.47) (−3.01)
Inflation −0.249 −0.199 −0.251
(−1.19) (−1.09) (−1.19)
Output growth −0.009 * −0.007 −0.009 *
(−1.85) (−1.62) (−1.85)
Flexible exchange rate regime 0.159 *** 0.133 ** 0.161 ***
(3.23) (2.42) (3.22)
Government debt −0.001 0.000 −0.001
(−1.30) (−1.18) (−1.29)
Financial development −0.058 −0.049 −0.059
(−1.41) (−1.29) (−1.41)
Central bank instrument independence 0.036 0.031 0.036
(0.91) (0.85) (0.91)
Duration of non-IT period 0.010 ** 0.008 * 0.010 **
(1.88) (0.50) (1.61)
Notes: This table reports direct, indirect, and total effects with t-values (in parentheses) for models
(1), (2), and (3) as in Table 5.1. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance
level, respectively.
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Chapter 4, uses the full sample for the analysis and retains observations on
countries after IT adoption. The estimated direct effect of inflation in model
(1) is equal to -1.18. Meanwhile, in our spatial probit models (2) and (3) we
remove observations on countries after they adopt IT. It leads to a drop in
the size of the direct effect of inflation to -0.10 in model (2) and -0.25 in model
(3). These results are consistent with the findings in Chapters 3 and 4.11
Note that we report the direct and indirect effects on the probability to
adopt IT, i.e. Pr(yit = 1). Once we consider the willingness to adopt IT,
represented by the latent variable y∗it, instead of the probability, the newly
calculated direct and especially spatial spillover effects become much larger
in absolute values. Thus, the impact of changes in explanatory variables on
the willingness of a particular country as well as other countries to adopt IT
is stronger than the impact on their probability to adopt. These results are
available on request.
5.6 Conclusion
The analysis of spatial interactions between countries in their choice to ad-
opt IT has not received much attention in the literature. This chapter adds
the spatial econometric aspect into the empirical investigation of IT adop-
tion. We propose a novel approach to the analysis of spatial interdepend-
ence by developing a spatial probit model with two spatially lagged vari-
ables, one for countries that did not adopt IT yet, and one for countries that
already adopted it. The empirical model is estimated by maximum likeli-
hood methods, using the Recursive-Importance-Sampling simulator to eval-
uate the truncated multidimensional normal distribution.
The outcomes are sensitive to the choice of the spatial weights matrix.
Most notably, we find that countries that adopt IT in the current period in-
crease the probability of other countries with similar legal origins to adopt
it as well. Thus, the endogenous interaction effects are found significant.
11 Note that in Chapters 3 and 4 the estimated effect of inflation is between -0.30 and -0.50.
The differences in the size could be due to the fact that in this chapter we use a modified
dataset of Chapter 3 and include only six explanatory variables.
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Meanwhile, for the common language weights matrix, the results suggest
that countries that already adopted IT before the current period have a sig-
nificant negative effect on others to adopt. In addition, we find several sig-
nificant direct and indirect effects in our model specifications. The latter im-
plies that the explanatory variables for a particular country have a signific-
ant spillover effect on the probability of other countries to adopt IT.
Chapter 6
Inflation targeting and inflation
performance∗
6.1 Introduction
Twenty years after New Zealand adopted inflation targeting (IT), its pros
and cons are still discussed in the economic literature (Roger, 2009; Walsh,
2009; De Carvalho Filho, 2010). Proponents of IT consider it an attractive mo-
netary strategy, arguing that it will lead to lower and less variable inflation
and will increase the credibility of the central bank. These alleged benefits
have been examined in several studies, often concluding that IT countries
experienced a larger decrease in inflation than non-IT countries. However,
Ball and Sheridan (2004) argue that these studies suffer from an endogeneity
bias, as countries struggling with high inflation are far more likely to ad-
opt IT. Controlling for this regression-to-the-mean effect, Ball and Sheridan
(2004) conclude that the adoption of IT has no impact on inflation in their
sample of advanced countries. In an update of this research, Ball (2010) finds
a significant but small effect, while Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and
Willard (2012) do not find a significant impact of IT on inflation.
Some recent studies focusing on emerging countries report a significant
effect of IT on inflation. Gemayel et al. (2011), for example, conclude that
∗This chapter is based upon Samarina et al. (2014).
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IT reduces inflation in low-income economies. Gonc¸alves and Salles (2008)
and De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012) report similar results
for a set of emerging and developing countries. In short, the literature has
not reached a consensus on the effect of IT on macroeconomic performance.
Additionally, it is difficult to compare the results between the studies as each
uses different country samples, time periods, IT adoption dates, and meth-
odologies.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine to what extent results of previ-
ous studies are driven by particular choices that have to be made in this line
of empirical research, such as the sample of countries, IT adoption date, es-
timation period and methodology applied, in order to test the robustness of
these results. This study adds to the existing literature by providing a com-
prehensive robustness analysis of IT effects on inflation performance. Spe-
cifically, we examine how the sample composition, the estimation period,
and the dating of IT introduction influence the results of this research. Mo-
reover, to explore whether conclusions depend on the choice of a particu-
lar methodological approach, we apply two completely different estimation
techniques, which have been widely used in previous studies, namely the
difference-in-differences method and propensity score matching. Our sam-
ple consists of 25 advanced and 59 emerging and developing countries over
the period 1985–2011.
Our findings suggest that distinguishing countries by economic devel-
opment is crucial, as no effect of IT is found for advanced countries, whereas
the results indicate a significant impact of IT on inflation reduction in emer-
ging and developing countries. Moreover, our results are robust to the choice
of the econometric method.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 offers a liter-
ature review, while sections 6.3 and 6.4 describe the methodology and data,
respectively. Section 6.5 presents the empirical results and section 6.6 con-
cludes.
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6.2 Literature review
Countries that adopted IT generally saw their inflation decline. However,
previous research has not led to a consensus on whether this lower inflation
is due to IT or external factors. For instance, the global trend of decreas-
ing inflation may be responsible for most of the decline in inflation in IT
countries. Apart from some case studies, most previous studies on IT effects
have used three econometric methods, namely: a difference-in-differences
approach, a propensity score matching method, and panel estimations.
Early studies adopting a difference-in-differences approach, such as Neu-
mann and von Hagen (2002), found that IT reduced the mean and the vari-
ance of inflation. However, these studies ignored the possibility of endo-
geneity: the initial level of inflation affects the likelihood that a country will
adopt IT. Hence, research that does not test for these initial conditions is
likely to produce biased results. Ball and Sheridan (2004) were the first to
tackle this problem by adding initial conditions as an explanatory variable.
This led to very different results: the initial level of inflation explains most
of the decline of inflation, while IT has no additional significant effect. In
an update of this research, Ball (2010) finds that IT results in a significant
reduction in inflation, but the effect is relatively small.
Vega and Winkelried (2005), Lin and Ye (2007), and De Mendonc¸a and
de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012) solve the endogeneity issue in a different way
by applying the propensity score matching method. This method compares
countries that had similar initial conditions whereas one adopted IT and
the other did not. Lin and Ye (2007) and De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e
Souza (2012) find no significant effect of IT on inflation in advanced coun-
tries, but using a larger and more diverse sample Vega and Winkelried (2005)
report opposite results.
Finally, some studies based on panel estimations conclude that although
IT countries have lower inflation and output volatility after their change of
monetary policy strategy, they have not performed better than non-inflation
targeters (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Willard, 2012).
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Although most findings of the studies discussed above are not support-
ive of IT, it is important to note that these studies focus on advanced coun-
tries. More recent studies recognize this and perform similar analyses on a
sample of emerging economies. Batini and Laxton (2006) report that IT has
a significant effect on the fall of inflation, but they make the caveat that only
a short time has elapsed since the implementation of IT in most emerging
economies. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) also include emerging and
developing economies in their sample and find no effect of IT when they
compare IT countries with a sample of non-IT OECD countries. The authors
argue that this makes their results more stringent as their control group is
at the ”international frontier of macroeconomic management and perform-
ance” (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007, p. 4) and it will raise the stakes
against IT. More recently, Gonc¸alves and Salles (2008) apply a difference-in-
differences analysis to a larger sample of emerging economies; their results
show a significant effect of IT on the decline of inflation as well as its volat-
ility. However, Ball (2010) criticizes this study by questioning the dating of
IT adoption, the range of time series used, and the way periods of hyperin-
flation are treated.
Lin and Ye (2009) and De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012)
use propensity score matching and find strong evidence that IT reduces
inflation and its volatility in emerging and developing countries. Finally,
Gemayel et al. (2011) examine the performance of IT for low-income coun-
tries; they find a significant impact of IT on inflation decrease. However, as
they admit themselves, the sample of low-income countries is too small to
draw reliable conclusions, as only Ghana and Armenia adopted IT, while
Albania, Moldova, and Georgia are moving towards it. Unlike other stud-
ies, Brito and Bystedt (2010) apply a different technique — a dynamic panel
estimator — and find that IT reduces inflation in emerging economies, but
this result is not robust to the variations in the control group.
It is worth mentioning that all the discussed studies have one common
shortcoming, namely treating IT choice as binary. That is, they assume that
countries either adopt IT or do not adopt IT; hence, they do not distinguish














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































between differences in IT regimes based on the number of targets, the central
bank’s objectives or transparency in communication of monetary strategy.
Unfortunately, so far there is no comprehensive IT index for all IT countries
available in the literature that would differentiate between IT regimes based
on various criteria.1 This remains a task for future research.
To conclude, as summarized in Table 6.1, recent empirical studies find
very contrasting results regarding the effects of IT on inflation performance.
Blinder et al. (2008) point out that the selection of the control group is of ut-
most importance in this line of research. Unfortunately, not all studies take
this issue carefully into account. Previous research is also inconsistent in se-
lecting the adoption dates of IT and often does not examine whether the
choice of a particular date affects the outcomes. Nor do previous studies
investigate to what extent results are driven by the choice of a particular
method, notably difference-in-differences versus propensity scoring. This
chapter aims to improve upon these shortcomings. In contrast to previous
studies, we also include the years of the Global Financial Crisis (2008–2010),




Our first estimation technique is the difference-in-differences method. Fol-
lowing Ball and Sheridan (2004), initial inflation is included as an explanat-
ory variable to take regression-to-the-mean into account. Regression-to-the-
mean happens if poorly performing countries converge to the mean per-
formance regardless of the implemented policies. At the same time, poor
1 Note that the use of a complex IT index would require a modification of the estimation
techniques (such as propensity score matching and difference-in-differences method) to al-
low for a multinomial IT variable instead of a dummy, which is quite difficult. This could
explain why a non-binary IT variable has not been used so far in the analysis of IT effects.
We follow previous studies and use an IT dummy. By examining to what extent issues such
as adoption date affect the results we hope to capture at least to some extent that IT is more
complex than a binary state of the world.
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performers are also more motivated to adopt new monetary policy strate-
gies in order to improve their inflation performance, resulting in biased es-
timates. This might occur in our analysis, since the sample of non-inflation
targeters has a higher mean inflation rate before adoption than the sample
of inflation targeters. We take this into account and estimate the following
equation:2
(pii,post − pii,pre) = α+ β1pii,pre + β2 ITi + ε i; i = 1, . . . , N, (6.1)
where pii,pre denotes average inflation of country i in the period before IT
adoption, while pii,post is average inflation in the post-adoption period. The
left-hand side of Equation (6.1) shows the change in inflation between the
periods after IT adoption and before adoption; α is a constant term; β1 and
β2 are parameters to be estimated; ITi is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if country i adopted IT, and 0 otherwise. If IT adoption leads
to lower inflation, β2 is negative. To control for regression-to-the-mean, we
include initial inflation pii,pre as an independent variable. Finally, ε i is an
error term with mean zero and variance σ2ε . The model is estimated using
OLS for cross-sectional data.
6.3.2 Propensity Score Matching method
The difference-in-differences technique has some important drawbacks. First,
it does not deal with selection bias, which appears due to the arbitrary
choice of countries for the control group of non-IT countries (De Mendonc¸a
and de Guimara˜es e Souza, 2012). Another important issue is endogeneity
of IT choice. The decision of countries to adopt IT is not exogenous but is
driven by various macroeconomic, financial, institutional, and other factors.
Moreover, self-selection of IT adoption may lead to wrong conclusions about
the actual effects of IT on inflation. For instance, in Chapter 3 we find that
countries with lower past inflation are more likely to adopt IT. Not surpris-
ingly, it could be found that inflation targeters have lower inflation after
2 See Batini and Laxton (2006) for more details about the model.
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adoption than non-inflation targeters. To deal with the self-selection prob-
lem and endogeneity of IT, we apply the Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
framework, which has been used by Vega and Winkelried (2005), Lin and Ye
(2007, 2009), and De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012).
The PSM technique involves a two-step procedure.3 First, we estimate
the propensity score, which measures the conditional probability to adopt
IT given countries’ pre-adoption characteristics. This probability is specified
as follows:
p(X) = Pr(D = 1|X) = E(D|X), (6.2)
where D = {0, 1} is a treatment (IT) dummy that takes value 1 if a country
chooses IT, and 0 otherwise; X is a matrix of the pre-adoption characteristics.
Propensity scores can be estimated by any probability model. We use the lo-
git model as it fits the data better than the probit model. Following previous
studies (Lin and Ye, 2009; De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza, 2012),
we choose such variables for the X matrix that satisfy the following condi-
tions: (i) they characterize the state of the country’s economy, (ii) they may
drive the decision to adopt IT, and (iii) they may influence average inflation.
Second, once the propensity score p(X) is known, the average effect of
treatment on the treated (ATT) is estimated as in Equation (6.3):
ATT ≡ E{Y1i −Y0i|Di = 1}
= E[E{Y1i|Di = 1, p(Xi)} − E{Y0i|Di = 0, p(Xi)}|Di = 1],
(6.3)
where Y1 and Y0 are potential inflation outcomes in two counterfactual situ-
ations: with the treatment (IT applied) and without (IT not applied), respect-
ively. In order to evaluate Equation (6.3) given Equation (6.2), two condi-
tions need to be satisfied:
I. The Balancing Hypothesis: observations with the same propensity score
should have the same distribution of observable (and unobservable) charac-
3 The PSM methodology employed in this paper is based on the description of Becker and
Ichino (2002), Dehejia and Wahba (2002), and De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza
(2012).
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teristics independently of the treatment status: D ⊥ X|p(X) . To test the Bal-
ancing Hypothesis we apply the following algorithm of Becker and Ichino
(2002) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002):
1. Fit the logit (probit) model with a parsimonious specification that in-
cludes all covariates as linear terms.
2. Split the sample into k equally spaced intervals of the propensity score.
3. Within each interval, test whether the means of covariates do not dif-
fer significantly between treated and control units.
4. If the means of all covariates do not differ, the balancing property is
satisfied.
5. If the means of one or more covariates differ for some interval, divide
the interval into finer ones and re-evaluate.
6. If the means differ for many intervals, modify the model specification
by adding interaction terms and/or higher-order terms of covariates
and re-evaluate.
7. Repeat the algorithm until the balancing property is satisfied.
II. The Unconfoundedness Hypothesis: assume that the assignment to treat-
ment is unconfounded, such that:Y1,Y0 ⊥ D|X. Then, it implies thatY1,Y0 ⊥
D|p(X).4
To calculate the ATTs, we use the estimated propensity scores to match
the units from the treatment group (inflation targeters) with the most suit-
able units from the control group (non-inflation targeters) based on different
matching criteria. We apply four matching methods suggested in the liter-
ature: nearest-neighbor matching, radius matching, kernel matching, and
stratification matching (for details see Becker and Ichino (2002)). To test
sensitivity of the results, in radius matching we use three different radius
distances (r = 0.005; 0.02; 0.04), while in kernel matching the Gaussian and
Epanechnikov kernel functions are applied. Standard errors for the ATTs are
4 The Unconfoundedness Hypothesis cannot be tested.
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obtained by bootstrapping (see De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza
(2012) for a description of the bootstrapping procedure). 5
6.4 Data description
6.4.1 Country sample
Our dataset consists of 84 countries over the period 1985–2011, out of which
29 adopted IT during the period analyzed (the treatment group), while 55
countries did not adopt IT (the control group). Following the IMF classific-
ation, our sample contains 25 advanced and 59 emerging and developing
countries (see Table C.1 in the Annex for details)
The control group of non-inflation targeters is selected in the follow-
ing way. In the subsample of advanced countries we include 12 inflation
targeters, matched with 13 advanced non-inflation targeters, using OECD
membership as a criterion. In the subsample of emerging and developing
countries we include 17 inflation targeters. Following the approach of Rose
(2007) and Lin and Ye (2009), the control group for this subsample consists
of 42 emerging and developing countries that have a population at least as
large as the population of the smallest IT country, and/or GDP per capita
at least as high as GDP per capita of the poorest inflation targeter in this
subsample.
6.4.2 Data: Difference-in-differences method
For the difference-in-differences method we use quarterly observations start-
ing from the first quarter of 1985 until the last quarter of 2011. To measure
5 The third possible estimation technique is a dynamic panel model. However, it has been
rarely used in previous studies on the IT impact on inflation for several reasons. First, sim-
ilar to the difference-in-differences method, dynamic panel models do not address the prob-
lem of self-selection of countries adopting IT as well as the arbitrary choice of non-IT coun-
tries. Second, there are serious estimation issues in such models that are nontrivial to be
solved, such as the initial conditions problem, serial correlation in error terms, and selection
of valid, non-redundant instruments for model identification (Baltagi, 2008, Chapter 8). For
these reasons we do not apply dynamic panel models in this analysis.
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inflation, we use quarterly data on annualized CPI inflation rate from the In-
ternational Financial Statistics IMF database. Average inflation for the pre-
adoption period is calculated as the mean inflation from the start of the ana-
lyzed period until (and including) the last quarter before IT adoption. Aver-
age inflation for the post-adoption period is calculated as the mean inflation
starting from the first quarter of IT adoption until the end of the sample
period.
There is no agreement in the literature on the exact adoption dates of IT.
De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012) provide an up-to-date com-
parison of different adoption dates, mentioned in studies on IT. Authors use
different criteria for pinpointing the start of IT. For instance, Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) consider a country as an inflation targeter when the
inflation target is being gradually reduced towards a fixed, stationary level,
while Batini and Laxton (2006) recognize a country as an inflation targeter
when inflation is the single nominal anchor for monetary policy. Ball and
Sheridan (2004) claim that the choice of adoption dates does not influence
their results on the impact of IT on inflation. However, they do not provide
detailed results.
To test whether the effects of IT on inflation depend on the selection
of adoption dates, both for advanced and emerging and developing coun-
tries, we use two different dates: ’loose’ and ’strict’ adoption dates. ’Loose’
dates are the earliest known adoption dates, which often correspond to soft
IT, when countries simply announce inflation targets without strong com-
mitment to achieving them and use simultaneously other nominal anchors.
’Strict’ dates correspond to the latest known adoption dates of ’stable’ IT,
when a central bank uses a single, inflation target in monetary policy and
is credibly committed to reaching the target. Table 6.2 shows the adoption
dates used in this study. For some countries, the difference between both
dates is substantial.
In order to compare the performance of inflation targeters with non-
inflation targeters before and after the adoption, we need to select a ’cut-
off date’ for non-inflation targeters. Most of studies solve this problem by
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Table 6.2. Adoption dates of IT
Advanced countries Emerging and developing countries
Countries Loose IT Strict IT Countries Loose IT Strict IT
Australia 1993q1 1994q4 Brazil 1999q1 1999q3
Canada 1991q1 1995q1 Chile 1991q1 2001q1
Finland 1993q1 1994q1 Colombia 1991q1 1999q4
Iceland 2001q1 2003q1 Czech Republic 1998q1 1998q1
Israel 1992q1 1997q2 Ghana 2007q2 2007q2
Korea 1998q1 2001q1 Guatemala 2005q1 2005q1
New Zealand 1990q1 1993q1 Hungary 2001q1 2001q3
Norway 2001q1 2001q1 Indonesia 2005q1 2006q1
Spain 1994q1 1995q2 Mexico 1999q1 2001q1
Sweden 1993q1 1995q1 Peru 1994q1 2002q1
Switzerland 2000q1 2000q1 Philippines 2001q1 2002q1
United Kingdom 1992q1 1993q1 Poland 1998q1 1999q1
Romania 2005q3 2005q3
Slovakia 2005q1 2005q1
South Africa 2000q1 2001q1
Thailand 2000q1 2000q2
Turkey 2002q1 2006q1
Average 1994q4 1996q4 Average 2000q1 2002q2
Notes: Finland, Spain, and Slovakia abandoned IT after they adopted the euro in 1999,
1999, and 2009, respectively.
Sources: Ball (2010), Gemayel et al. (2011), De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza
(2012).
calculating the average adoption date for inflation targeters and use it as
the benchmark adoption date for non-inflation targeters. In this chapter we
apply a similar approach. We divide the sample into advanced, and emer-
ging and developing economies, since we conduct estimations separately
for these subsamples. For advanced countries the ’loose’ benchmark ad-
option date is the fourth quarter of 1994 and the ’strict’ date is the fourth
quarter of 1996. For emerging and developing economies the respective
benchmark dates are the first quarter of 2000 and the second quarter of 2002.
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We need to select a long time period to calculate the average inflation
before IT adoption and compare it with inflation for a similarly long period
after the adoption. The range of observations varies greatly in existing liter-
ature. Studies use time series that start in 1980, 1985 or 1990 (see Table 6.1).
Research focusing on advanced countries commonly uses earlier starting
dates than studies on emerging and developing economies, since advanced
countries adopted IT earlier than emerging and developing ones. To test for
the sensitivity of using different time horizons, we use two periods for each
subsample: observations starting in 1985 and 1990 for advanced countries
and observations starting in 1990 and 1996 for emerging and developing
countries.
6.4.3 Data: PSM method
For the PSM estimation, we use annual observations over 1985–2011. The
outcome variable is measured as the annual CPI inflation rate, from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. For IT adoption dates, we refer to
Table 6.2 and use the ’half-year rule’: if IT is adopted in the first or second
quarter of year t, the adoption year is t, if adopted in the third or fourth
quarter — the adoption year is (t + 1).
Based on previous studies that analyze the probability to adopt IT and
its effects on inflation (Lin and Ye, 2009; De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e
Souza, 2012; Samarina and de Haan, 2014), we select the following variables
that may drive IT choice: (1) one-year lagged CPI inflation rate6; (2) log of
real GDP per capita, in 2000 USD; (3) exchange rate regime indicator (ranges
between 1 and 15, higher values indicate more flexible exchange rates); (4)
broad money growth; (5) financial development (proxied as credit by bank-
ing sector to GDP); (6) government debt as percentage of GDP; (7) trade
openness (measured as export plus import as percentage of GDP); and (8)
financial openness (Chinn-Ito index of capital account liberalization). The
expected signs and motivation for the choice of these variables are described
6 To reduce the impact of extreme observations, the inflation rate is transformed as pi/1001+pi/100 .
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in De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012) and in Chapter 3 of this
thesis. Additionally, to control for time fixed effects in IT adoption, we in-
clude a time trend.
The data for these variables were collected from the following sources:
World Development Indicators, IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF
Historical Public Debt Database, Eurostat, national statistics, Ilzetzki et al.
(2011) based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) for exchange rate regimes, and
Chinn and Ito (2008) for the financial openness index.
To make our results from the PSM comparable with the difference-in-
differences method, we follow similar procedures. That is, we examine ad-
vanced countries, and emerging and developing countries separately. We
use for PSM two adoption dates (’loose’ and ’strict’) and two time periods
for each sample: 1985–2011 and 1990–2011 for advanced countries, 1990–
2011 and 1996–2011 for emerging and developing countries.
6.4.4 Descriptive statistics
The experience of IT and non-IT countries with inflation can be compared
by analyzing their time series. Figures 6.1 and 6.2-6.3 present the average
inflation rate in advanced countries and emerging and developing ones, re-
spectively. As Figure 6.1 shows, the average inflation rate of advanced IT
countries was higher than inflation in non-IT countries in the period 1985–
1989, but from 1990 it declined substantially over time. This trend is also ob-
servable after IT adoption. However, inflation has also decreased in non-IT
countries. It seems that average inflation in both country groups had con-
verged to a lower global mean before most countries adopted IT, suggesting
no substantial effect of this monetary strategy on inflation reduction. Ad-
ditionally, during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008–2010 average inflation
rates in both IT and non-IT countries have increased.
Figure 6.2 shows that average inflation in emerging and developing IT
countries has been higher than in non-IT countries before IT adoption, but
decreased after adoption. In this graph we exclude observations for coun-
tries that experienced hyperinflation, i.e. annual inflation rates over 50%, for
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Figure 6.1. Average inflation in advanced IT and non-IT countries, 1985–
2011
Figure 6.2. Average inflation in emerging and developing IT and non-IT
countries, 1990–2011 (excluding countries with hyperinflation)
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longer than a year. Figure 6.3 plots average inflation for all emerging and de-
veloping countries in our sample. Now we observe a more noticeable differ-
ence between IT and non-IT countries: the average inflation of emerging and
developing IT countries is lower than in non-IT countries throughout the
entire time period. The common feature of the graphs is that inflation rates
have converged globally, suggesting that regression-to-the-mean is strong.
Figure 6.3. Average inflation in emerging and developing IT and non-IT
countries, 1995–2011 (including countries with hyperinflation)
Note: In this graph we use the time period from 1995. During the years 1990–1994, average
inflation in emerging and developing countries was extremely high and in some quarters
reached over 1000%. Adding such high values in the graph would make the low values
indistinguishable.
Tables C.2-C.3 in the Annex present the descriptive statistics for aver-
age inflation and its volatility in IT and non-IT countries, calculated for the
pre- and post-adoption periods. Advanced inflation targeters show a larger
decline of average inflation than non-inflation targeters; however, they also
had higher inflation before IT adoption (see Table C.2). Similar results are
found for average inflation volatility in advanced countries. Opposite find-
ings are reported for emerging and developing countries (see Table C.3).
Here, average inflation level and its volatility declined more in the group of
non-inflation targeters, which are also characterized by higher initial infla-
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Columns (1)-(4) of Table 6.3 present the estimation results for advanced
countries. We estimate Equation 6.1 for two periods (1985–2011 and 1990–
2011) and two adoption dates (’loose’ and ’strict’). The residuals diagnostics
do not suggest the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error terms. This
could be explained by the high degree of homogeneity within the group of
advanced countries as well as a small number of observations in the ana-
lyzed sample (Ball, 2010). Hence, we use OLS standard errors.
Our findings suggest that, regardless of the chosen time period and ad-
option dates, the coefficient estimate of IT dummy is insignificant. Thus, IT
does not have a significant effect on inflation in advanced countries. Mo-
reover, the positive sign of β2 implies that advanced inflation targeters ex-
perienced a smaller decline in inflation than non-inflation targeters. Appar-
ently, the largest contribution to the inflation decrease can be subscribed to
regression-to-the-mean, as the initial inflation is significant with a negative
sign. This implies that inflation would have decreased in IT countries even
if they had not applied IT. The results are robust to different time periods
and adoption dates.
We compare our results to Ball and Sheridan (2004), since their study is
the closest to ours in terms of methodology and sample. Our findings differ
from Ball and Sheridan (2004) mainly in the sign of the IT dummy. They find
that IT has a negative, although insignificant, effect on the inflation reduc-
tion. The difference in findings could be due to the choice of the analyzed
time period — in our study the period is 10 years longer than in Ball and
Sheridan (2004) and includes the years of the recent financial crisis. Addi-
tionally, our study includes five more advanced IT countries.
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Table 6.3. Difference-in-differences estimation results for advanced coun-
tries
(1) (2) (3) (4) Ball and Sheridan (2004), p. 258
Sample period 1985–2011 1990–2011 1985–2001
Adoption dates Loose Strict Loose Strict Non-constanta Constanta
IT dummy 0.267 0.294 0.400 0.363 −0.550 −0.510
(0.434) (0.444) (0.438) (0.418) (0.350) (0.340)
Initial inflation −0.948 *** −0.961 *** −0.823 *** −0.866 *** −0.780 *** −0.760 ***
(0.016) (0.026) (0.054) (0.067) (0.070) (0.070)
Constant 1.882 *** 1.879 *** 1.300 *** 1.502 *** 1.120 *** 1.010 ***
(0.301) (0.318) (0.386) (0.397) (0.320) (0.330)
Observations 25 25 24 25 20 20
R2 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.88 0.90 0.87
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses). ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
a Non-constant and constant adoption dates in Ball and Sheridan (2004) are similar to ’loose’ and
’strict’ adoption dates, respectively, used in this chapter.
To check whether the results are sensitive to sample modifications, we
perform two robustness tests. First, we exclude Spain and Finland from the
sample, as they abandoned IT in 1999 in order to adopt the euro. Second,
instead of dropping both countries completely, we only discard their ob-
servations from the first quarter of 1999. Both robustness checks produce
qualitatively similar results to those reported in Table 6.3 (results available
on request).
This analysis has shown that for advanced countries IT does not have
a significant effect on inflation reduction in IT countries, compared to non-
inflation targeters.
Emerging and developing countries
Similar models are estimated for the sample of emerging and developing
countries. We use two estimation periods (1990–2011 and 1996–2011) and
two adoption dates (’loose’ and ’strict’).
Since several emerging and developing countries experienced periods of
hyperinflation (especially Latin American and transition economies), these
observations can influence the results substantially. Two approaches can be
used to deal with this issue. The most common approach is to remove the
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high-inflation countries completely from the estimation. The other method
suggested in the literature (Gonc¸alves and Salles, 2008) is to only remove the
observations with exceptionally high inflation in such countries and replace
them with the average inflation of more stable periods. Although Gonc¸alves
and Salles (2008) acknowledge some selection problems with this method,
they see it as inevitable since their sample decreases so dramatically if they
remove all observations for high-inflation countries, that they cannot pro-
duce reliable results. Ball (2010) criticizes this method because it is unclear
how it affects the estimation results.
We follow the first approach and estimate the models separately for the
full sample including high-inflation countries (Table 6.4) and for the sample
without these countries (Table 6.5). In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the
models are estimated with robust (White-corrected) standard errors.
Table 6.4 presents the estimation results with all 59 emerging and devel-
oping countries included. The coefficient of the IT dummy has a negative
sign in all the models, suggesting that emerging and developing IT coun-
tries experienced a larger decline in inflation compared to non-IT counter-
parts. The coefficient of β2 is also much larger than for advanced countries.
Moreover, in the estimations for ’strict’ adoption dates the IT dummy is sig-
nificant, indicating that IT implementation significantly reduces inflation in
emerging and developing countries. However, this effect becomes insigni-
ficant once we consider ’loose’ adoption dates. Regression-to-the-mean is
evident here as well, since the initial inflation level has a significant impact
on the decline of inflation over time.
Our results are in line with those of Batini and Laxton (2006), Gonc¸alves
and Salles (2008), and Gemayel et al. (2011) who also find a significant im-
pact of IT on inflation decline in emerging and developing countries.
Turning to the estimation results excluding the high-inflation countries7,
Table 6.5 shows that the coefficient of the IT dummy is significant with a neg-
ative sign in most models. In addition, the initial inflation level is significant
with a negative sign in all estimations. This result suggests that IT indeed
7 See Table C.1 in the Annex for the countries concerned.
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Table 6.4. Difference-in-differences estimation results for emerging and
developing countries, full sample
Gonc¸alves and Gemayel
(1) (2) (3) (4) Salles (2008) et al. (2011)
Table 2, Table 2,
model 3 model 5
Sample period 1990–2011 1996–2011 1990–2005 1990–2008
Adoption dates Loose Strict Loose Strict
IT dummy −3.085 −2.612 ** −1.694 −2.070 ** −1.990* −1.620 *
(2.069) (1.115) (1.288) (0.964) (0.980)
Initial inflation −0.994 *** −0.996 *** −0.960 *** −0.976 *** −0.710*** −0.780 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.070)
Constant 8.580 *** 7.594 *** 7.392 *** 7.197 *** 2.230* 4.640 ***
(1.104) (0.819) (0.995) (0.744) (1.010)
Observations 59 59 56 59 36 39
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.86 0.78
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates and their robust (White-corrected) standard errors (in
parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
Table 6.5. Difference-in-differences estimation results for emerging and
developing countries, without countries with hyperinflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) Gemayel et al. (2011)
Table 2, models 1,3
Sample period 1990–2011 1996–2011 1990–2008 1996–2008
Adoption dates Loose Strict Loose Strict
IT dummy −1.340 −2.340 ** −1.442 * −2.775 *** −1.960 * −2.210 *
(0.950) (0.998) (0.856) (0.786) (1.050) (0.870)
Initial inflation −0.668 *** −0.689 *** −0.699 *** −0.643 *** −0.730 *** −0.790 ***
(0.076) (0.107) (0.079) (0.090) (0.090) (0.080)
Constant 2.232 *** 3.179 *** 3.617 *** 4.104 *** 3.90 *** 5.45 ***
(0.782) (1.012) (0.804) (0.869) (1.110) (0.930)
Observations 32 32 45 48 26 38
R2 0.81 0.75 0.74 0.68 0.76 0.75
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates and their robust (White-corrected) standard errors (in
parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
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contributed to inflation reduction in emerging and developing countries.
The IT dummy is only insignificant for ’loose’ adoption dates in the period
1990–2011, indicating that results are somewhat sensitive to the choice of
adoption dates.
Similarly to the analysis for advanced countries, we take into account
that one country in the sample of emerging and developing economies,
Slovakia, abandoned IT in 2009 in order to adopt the euro. We perform sens-
itivity tests by excluding Slovakia from the sample as well as by dropping
its observations from 2009. These modifications do not influence our main
results (available on request).
To conclude, we find evidence that IT implementation significantly re-
duces inflation in emerging and developing countries. Once we exclude
countries with hyperinflation, the effects of IT on inflation performance in
emerging and developing countries become more pronounced.
6.5.2 Propensity Score Matching method
Advanced countries
We conduct the analysis for two adoption dates (’loose’ and ’strict’) and two
periods (1985–2011 and 1990–2011). Table 6.8 presents the estimation results
of the propensity scores for the sample of advanced countries. We exclude
broad money growth from the set of covariates, as it is insignificant in all
models. The chosen model specifications satisfy the Balancing Hypothesis.
We find that advanced countries with lower GDP per capita, more flex-
ible exchange rate regimes, lower financial development, and higher trade
openness are more likely to choose IT. The coefficient of the time trend is sig-
nificant with a positive sign, indicating that as time passes, the probability
of a country to adopt IT increases. Other variables are not significant. Our
findings differ from Lin and Ye (2007) who report negative and significant
coefficient estimates of lagged inflation and trade openness. Such a differ-
ence in results could be due to the fact that the authors examine advanced
countries during 1985–1999, while our analyzed period is extended until
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Table 6.6. Estimates of the treatment effect on inflation, advanced coun-
tries
Matching methods
Adoption Nearest- Radius, Radius, Radius, Kernel, Kernel, Stratification
dates neighbor r = 0.005 r = 0.02 r = 0.04 Gaussian Epanechn.
1985–2011
Loose −0.093 −0.615 −0.837 ** −0.801 ** −0.030 −0.126 −0.034
(0.604) (0.477) (0.348) (0.325) (0.420) (0.349) (0.308)
Strict −1.216 −0.704 * −0.518 * −0.580 ** −0.527 −0.742 −0.370
(0.830) (0.420) (0.288) (0.243) (0.631) (0.688) (0.588)
1990–2011
Loose −0.114 0.105 −0.069 −0.071 −0.090 −0.293 −0.091
(0.619) (0.489) (0.340) (0.290) (0.408) (0.358) (0.360)
Strict −0.521 −0.346 −0.399 −0.353 −0.489 −0.616 −0.299
(0.874) (0.396) (0.276) (0.246) (0.670) (0.741) (0.568)
Notes: The 0.06 fixed bandwidth is used for Epanechnikov and Gaussian kernels. Bootstrapped stand-
ard errors (based on 1000 replications of the data) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
2011. Our conclusions differ also from De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e
Souza (2012) for some variables, possibly because they estimate propensity
scores for all countries together.
Table 6.6 reports the estimated ATTs on the level of inflation. Our find-
ings suggest that in most cases, regardless of the time period and adoption
dates, the ATTs are insignificant. This holds in all estimations for nearest-
neighbor, kernel, and stratification matching. Interestingly, for the period
1985–2011 the effect of IT on inflation is negative and significant for all three
radiuses. However, these effects become insignificant once wider radiuses
are used.8 Our findings for the ATTs are comparable to the results of Lin
and Ye (2007) and De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012).
We conduct sensitivity tests by excluding Spain and Finland from the
sample as well as by discarding their observations from 1999. Both modific-
ations produce similar results to the main ones.
8 As a robustness check, we applied radius matching with r = 0.05; 0.075; 0.1. All the estim-
ated ATTs were insignificant. These results are available on request.
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Emerging and developing countries
A similar PSM estimation procedure is applied for emerging and develop-
ing countries. We use again two periods (1990–2011 and 1996–2011) and two
adoption dates (’loose’ and ’strict’). Additionally, to take into account the
hyperinflation episodes in some countries, we conduct the PSM separately
for the sample with high-inflation countries and without these countries.
Table 6.8 reports the logit estimates of the propensity scores. We exclude fin-
ancial development, since it was insignificant; also, the model specification
without this variable satisfies the Balancing Hypothesis.
Our findings from the propensity score estimations suggest that emer-
ging and developing countries with lower past inflation, higher GDP per
capita, more flexible exchange rate regimes, lower money growth, lower
government debt, lower trade openness, and higher financial openness are
more likely to adopt IT. Additionally, the time trend is significant with a
positive sign. The results are robust to the exclusion of high-inflation coun-
tries. These findings are consistent with the results of Lin and Ye (2009) and
De Mendonc¸a and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012).
Table 6.7 presents the estimated ATTs on the level of inflation. For the full
sample, the ATTs are all found to be statistically significant and negative, for
all adoption dates and time periods. For the sample without high-inflation
countries the ATTs are also significant with a negative sign in most of ap-
plied matching methods. However, for ’strict’ dates in the period 1990–2011
only the ATT from stratification matching is significant.
We perform a sensitivity analysis by excluding Slovakia from the sample
as well as by dropping its observations from 2009. These modifications do
not change the main results.
Our estimated results of the ATTs for emerging and developing coun-
tries are in line with the findings of Lin and Ye (2009) and De Mendonc¸a and
de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012). We find strong evidence that IT significantly
reduces inflation in emerging and developing countries. These outcomes re-
main robust to different adoption dates, time periods analyzed as well as
sample modifications.
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Table 6.7. Estimates of the treatment effect on inflation, emerging and de-
veloping countries
Matching methods
Adoption Nearest- Radius, Radius, Radius, Kernel, Kernel, Stratification
dates neighbor r = 0.005 r = 0.02 r = 0.04 Gaussian Epanechn.
Full sample
1990–2011
Loose −3.618 ** −3.676 *** −4.165 *** −4.322 *** −5.118 *** −5.251 *** −5.572 ***
(1.838) (1.071) (0.792) (0.675) (1.013) (1.208) (1.287)
Strict −3.298 ** −2.724 *** −2.699 *** −2.761 *** −3.360 *** −2.986 *** −2.972 ***
(1.568) (0.803) (0.527) (0.446) (1.010) (1.155) (0.806)
1996–2011
Loose −7.954 *** −3.056 *** −3.113 *** −2.884 *** −5.675 *** −5.847 *** −5.475 ***
(2.284) (0.980) (0.682) (0.602) (1.441) (1.721) (1.694)
Strict −3.475 * −2.566 *** −2.733 *** −2.707 *** −3.691 *** −3.209 ** −3.164 ***
(1.832) (0.621) (0.532) (0.472) (1.206) (1.322) (0.926)
Without countries with hyperinflation
1990–2011
Loose −10.728 ** −0.556 −1.650 * −1.755 ** −6.233 ** −7.712 ** −9.813 **
(4.762) (1.332) (0.978) (0.884) (2.916) (3.299) (4.539)
Strict −1.712 −1.249 −1.115 −1.054 −1.936 −0.402 −1.629 ***
(1.864) (1.359) (0.843) (0.713) (1.386) (1.037) (0.622)
1996–2011
Loose −2.303 −1.653 ** −1.907 *** −1.957 *** −2.804 ** −2.436 * −2.685 ***
(2.036) (0.806) (0.525) (0.499) (1.217) (1.362) (0.753)
Strict −4.720 *** −2.639 *** −2.539 *** −2.382 *** −2.590 *** −2.863 *** −2.706 ***
(1.239) (0.817) (0.546) (0.498) (0.839) (0.868) (0.790)
Notes: The 0.06 fixed bandwidth is used for Epanechnikov and Gaussian kernels. Bootstrapped stand-
ard errors (based on 1000 replications of the data) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Thus, both estimation techniques — difference-in-differences and PSM
— yield similar results in terms of the effect of IT on inflation. The general
observation from the empirical analysis is that while IT has no significant
influence on inflation reduction in advanced countries, it contributes sub-
stantially to decreasing inflation in emerging and developing economies.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter conducts a comprehensive robustness analysis of IT effects on
inflation. We examine to what extent the outcomes are sensitive to the choice
of country samples, time periods, and IT adoption dates. In doing so, we
use as large a sample as possible and carefully select countries included in











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the control group. Moreover, we apply two methodological approaches —
the difference-in-differences technique and the PSM method — to check the
robustness of our conclusions to the method used. Both approaches produce
qualitatively similar results.
We find that there is a large difference between country samples. IT has
no impact on inflation in advanced countries, while it significantly reduces
inflation in emerging and developing countries. A possible explanation for
this difference is that emerging and developing countries lacked credibility
in monetary policy conduct. The decision to adopt IT in such economies
signaled a strong commitment of monetary authorities to achieving price
stability. As a result, credibility of central banks increased, which helped to
anchor inflation expectations.
Another reason why the results for emerging and developing countries
may differ is that advanced countries represent a more homogenous group
in terms of their characteristics and performance. In contrast, emerging and
developing countries are a very heterogeneous group with more diverse
initial conditions. For instance, some countries experienced hyperinflation.
Dropping these countries makes the negative impact of IT on inflation in




This empirical thesis focuses on two monetary policy strategies, namely mo-
netary targeting and inflation targeting. In particular, the thesis addresses
the following four research questions:
1. Do financial system changes affect the decision to abandon monetary
targeting?
2. Which determinants drive inflation targeting adoption?
3. How do spatial interactions between countries influence the decision
to adopt inflation targeting?
4. Does inflation targeting influence inflation and does this impact vary
across countries?
Chapter 2 answers the first research question and examines how fin-
ancial system reforms and characteristics affect the likelihood of countries
to abandon monetary targeting. Additionally, we include macroeconomic,
fiscal, external, and institutional control variables associated with countries’
decisions to leave this monetary strategy. Our findings suggest that coun-
tries with liberalized, deregulated, developed, and dollarized financial sys-
tems are more likely to abandon monetary targeting. Moreover, the exchange
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rate regime in place affects the probability to give up monetary targeting
conditional on the level of capital mobility. In line with the policy trilemma
hypothesis, our results show that countries with limited capital mobility
can use money growth targets and keep fixed exchange rates at the same
time. However, when capital mobility is high, a fixed exchange rate regime
is incompatible with monetary targeting. Additionally, we find that more
developed countries with lower inflation and larger fiscal deficits are more
likely to abandon monetary targeting. Importantly, the outcomes for emer-
ging and developing countries differ from those for advanced economies.
In particular, financial dollarization increases the probability to leave mo-
netary targeting in advanced countries, whereas financial development is
significant in emerging and developing countries. Financial liberalization
has a significant impact in advanced as well as emerging and developing
countries.
Chapter 3 addresses the second research question by investigating which
economic, fiscal, external, financial, and institutional factors affect the like-
lihood to adopt inflation targeting. The novelty of our approach is in ex-
cluding the post-adoption period from the empirical analysis. The results
suggest that countries with low inflation, high output and exchange rate
volatility, a flexible exchange rate regime, and lower government debt are
more likely to adopt inflation targeting. In addition, countries with less de-
veloped financial markets and a market-based financial system are more
likely to adopt this strategy. The outcomes differ slightly between soft and
full-fledged inflation targeting adoption; inflation is found less important
for adopting soft than for full-fledged inflation targeting. As a robustness
check, we distinguish two types of inflation targeting based on the number
of nominal targets — inflation targeting with multiple targets and inflation
targeting with a single, inflation target. We find that different explanatory
variables affect the probability to adopt different types of inflation targeting.
Additionally, the probability to switch from inflation targeting with multiple
targets to inflation targeting with a single target is affected by lower infla-
tion and output growth, better fiscal discipline and flexible exchange rate
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regimes. Finally, our sensitivity analysis shows that the factors leading to in-
flation targeting adoption differ between OECD and non-OECD countries.
This result can be explained by the fact that there are substantial differences
between these country groups in terms of their macroeconomic character-
istics, credibility of their central banks, and monetary policy objectives.
Chapter 4 provides further evidence on the factors of inflation targeting
adoption. We test whether country characteristics influence the decision to
apply inflation targeting differently before and after its adoption. We use a
structural break analysis and include a smooth transition function to distin-
guish between the pre- and post-adoption periods. The findings suggest that
there is a structural change in economic and institutional characteristics oc-
curring during and after adoption. The factors leading to inflation targeting
adoption differ significantly between the periods before and after adoption.
Inflation has the most prominent role, as its effect on the probability to ad-
opt inflation targeting is largely overestimated in the model that includes
the post-adoption period compared to the one without this period. Thus,
including the post-adoption period in the empirical analysis of inflation tar-
geting adoption produces biased results. To eliminate this bias it is necessary
to discard observations after adoption, as was done in Chapters 3 and 5.
Chapter 5 adds a spatial econometric aspect into the analysis of inflation
targeting adoption. We construct a spatial probit model with two spatially
lagged variables, one for countries that did not adopt inflation targeting yet
at the start of the period and one for countries that already adopted this
strategy. Three spatial weights matrix specifications are used: ten-nearest
neighbors, common language, and common legal origins. We find that the
estimation results are sensitive to the choice of the spatial weights matrix.
For the common language weights matrix, the interaction effects with coun-
tries that adopt inflation targeting in the current period are insignificant,
while the countries that already adopted it have a significant negative im-
pact on others to adopt. A possible explanation for this negative impact is
that over time the probability to adopt inflation targeting decreases as the
number of neighboring countries that did not adopt yet diminishes. For the
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spatial weight matrix based on common legal origins, we find that coun-
tries which adopt inflation targeting in the current period significantly in-
crease the probability of others to adopt this strategy in the same period.
For the ten-nearest neighbors’ spatial weights matrix, both spatial terms are
insignificant. Additionally, we find evidence for spatial spillover effects of
countries’ characteristics on inflation targeting adoption.
Chapter 6 addresses the final research question in an extensive analysis
of the effects of inflation targeting on inflation. We examine the sample of ad-
vanced and emerging and developing countries separately, using two differ-
ent adoption dates (’loose’ and ’strict’) and two time periods for each sam-
ple. To explore whether outcomes depend on the choice of methodology, we
apply two estimation techniques — difference-in-differences and propensity
score matching. The estimation results differ substantially between country
samples. Inflation targeting has no significant effect on inflation in advanced
countries, while it significantly decreases inflation in emerging and devel-
oping countries. Moreover, excluding high-inflation countries from the lat-
ter sample enhances the negative impact of inflation targeting. Addition-
ally, the outcomes are sensitive to the choice of adoption dates. Finally, both
methodological approaches arrive at similar conclusions.
7.2 Policy implications
The findings of this thesis have several policy implications. First, the ana-
lyses of monetary targeting abandonment and inflation targeting adoption
have shown that financial system characteristics play an important role in
the choice of a monetary policy strategy. In the aftermath of the Global Fin-
ancial Crisis 2008–2010, many central banks started modifying their mone-
tary policy frameworks to combine the objective of price stability with the
goal of financial stability. Given that at present having low and stable in-
flation is less of a problem for advanced countries, more emphasis is put
on adjusting monetary policy strategies to deal with financial system imbal-
ances. In this light, financial system characteristics matter for the monetary
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strategy choice.
As for monetary targeting, our findings suggest that financial system
changes contribute to the abandonment of monetary targeting. These res-
ults are relevant mainly for emerging and developing countries that are still
using this strategy. Such countries are going through the financial evolu-
tion processes that include deregulation, liberalization, and development.
In these circumstances, they may soon experience increasing instability of
money demand that makes monetary targeting ineffective in reaching its
objectives. Thus, it is recommended for emerging and developing countries,
which apply monetary targeting, to identify and monitor the changes in
their financial systems that may lead to countries’ decision to leave mone-
tary targeting.
Second, the analysis of inflation targeting adoption suggests that the
factors leading to adoption differ between OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries. In the pre-adoption period, non-OECD countries have higher infla-
tion and financial instability, worse fiscal discipline, and lower central bank
independence than OECD countries. Therefore, emerging and developing
(non-OECD) countries, which consider implementing inflation targeting in
the future, are recommended to prepare well for adoption through improv-
ing their macroeconomic performance, financial markets, fiscal discipline,
and institutional framework. Additionally, given that many emerging and
developing countries suffer from high inflation before adoption, they are
advised first to adopt a soft version of inflation targeting (with multiple tar-
gets) that involves less commitment to the inflation target, but at the same
time signals to the public the long-term goal to achieve price stability. Once
this strategy succeeds in bringing down inflation to sustainable levels and
increasing credibility of central banks, it is possible to switch to full-fledged
inflation targeting with a strong commitment to the single, inflation target.
Finally, the institutional framework of a central bank and its communic-
ation strategy matter for the conduct of monetary policy and its effective-
ness. Establishing a strong commitment to a nominal target (money growth
or inflation) is crucial for achieving price stability and enhancing credibility
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of monetary authorities. Central bank independence matters, too. Although
we did not find that central bank independence drives the adoption of in-
flation targeting, it is the case that institutions improve only after adoption.
Apparently, some countries consider adopting inflation targeting as a start-
ing point of economic and institutional reforms (Hammond, 2012), which
will lead to better macroeconomic performance and monetary policy con-
duct. A very important institutional aspect is also transparency of a central
bank in communicating its strategy to the public. Opaque communication
of monetary policy-making reduces the central bank’s credibility and makes
it difficult to achieve its objectives. To conclude, central banks are recom-
mended to improve their institutional framework and communication for
effective implementation of any monetary policy strategy.
7.3 Directions for future research
There are several possible directions for future research in the area of mo-
netary policy strategies. Chapter 5 proposed a spatial probit model with
two spatially lagged variables. However, this chapter focused mainly on the
methodological innovation, which was supplemented with an illustration
for inflation targeting adoption. In future work, it would be worth to extend
this study by conducting a full-fledged analysis of spatial interactions in in-
flation targeting adoption. The robustness of results could be tested by using
different adoption dates, country samples, a larger set of explanatory vari-
ables as well as various spatial weights matrices that control for economic,
financial, political, and other dimensions of proximity between countries.
In Chapter 6 we mention that one shortcoming of the literature on in-
flation targeting adoption and performance is that inflation targeting choice
is being treated as binary. That is, the existing studies do not consider that
there can be more than one type of inflation targeting. Given that the frame-
work of inflation targeting regimes differs from country to country, future
research could concentrate on constructing a comprehensive inflation tar-
geting index that would take into account such criteria as the number of
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nominal targets used in monetary strategy, the time horizon of the inflation
target, central bank’s objectives, or transparency in communication of mo-
netary strategy. Having such a multinomial index could bring new insights
into the analysis of inflation targeting adoption and the impact of different
inflation targeting regimes on macroeconomic performance.
Next, the study of monetary policy strategies could be further extended
by examining the timing of inflation targeting (and other strategies) adop-
tion and the impact of this adoption on monetary policy conduct. For this
purpose, regime-switching models could be used. Petreski (2011) and Creel
and Hubert (2013) apply Markov-switching VAR models to analyze whether
inflation targeting adoption constitutes the switch in monetary policy con-
duct for, respectively, nine emerging and eight advanced countries. How-
ever, Markov switching models treat the change in a regime as a rapid switch,
whereas the transition to a different monetary strategy is rather a gradual
process, which needs time for adjusting economic and institutional funda-
mentals to the new framework. Thus, it would be worth to examine the
changes of monetary strategies by applying a methodological approach that
allows for slow transition, namely smooth transition autoregressive models.
In several chapters we emphasize inflation as a crucial factor driving
inflation targeting adoption and a major focus of this strategy. However,
given that many advanced countries have already achieved low inflation,
they might choose to apply inflation targeting not to control the level of
inflation, but rather to decrease inflation volatility. Thus, it would be inter-
esting to incorporate inflation volatility into the analysis of adoption and
performance of inflation targeting (and other monetary strategies), in future
research.
This thesis investigated different monetary policy strategies separately.
In future research, it would be interesting to analyze all monetary policy
strategies simultaneously, using e.g. multinomial choice models.
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Table A.2. Correlation matrix (full sample)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Financial liberalization 1.00
2 Financial deregulation 0.48 1.00
3 Financial development 0.52 0.21 1.00
4 Financial dollarization -0.30 0.00 -0.30 1.00
5 GDP per capita (ln) 0.62 0.27 0.73 -0.54 1.00
6 Inflation -0.36 -0.25 -0.37 0.06 -0.32 1.00
7 Exchange rate regime 0.15 0.14 0.17 -0.12 0.13 0.19 1.00
8 Money growth volatility -0.15 -0.01 -0.26 0.11 -0.25 0.51 0.16 1.00
9 Trade openness -0.24 0.23 -0.36 0.40 -0.34 0.17 -0.11 0.24 1.00
10 Fiscal balance 0.20 0.39 0.09 0.08 0.16 -0.25 -0.07 -0.15 0.11 1.00
11 Central bank 0.64 0.46 0.38 -0.25 0.49 -0.33 0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.18 1.00
independence
Note: Numbers in bold indicate correlation coefficients that are significant at the 5 % significance
level.
Table A.3. Correlation matrix (MT-’leavers’)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Financial liberalization 1.00
2 Financial deregulation 0.55 1.00
3 Financial development 0.58 0.34 1.00
4 Financial dollarization -0.16 0.06 -0.11 1.00
5 GDP per capita (ln) 0.66 0.36 0.63 -0.35 1.00
6 Inflation -0.45 -0.30 -0.41 0.05 -0.40 1.00
7 Exchange rate regime 0.13 0.07 0.24 -0.07 0.07 0.17 1.00
8 Money growth volatility -0.19 -0.05 -0.27 0.15 -0.32 0.59 0.15 1.00
9 Trade openness -0.29 0.24 -0.39 0.41 -0.42 0.21 -0.10 0.27 1.00
10 Fiscal balance 0.26 0.41 0.10 0.13 0.21 -0.26 -0.07 -0.19 0.22 1.00
11 Central bank 0.70 0.51 0.33 -0.20 0.49 -0.32 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.16 1.00
independence































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.3. Panel unit root tests
ADF-Fisher PP-Fisher
Statistic P-value Statistic P-value
Inflation 335.97 0.00 441.46 0.00
Output growth 326.67 0.00 343.47 0.00
Output volatility 427.96 0.00 484.27 0.00
Exchange rate volatility 528.81 0.00 553.50 0.00
Fiscal balance 278.12 0.00 284.65 0.00
Government debt 491.17 0.00 591.97 0.00
Trade openness 348.88 0.00 370.69 0.00
External debt 272.15 0.00 291.47 0.00
Financial development 153.49 0.01 96.18 0.94
Economic development 743.72 0.00 588.55 0.00
Financial openness 92.19 0.36 114.38 0.06
Notes: The Table reports Fisher-type panel unit root tests for all explanatory variables, ex-
cept dummies. We use both ADF and PP (Phillips-Perron) tests. The PP test is robust to
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The automatic selection of lags is based on the
Schwartz criterion. We include individual intercepts to control for level differences bet-
ween the cross-sections. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
chi-square distribution. P-value < 0.05 indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of a
common unit root on the 5% significance level and suggests that a particular variable is
stationary.
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Table C.1. Country sample
Advanced countries (25)
Inflation targeters (12) Non-inflation targeters (13)
Australia New Zealand Austria Italy
Canada Norway Belgium Japan
Finland Spain Denmark Luxemburg
Iceland Sweden France Netherlands
Israel Switzerland Germany Portugal
Korea United Kingdom Greece United States
Ireland
Emerging and developing countries (59)
Inflation targeters (17) Non-inflation targeters (42)
Brazil# Peru# Albania# Egypt Pakistan
Chile Philippines Algeria El Salvador Panama
Colombia Poland# Angola# Honduras Paraguay
Czech Republic Romania# Argentina# Hong Kong Russia#
Ghana# Slovakia Armenia# India Serbia#
Guatemala South Africa Azerbaijan# Iran Singapore
Hungary Thailand Belarus# Jordan Slovenia
Indonesia Turkey# Bolivia Kazakhstan# Sri Lanka
Mexico Bulgaria# Latvia# Sudan#
China Lithuania# Tunisia
Costa Rica Malaysia Ukraine#
Croatia# Mongolia# Uruguay#
Dominican Rep.# Morocco Vietnam
Ecuador# Nigeria# Venezuela#
Note: # Countries with hyperinflation.
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Table C.2. Descriptive statistics, advanced countries, 1985–2011
Country Variable Pre-adoption Post-adoption Difference
group period period
’Loose’ adoption dates
IT Average inflation level 11.59 2.75 −8.84
Average inflation volatility 12.63 1.74 −10.90
Non-IT Average inflation level 4.80 2.13 −2.97
Average inflation volatility 1.65 1.12 −0.53
’Strict’ adoption dates
IT Average inflation level 8.85 2.52 −6.33
Average inflation volatility 10.78 1.47 −9.31
Non-IT Average inflation level 4.40 2.05 −2.35
Average inflation volatility 1.76 1.07 −0.69
Table C.3. Descriptive statistics, emerging and developing countries, 1990–
2011
Country Variable Pre-adoption Post-adoption Difference
group period period
’Loose’ adoption dates
IT Average inflation level 209.71 6.73 −202.98
Average inflation volatility 301.85 4.10 −297.75
Non-IT Average inflation level 227.25 9.91 −217.34
Average inflation volatility 493.32 8.82 −484.50
’Strict’ adoption dates
IT Average inflation level 126.56 5.50 −121.06
Average inflation volatility 234.67 2.43 −232.24
Non-IT Average inflation level 176.57 8.32 −168.25
Average inflation volatility 438.97 5.26 −433.71
Samenvatting∗
Dit proefschrift concentreert zich op twee monetaire beleidstrategie¨en, mo-
netary targeting en inflation targeting. Het proefschrift behandelt de volgende
vier onderzoeksvragen:
1. Hebben veranderingen in financie¨le systemen invloed op de beslissing
om afstand te doen van monetary targeting?
2. Welke determinanten zijn belangrijk bij het aannemen van inflation tar-
geting?
3. Hoe beı¨nvloeden ruimtelijke interacties tussen landen de beslissing
om over te gaan tot inflation targeting?
4. Heeft inflation targeting effect op inflatie en verschilt het effect tussen
landen?
Hoofdstuk 2 beantwoordt de eerste onderzoeksvraag en onderzoekt hoe
hervormingen in en eigenschappen van financie¨le systemen de waarschijn-
lijkheid beı¨nvloeden dat landen afstand doen van monetary targeting. Hier-
bij houden we rekening met macroeconomische, fiscale, externe, en insti-
tutionele controlevariabelen die samenhangen met de beslissing van lan-
den om deze monetaire strategie te verlaten. Onze bevindingen suggereren
dat landen met geliberaliseerde, gedereguleerde, ontwikkelde, en gedollari-
seerde financie¨le systemen de strategie van monetary targeting eerder achter
zich zullen laten. Bovendien beı¨nvloedt het heersende wisselkoersregime de
∗ I thank Jan Jacobs for translating the summary.
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kans om monetary targeting op te geven afhankelijk van het niveau van ka-
pitaalmobiliteit. In overeenstemming met de policy trilemma hypothese laten
onze resultaten ook zien dat landen met beperkte kapitaalmobiliteit geld-
groeidoelen kunnen haneren en tegelijkertijd vaste wisselkoersen kunnen
behouden. Echter, bij een hoge kapitaalmobiliteit is een regime van vaste
wisselkoersen onverenigbaar met monetary targeting. We vinden bovendien
dat meer ontwikkelde landen met vrij lage inflatie en hoge begrotingste-
korten monetary targeting eerder zullen verlaten. De uitkomsten voor opko-
mende – en ontwikkelingslanden verschillen van die voor ontwikkelde lan-
den. Financie¨le dollarisatie verhoogt de kans op het verlaten van monetary
targeting in ontwikkelde landen, terwijl financie¨le ontwikkeling belangrijk is
in opkomende – en ontwikkelingslanden. Financie¨le liberalisatie speelt een
significante rol zowel in ontwikkelde als ontwikkelingslanden.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op de tweede onderzoeksvraag door te onderzoe-
ken welke economisch, fiscale, externe, financie¨le, en institutionele factoren
de waarschijnlijkheid beı¨nvloeden dat inflation targeting wordt aangenomen.
De noviteit van onze aanpak is het uitsluiten van de periode na de adoptie in
de empirische analyse. De resultaten suggereren dat landen met lage infla-
tie, hoge productie en wisselkoersvolatiliteit, een systeem van flexibele wis-
selkoersen en vrij lage overheidsschuld eerder inflation targeting zullen aan-
nemen. Landen met minder goed ontwikkelde financı¨ele markten en een op
de markt gebaseerd financie¨el system zullen deze strategie ook eerder aan-
nemen. De uitkomsten tussen het aannemen van soft inflation targeting en
full-fledged inflation targeting verschillen enigzins. Inflatie is minder belang-
rijk bij het aannemen van soft inflation targeting dan bij full-fledged inflation
targeting. Om de robustheid te controleren, onderscheiden we twee vormen
van inflation targeting — inflation targeting met meerdere doelen en inflation
targeting met slechts e´e´n doel, inflatie. We vinden dat verschillende verkla-
rende variabelen de kans beı¨nvloeden verschillende vormen van inflation
targeting aan te nemen. Bovendien wordt de kans om over te stappen van
inflation targeting met meerdere doelen naar inflation targeting met e´e´n doel
beı¨nvloed door lagere inflatie en groei, betere fiscale discipline en flexibele
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wisselkoersen. Ten slotte, onze gevoeligheidsanalyses laten zien dat facto-
ren die leiden tot het aannemen van inflation targeting verschillen tussen
landen binnen en buiten de OESO. Deze uitkomst kan worden verklaard
uit het bestaan van aanzienlijke verschillen tussen deze groepen van landen
in termen van macroeconomische karakteristieken, geloofwaardigheid van
hun centrale banken, en doelstellingen van monetair beleid.
Hoofdstuk 4 verschaft aanvullende informatie over de factoren achter
het aannemen van inflation targeting. We toetsen of karakteristieken van lan-
den de beslissing om inflation targeting aan te nemen vo´o´r en na de adop-
tie anders beı¨nvloeden. We gebruiken een structurele breukanalyse met een
geleidelijke transitiefunctie om de periodes vo´o´r en na de adoptie te onder-
scheiden. De uitkomsten suggereren dat er een structurele verandering in
economische en institutionele karakteristieken optreedt in de periode vo´o´r
en na de adoptie. Inflatie speelt de meest prominente rol; het effect van infla-
tie op de kans dat inflation targeting wordt aangenomen wordt zwaar over-
schat in het model waarin de periode na de adoptie is meegenomen ver-
geleken met het model zonder deze periode. Oftewel, het opnemen van de
periode na adoptie in de empirische analyse van het aannemen van inflation
targeting leidt tot vertekende uitkomsten. Om deze vertekening eruit te ha-
len, is het noodzakelijk observaties van na de adoptie van inflation targeting
te negeren, zoals is gedaan in de Hoofdstukken 3 en 5.
Hoofdstuk 5 voegt een ruimtelijke econometrische dimensie toe aan de
analyse van inflation targeting. We construeren een ruimtelijk probit model
met twee ruimtelijk vertraagde variabelen, e´e´n voor landen die aan het be-
gin van de periode nog niet zijn overgegaan op inflation targeting en e´e´n voor
landen die de overgang al wel hebben gemaakt. Drie ruimtelijke gewichten-
matrices zijn gebruikt, gebaseerd op de tien naaste buurlanden, gemeen-
schappelijke taal, en gemeenschappelijke juridische oorsprong. De schat-
tingsuitkomsten zijn gevoelig voor de keuze van de ruimtelijke gewichten-
matrix. Bij de gewichtenmatrix gebaseerd op het hebben van een gemeen-
schappelijke taal spelen interactie effecten met landen die al zijn overge-
gaan op inflation targeting in de lopende periode geen rol, terwijl landen die
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al eerder zijn overgegaan een negatieve invloed hebben op andere landen
die de strategie willen aannemen. Een mogelijke verklaring voor dit nega-
tieve effect is dat de kans op het overgaan op inflation targeting in de loop
van de tijd afneemt omdat het aantal landen dat nog niet is overgegaan
kleiner wordt. Voor de ruimtelijke gewichtenmatrix gebaseerd op een ge-
meenschappelijke juridische oorsprong vinden we dat landen die inflation
targeting aannemen in de lopende periode de kans dat andere landen deze
strategie aannemen in dezelfde periode aanzienlijk verhogen. Gebruiken we
de gewichtenmatrix gebaseerd op de tien naaste buurlanden dan zijn beide
ruimtelijke variabelen significant. Bovendien vinden we bewijs voor ruim-
telijke overloopeffecten van karakteristieken van landen op het aannemen
van inflation targeting.
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt de laatste onderzoeksvraag door middel van een
uitgebreide analyse van de effecten van inflation targeting op inflatie. We on-
derzoeken de groepen van ontwikkelde landen en opkomende – en ont-
wikkelingslanden afzonderlijk, gebruikmakend van twee adoptietijdstip-
pen (‘loose’ en ‘strict’) en twee schattingsperioden. Om te achterhalen of
uitkomsten afhangen van de keuze van de methodologie passen we twee
schattingstechnieken toe — difference-in-differences en propensity score mat-
ching. De schattingsuitkomsten tussen de groepen van landen verschillen
aanzienlijk. Inflation targeting heeft geen significant effect op inflatie in ont-
wikkelde landen, terwijl het inflatie significant verlaagd in opkomende – en
ontwikkelingslanden. Echter, het uitsluiten van landen met hoge inflatie van
de laatste groep versterkt de negatieve invloed van inflation targeting. Boven-
dien zijn de uitkomsten gevoelig voor de keuze van het adoptietijdstip. Ten
slotte, beide methodologische benaderingen leiden tot dezelfde conclusies.
